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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation uncovers how select multiethnic American literatures imagine 
minoritarian subjectivity that is not premised on categories of nationalism or American mythos 
of agency, but rather privilege non-Western humanist subject-formation processes. Given their 
outlying position in the American literary canon, multiethnic, interracial texts have the capacity 
to engage not only alternative frameworks of subject formation, but also specifically humanist 
frames – meaning, encounters of inclusion that occur because of a reciprocal recognition of a 
shared condition of being. Investigating narratives of interethnic reception, this project 
illuminates how some modes of being, such as suffering and joy, illustrate a new humanism 
predicated on radical empathy. Employing an archive of narrative works that range from Barack 
Obama’s Dreams of My Father (1995) to Monique Truong’s Bitter in the Mouth (2010), 
alongside texts such as Karen Tei Yamashita’s Through the Arc of the Rainforest (1990), this 
dissertation shows how minority subjectivities can be cultivated beyond the domain of settler 
agendas: how, for example, ethnic difference incites cross-cultural dignity, not racial 
subjugation; or how militaristic violence heralds guardianship amongst its victims, not reactive 
hatred. Ultimately, this narrative methodology works to undermine mechanisms of agency that 
create subjects only to control, condition, and constrain them. 
Exploring how multiethnic literature expresses underexamined humanist encounters 
between minoritized peoples, this dissertation demonstrates the potential to destabilize the 
exclusionist nationalism that first marginalized them, without engaging or relying on said 
national codes of subjectivity. To that end, this project concludes by exploring how a 
methodology of empathetic humanism can be put into praxis. Providing examples of partnerships 
with local disenfranchised groups to co-create public-facing projects that expand the frame of 
“who counts” as a viable subject, this dissertation closes by demonstrating how empathetic 
humanism as a theory and methodology can be employed to benefit the public, common good. 
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1 INTRODUCTION: EXPANDING THE FRAME  
 
The function of the university is not simply to teach breadwinning,  
or to furnish teachers for the public schools, or to be a centre  
of polite society; it is, above all, to be the organ of that fine  
adjustment between real life and the growing knowledge of life, 
 an adjustment which forms the secret of civilization.  
– W.E.B. Du Bois  
“Of the Wings of Atalanta” 
 The Souls of Black Folk 
(1903)  
 
In the last few years of my degree seeking process, I have been an Innovation Fellow at 
Georgia State University. In this capacity, I imagine and manage complex projects that are both 
technical and cultural in nature, leading interdisciplinary teams on public-facing advocacy 
projects that privilege ethnographic aims. Collaborating with community and academic partners, 
my work finds ways to make (often undertold) life stories communicable and shareable in form. 
The underlying goal of these efforts is to reimagine academic work to be directed by and through 
minoritized people, and in doing so, to democratize the process of writing life to foreground 
those who historically have been excluded from that purview. Part of what I have come to 
understand through this work––which includes fostering ties in the local community to create 
steering groups; talking with migrants, refugees, and returning citizens; listening to stories of 
travel, displacement, and incarceration alongside goals of dignity and well-being––is that any 
scholar or academic institution has much to learn from these disenfranchised minority groups. 
Theirs are stories not only of intense suffering and gross victimization, but they are also stories 
of tenacity, mercy, and joy. In every case, they are testaments of what it means to be human and, 
as such, have hailed me to forge a critical, philosophical reckoning of humanism to help situate 
the work I do in the public sphere. Their stories have galvanized my doctoral research and 
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spurred me to consider how the institution of higher education can be best leveraged in 
humanistic work. Though often thought of as a hierarchal network of research and teaching 
institutions with varying prestige, the system of higher education in reality has strong 
intellectual, technological, and social connections with local, regional, and national non-
academic organizations. The university system is a capacious infrastructure that can promote 
stability in working with minority groups—and, I argue, has a responsibility to do so. In other 
words, I have come to understand Du Bois’s conviction that the university can provide “that fine 
adjustment between real life and the growing knowledge of life” and, even, lend it form.     
As a humanist, I consider myself to be a builder: of meaningful scholarship, 
interdisciplinary teams, tactful students, trans-institutional collaborations, cross-cultural 
coalitions, and dignity in disenfranchised communities. Yet my research has taught me that as 
academics we should always remember that the analytic of “human” has historically been 
invoked to enact violence and siphon education into restrictive boxes of identity rather than 
promote inclusive expansion, despite what the taglines of liberal multiculturalism would have us 
believe. Establishing and maintaining prerequisites to agency, even in a well-intentioned manner 
of “giving voice” to people of color, ultimately only creates, endorses, and maintains 
disenfranchised groups. Recognizing this ever-precarious facet of humanistic work, my project 
seeks to discern how minority people promote connections and receptions that remain 
heterogenous to the order of bio- and geopolitics that economize and condition agency.  
To that end, I have learned to weave together my research, teaching, and fellowship work 
in ways that foreground humanistic and participatory scholarship. For the past two years, for 
example, I have co-lead an international grant project that partners with teams in Hong Kong and 
Pretoria to investigate housing precarity and well-being for migrants to help guide the United 
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Nations’ current “new urban rights agenda.” Our Urban Migration grant research leverages big 
data and geospatial visualization of migrant newcomers to contextualize the stories we receive 
through our personal interviews with migrants and refugees in the Atlanta area. As a preliminary 
relationship-building effort, I first meet with representatives from the migrant community from 
which we seek interviews so that we can come to know one another as collaborators and 
partners. I had dinner with two extraordinary women from Mexico and Columbia as one of these 
preliminary partnership meetings. Both women came to the United States fleeing profound 
poverty and domestic violence and survived impossible odds: one was sixteen years old when 
she travelled on foot, alone with her three year old son, for almost two weeks across barren 
border land; the other woman left her homeland when she was nineteen years old, travelled for 
many months with a group of migrants, often having to hide away in strange barns and 
warehouses for days at a time while on her northern route. Counter to typical American 
discourse, their travel stories were only a small part of our long conversation that evening. The 
vast majority of our time together was spent talking about how their small apartment 
communities of mostly undocumented newcomers share parenting and childcare responsibilities, 
how they have organized a complex and fail-proof system of notifying every member of the 
community when Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents are at their door, and how the 
elaborate pranks they play on one another is a form of gifting and solidarity. These stories are 
anecdotal and, for protective purposes, will not be detailed much further here. Yet they are 
important to cite in this introductory chapter because they show instances of how disenfranchised 
people in “real life” build agency amongst one another through empathetic reception – and how 
that agency not only defines their humanity, but also works outside the norms of American 
nationalism that typically restricts their identities as either victims or trespassers and always as 
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illegal. Working with vulnerable communities, the projects I manage are a natural extension of 
my research focus on interraciality and new humanisms. I believe that literature already shows us 
how radical empathy flourishes in dire conditions and imagines subject formation processes in 
which Western frames are not the metrics of agency.  
Simply put, literature helps us imagine and consider what is possible, in which settler 
agendas are not the end game. Over the last century we’ve seen a proliferation of texts that work 
within this heuristic and presuppose my work with disenfranchised communities of color. 
Creative works written by minority authors have already imagined ways to position traditional 
national tropes—such as race, religion, language, territory, and even militia—as part of, but not 
essential to, subject formation. As such, my project’s aim is to uncover how select multiethnic 
literatures have imagined minority subjectivity that is not premised on either categories of 
nationalism or American mythos of agency, but rather privilege non-Western humanist subject-
formation processes.  
These imaginations have been occurring through American-authored literary works for 
some time now, though often fleeting in narrative scope and glossed over by scholars. For 
example, James Weldon Johnson includes a brief chapter in his 1912 The Autobiography of an 
Ex-Colored Man dedicated to describing the “Club” in New York where “both white and colored 
people of certain classes” socialized without racial stigmas (55). Located in the basement of a 
house, the Club was a Chinese restaurant and lounge, owned by a “Chinaman,” who made sure 
that all “the walls were literally covered with photographs or lithographs of every colored man in 
America who had ever ‘done anything’,” from Frederick Douglass to West Indian heavyweight 
boxer champion Peter “Black Prince” Jackson (55). The “Chinaman proprietor” not only made 
room to visualize and celebrate “great colored” subjects, but also ensured there was plenty of 
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floor space in his establishment for the “colored bohemian” patrons to see “new and ambitious 
performers” practice their dancing and acrobatic acts. The Chinaman created space for 
unemployable acts of non-conformity, “because no manager could imagine that audiences would 
pay to see Negro performers in any other role than that of Mississippi river roustabouts” (56). It 
is interracial narrative moments such as this scene described by Johnson that register a subject-
formation mechanism of and by marginalized people that literary scholarship has to date left 
under-attended – which in turn also inspires my project’s analytical pursuit of non-Western 
humanist encounters in literature.  
Insofar as narratives have the capacity to register both particularity and ambiguity and 
therefore unsettle static definitions of identity, literature uniquely allows an analysis of race 
(positioned historically as a tool of post-Enlightenment European thought to fabricate “Man”) as 
ethnicity (as it is premised on a plurality of cultural indicators). As such, literature privileges 
individual experience over tendencies to either homogenize and sanitize difference (a maneuver 
of containment often evoked by liberal multiculturalism) or articulate difference solely through 
the sieve of established national paradigms (a common chasm created through transnationalism). 
And yet, as any bibliophile knows, stories irrevocably bind us to one another, and are capable of 
forging solidarity through the counter-narrative it may present. In her 2004 monograph 
Precarious Life, Judith Butler offers a reminder that “[w]hen we argue for protection against 
discrimination, we argue as a group or a class . . . we have to present ourselves as bounded 
beings – distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects before the law, a community defined by 
shared features” (24). Ethnic nationalisms, like all nationalisms, are enlivened by narratives. 
Going further, Partha Chatterjee acknowledges that minority peoples have historically employed 
ethnic nationalism as a method of colonial resistance. But Chatterjee also argues that minority 
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peoples have suffered the consequences of those efforts being undermined and relegated as a 
static counterforce to the dominant, which ultimately reified the structure of hegemony. I argue 
that it is precisely because of the historical tie between nationalism and anticolonialism that my 
project’s literary archive is uniquely situated to recognize how the nation ultimately seeks power 
for itself, not its constituents, and therefore has the capacity to imagine other forms of 
subjectivity that cannot be subsumed and relegated to the domain of the nation. Butler, too, 
proposes a similar caveat as Chatterjee when she cautions that “perhaps we make a mistake if we 
take the definitions of who we are, legally, to be adequate descriptions of what we are about,” as 
it cannot “do justice to passion and grief and rage, all of which tear us from ourselves, bind us to 
others, transport us, undo us, implicate us in lives that are not our own” (Precarious 25). 
Literature, of course, hails Butler’s call for justice, in that is the most sturdy and capacious 
vehicle that allows us to receive others “irreversibly, if not fatally” (Precarious 25). 
To be clear, my research does not merely seek to expose how people of color have been 
represented by other non-whites in the United States – this would only to serve to trace the game 
of hierarchal jockeying that Western modes of thinking established through imperialism (which 
admittedly is also a charge against early 20th century humanist thinking, but I will clarify my 
usage of the term in a later section). Rather, I seek ways that Others receive Others beyond the 
domain of domination that is easily executed through parameters of national belonging: how, for 
example, ethnic difference incites cross-cultural dignity, not racial subjugation; or how violent 
persecution heralds guardianship amongst its victims, not reactive hatred. Given their outlying 
position in the American literary canon, multiethnic, interracial texts have the capacity to engage 
not only alternative frameworks of subject formation, but also specifically humanist frames –
meaning, encounters of inclusion that occur because of a reciprocal recognition of a shared 
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condition of being, such as suffering and vulnerability. My project explores how interracial 
literature expresses underexamined non-Western humanist encounters and interactions between 
minoritized peoples and thereby illuminates a potential to destabilize the exclusionist nationalism 
that first marginalized them, without engaging or relying on said national codes of subjectivity. 
As a non-Western humanist theoretical approach can strike a key balance between homogeneity 
and universalization on the one hand, and the particular and the individual relation on the other, 
it is through this approach that I focus my exploratory inquiries of minority subjectivities.  
In many ways our current moment seems to be already moving beyond the centrality of 
nation-based paradigms and structures, as evidenced by my descriptions of my work with 
community partners. But what are we moving toward? Late capitalism and globalism are 
certainly key trending terms in the humanities, as they should be. We cannot afford to passively 
under criticize neoliberal forces. But as David Harvey suggests, it is the responsibility of 
academics “to ask what kinds of scholarly knowledge production will be necessary to sustain or 
transform a world in which millennial capitalism seemingly reigns triumphant” (530). 
Dismantling such deeply rooted systems of oppression, historically taken on by minority, 
postcolonial, and area studies, has proven to be a slippery endeavor though, as the very 
articulation of any sort of hegemonic force, even in an effort to combat it, often cements its 
power. To use a familiar reference, we can consider the intersection of race and nationalism. 
While “race” and “nation” historically have been tightly bound together (especially in 
sociological studies, such as Michael Omi and Howard Winant’s hallmark text, Racial 
Formation in the United States), this common practice has come to hinder our capacity of other 
imaginings of agency and Others. At the heart of our mythologies of American exceptionalism 
are the castings of race as “the melting pot” or “the salad bowl,” both of which purports a sort of 
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stable harmony and congruency amongst all races and ethnicities in the U.S., hinging on the 
neoliberal logic that hard work and ambition defines what it means to be American and trumps 
all other suits of difference.  
Yet recent civil domestic events have crudely proved otherwise: the only homogenization 
of Americans is how deeply we are all entrenched in a hierarchal system of race and class. Or, as 
Marxist philosopher Etienne Balibar remarks, “[I]n already constituted states, the organization of 
nationalism into individual political movements inevitably has racism underlying it” (37). As we 
are fully immersed in a global, digital age, transnational studies as a field has worked to attend to 
the chasm between underrepresented subjects and national ideologies. However, 
transnationalism is itself at heart a political movement, and therefore subject to the underlying 
racism that it seeks to combat as part of its project. This fact does not render transnationalism 
obsolete, but rather incites imaginative alternate approaches. I agree with Susan Koshy’s 
contention in her essay “The Postmodern Subaltern”: “if the challenge of forging a new politics 
is to be met, globalization studies, area studies, ethnic studies, and postcolonial studies will need 
to work synergistically together to locate the ‘spaces of hope’ on the global terrain, instead of 
insisting on the vanguardism of globalization theory” (111). In its most compact sense, my work 
here seeks such spaces of hope.  
1.1 Current Insufficiencies of Transnational Studies 
Scholars have been theorizing “the transnational turn” for some time now. And it seems 
that the academic obsession with the term will only continue to inspire conference themes, 
special issues of journals, syllabi, and institutions of higher education. Winfried Fluck simplifies 
the mass appeal of transnationalism, suggesting that “to pursue a transnational approach means 
to go beyond the borders of the nation-state as an object of analysis. In an age of globalization, 
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such a project is obviously timely and the description of transnational studies as a bold step 
across borders is ideally suited to serve as a commonsense legitimation” (365). It is for good 
reason, then, that transnational studies has been particularly enticing to minority studies scholars 
who argue for the recognition of marginalized peoples. Although transnational studies continues 
the critical work of reframing history and offering alternative contexts of social relations writ 
large, we need subject-based methodologies to keep pace. The transnational is, to date, still a 
mercurial term in that it has been defined in varying degrees to various ends by scholars across 
the humanities in which alterity is often the object of analysis, but not the unit of analysis. In his 
introduction to Re-Framing the Transnational Turn in American Studies, Donald Pease has no 
qualms in admitting that the term “transnational” lends itself to potentially haphazard and 
incongruent usage:  
Endowed with minimal analytic consistency, “the transnational” is as devoid of semantic 
coherence as it is of social existence. “The transnational” does not represent consistent 
political attitudes, and it lacks thematic unity. The term’s definitional variousness has 
generated a surfeit of representations, meanings, definitions, and attributions. It operates 
in different syntactic iterations and at asymmetrical levels of heterogenous discourses to 
accomplish disparate aims. (4) 
In the widespread excitement of adopting “the transnational” into academic discourses, its 
categorical use can be borrowed too casually and perhaps too broadly; while the intellectual 
parameters of the term are indeed far-reaching, we should be cautious of superfluous labeling. 
We need to take care to remember and attend the subject—the living, feeling, conscious entity, 
despite the theoretical instability of even these terms—when driving so hard to expand the scope 
and promote the “globalize and reframe” discourse that is so popular today. And so too should 
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we be cautious to recall the initial impulses that catalyzed “the transnational turn” across the 
humanities. Shu-mei Shih contends that transnationalism began as a reflexive push to understand 
the emerging global economic order. “This urge [to be more expansive in our scholarship in the 
contemporary era of globalization] was first expressed by scholars who studied the West, born of 
the perception that globalization was fast spreading from the West as new technologies and 
finance capitalism compressed time and space across the world,” she writes (“World Studies” 
430). Reconciling the West’s place with the shifting power postures throughout the world was 
the primary goal for these scholars and became the ever-present common denominator in 
formulations of the transnational. Shih continues, “Some strands of the conversation were about 
how either the West will homogenize the rest or the rest will heterogenize the West and about the 
worries and celebrations that will attend either outcome. The conversation, in other words, was 
centered on the West” (“World Studies” 430). And, as Shih likewise states alongside Francoise 
Lionnet, who together are the editors of Minor Transnationalism, the conversation still is 
centered on the West. “Critiquing the center,” they assert, “when it stands as an end in itself, 
seems only to enhance it; the center remains the focus and main object of study. The 
deconstructive dyad center/margin thus appears to privilege marginality only to end up 
containing it” (3). A self-reproducing pattern—a sort of feedback loop––is created when we 
study minority subjectivity through the referent of the center, rather than the margins. For this 
reason, one of the tenets of my project is to focus my analyses on encounters and relations that 
illuminate a context of interraciality and elide the tendency of understanding the self through 
opposition to dominant, Western- and Euro- centered discourses. I am interested in the ways that 
creative works by minority writers express minority subjects perceiving their individual agency 
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through encounters with other and different minority subjects, who thereby resist the dominant, 
universalizing forces of the center without even engaging them. 
We need to be attendant to the (often accidental) erasures that occur when revision 
scholarship, such as some trends in the field of transnational studies, ironically collapses 
alternative frameworks in its effort to asymptotically broaden history’s scope. In other words, we 
need to remember that we are interdependently responsible for privileging the human even in this 
present global age in which finance capitalism and digital relations are so often the vehicles of 
knowing one another, or at least are popular foci in humanities scholarship. Vivek Bald’s study 
of Bengali peddlers in New Orleans in the early 20th century is a prime example of the kind of 
national revision I refer to here. In his essay “Selling the East in the American South,” Bald 
traces underexplored lines of transit of peddlers from the central eastern region of India in the 
late 19th and early 20th centuries as they sold goods that they brought over from their homeland. 
These peddlers followed American vacationers into U.S. southern states, creating a hub of 
commerce in New Orleans. Bald’s intensive study of primary source immigration documents 
shows that many peddlers never permanently settled in the United States; rather, they made 
numerous trips “back home” to the Hooghly region. Importantly, Bald also shows how the 
peddlers continued their businesses into the Caribbean (arguably helping situate New Orleans as 
the northern most point of the Caribbean region), using the southern United States as a gateway 
to farther-reaching destinations. I cite Bald’s work not as a springboard for my own research 
aims, but rather to provide an example of what I believe is a successful analytic of 
transnationalism in which the United States is decentered and, more importantly, the minoritized 
subjects’ (i.e. the peddlers’) experience of being in transitory states is privileged. While location 
and geography are obviously a crucial component of Bald’s study, the notion of place and 
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belonging underscores his thesis. I see Bald’s work engaging transnationalism in a more 
inventive way than what many other reckonings in the field—for example, diaspora and 
borderland studies—have canonically pursued. That is not to say, of course, that field-forging 
studies such as Lisa Lowe’s 1996 Immigrant Acts or Gloria Anzaldúa’s 1986 Borderlands/La 
Frontera, and the countless works they have in turn inspired, are not just as crucial to scholars 
today as they were twenty and thirty years ago. But just as the Bengali peddlers traversed across 
and through the southern U.S. while en route to broader markets, I propose that traditional 
frameworks of place-based ethos are nodes, not end points, along the transitory rhizome of the 
study of minority subjects and interraciality of the United States.  
Bald’s research of the Bengali Muslim peddlers responds to the 2006 argument made by 
Americanist historian Matthew Frye Jacobsen, in which he asserts that the “durable nationalist 
framework” of America has been (sometimes inadvertently) established through a transnational 
historicizing of immigrant populations. Recent decades have produced an American narrative 
that hinges on a nationalizing notion that immigrants come to the United States in order to be 
Americanized, that is, as seekers of liberty, justice, and social mobility. Jacobsen contends that 
“in situating the transnational history of immigration so firmly as American history, in lashing 
the subjects so securely (if tacitly) to American exceptionalism, and in positioning immigration 
itself in such a way that it might become the very thing occluding a more complicated history of 
the peopling of North America,” previous generations of humanities scholars have situated the 
transnational as overly “national in its orientation and pervasive sensibilities” (74). While this 
“nation of immigrants” might seem passé in many circles of transnational scholars, its rhetoric 
has reassumed a global platform through current presidential political campaigns: the immigrant 
Other is, yet again, at once center stage while not even being on the stage. Likewise, it is not just 
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the integrity and purpose of the discipline of transnational studies that suffer the ramifications of 
nation-centric approaches, but actual populations of migrants and their descendants experience 
violent expressions of the very nationalism that is made possible by their presence. The stakes of 
this political and democratic power structure could not be more high as our current historical 
moment could very well be historicized as an age of fear, terror(ism), and mass murders.   
While the need to go beyond Western, national qualifications of subjectivity has been 
theorized, we are still largely lacking models of a productive alternative methodology. In his 
1993 monograph The Nation and Its Fragments, Chatterjee clearly positions this lack in his 
response to Benedict Anderson’s argument that nations are not so much “determinate products of 
given sociological conditions” as they are communities self-imagined into being (4). Chatterjee 
counters Anderson’s stance, inquiring, “If nationalisms in the rest of the world have to choose 
their imagined community from certain ‘modular’ forms already made available to them by 
Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine?” (5). A decade after Chatterjee’s 
famous remark Kandice Chuh published her highly acclaimed critical text, Imagine Otherwise, in 
which she argues that we must go beyond Western epistemology of who (or what) qualifies as a 
subject. Chuh’s monograph marks new territory for minority studies and, I think, provides some 
of the most exciting work to date that responds to Chatterjee’s critique.  
Extending Chuh’s aim––though admittedly at the risk of being redundant––it is crucial 
that I make my stance clear: nationalism does not have to be the harbinger of subjectivity. As 
Chuh states, such a relation turns back on itself, objectifying the very subjects it once sought to 
affirm. Multiethnic literatures of the U.S., as a field, seems to be in the quagmire of resisting 
systemic oppressions. Such resisting is relevant and necessary. But the concept of being 
American—belonging to a community, culture, or set of ideas linked to the territory of the 
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United States—without reinscribing or being dependent on agency from being American is 
difficult to express. To date, this concept is not yet fully realized through transnational 
approaches to American literature. Thus my project seeks to bridge this gap: my chapters look at 
how interracial encounters and subject formation have the potential to embody the most 
liberatory aspects among the aspirations of those in transnational studies. In their discussion of 
what “minor transnationalism” is and how it differs from the smartly implied “major” 
transnationalism, Lionnet and Shih do well in expressing the conundrum I seek to attend: 
What is lacking in the binary model of above-and-below, the utopic and the dystopic, and 
the global and the local is an awareness and recognition of the creative interventions that 
networks of minoritized cultures produce within and across national boundaries. All too 
often the emphasis on the major-resistant mode of cultural practices denies the complex 
and multiple forms of cultural expressions of minorities and diasporic peoples and hides 
their micropractices of transnationality in their multiple, paradoxical, or even irreverent 
relations with the economic transnationalism of contemporary empires. Common 
conceptions of resistance to the major reify the boundaries of communities by placing the 
focus on action and reaction, excluding other forms of participation in the transnational 
that may be more proactive and more creative even while economically disadvantaged. 
(7) 
Ultimately my project is inspired by the more transformative aspects of the transnational, which 
Pease is able to pinpoint with as much dexterity as he is able to assess its more feeble aspects. 
Pease’s recognition of the difficulties in locating consistency in usage or meaning of the term is 
necessary, as its liberatory potential resides in its mercuriality. “The transnational mobilizes 
plural, often competing discourses that generate contradictions, new truths, and ruptures. Indeed, 
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this promiscuous signifier operates through an empty discursive vacuum that seemingly thrives 
on the incompatible claims the transnational is made to represent” – and by doing so, can 
theoretically be employed to make anything new again, in any study, context, or history (5). 
Pease continues and offers the most cohesive, yet still infinitely dynamic, rendering of the term 
to date: “The transnational is not a discourse so much as it is a volatile transfer point that inhabits 
things, people, and places with surplus connectivities that dismantle their sense of a coherent, 
bounded identity. Drawing upon an interstitial dynamic that it advances, this complex figuration 
bears the traces of the violent sociohistorical processes to which it alludes” (4). In this study I 
reimagine and expand on work in transnational studies that is illustrative of Pease’s definition 
and I explore in particular how this view of transnationalism can serve as a platform to establish 
non-national interracial reception as a necessary framework for multiethnic literary studies. 
1.2 Humanism, Interraciality, and Comparison 
The void that nation-premised agency exposes can be ameliorated, I argue, through 
humanism, which I use as the organizing principle to my project. In his posthumous Humanism 
and Democratic Criticism, Edward Said argues that “there can be no true humanism whose 
scope is limited to extolling patriotically the virtues of our culture, our language, our 
monuments” (28). Not only does humanism’s scope outreach the national matrices of culture, 
language, and monuments for Said, it also asserts an ambiguity in its capacity to both extoll 
virtues and, implicitly, expose declensions. Said arrives at this articulation through the many 
shifts humanism has undergone historically. Modern academic approaches to humanism have 
varied greatly – indeed, even within the chronological scope of my archive, roughly the mid 20th 
to early 21st centuries, humanism has undergone revisions. These revisions do not indicate a 
weak intellectual grounding, though. Rather, the transformations and new interpretations of the 
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philosophical concept are an essential aspect of humanism’s core: for humanism to maintain its 
overarching purpose of assessing the values of the human, it must remain open to the shifting 
ways that humans interact with and perceive themselves, each other, and their environments. 
While humanism as a school of thought can be traced through pre-biblical texts (though 
many philosophers cite God’s positioning of Adam to rule over all other life in the garden of 
Eden as a “natural” starting point), for my project, the most necessary distinction rests in the 
varying interpretations of the term in the 20th century. Until the 1960s, according to Said, a 
resurgence of humanism swept through American art and scholarship as part of the national 
project of first defining and then elevating the human spirit. The key to access this heightened 
status was cultivating and reading canonical Western cultural and literary products by educated 
individuals who had the intellectual ability to interpret the progress of mankind. This strain of 
humanism was “very restricted and difficult,” and functioned “like a rather austere club with 
rules that keep most people out” (16). Along with Said, other major scholars whose work address 
humanism, like Judith Butler (in her later works) and Paul Gilroy, self-consciously distance 
themselves from the pre-civil rights humanism in order to profess a non-hierarchal humanism. 
More recent usages of humanism tend to focus on how the human is established through 
universal experiences of being as “an emancipatory intervention to social reality” (Suárez Müller 
478). This definition of the term departs from the construction of “the human” as part of the 
Western epistemological project of the early 20th century. In Said’s revision of humanism, he 
urges an approach that is “not a way of consolidating and affirming what ‘we’ have always 
known and felt,” but instead as “a means of questioning, upsetting, and reformulating so much of 
what is presented to us as commodified, packaged, uncontroversial, and uncritically codified 
certainties” (28). While I concur with Said’s premise that neither we nor our experiences are all 
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the same, I maintain there exists common emotional and experiential threads among humans that 
can help us examine subjectivity across populations, places, and time. I seek to employ the ways 
that humanism highlights shared universal conditions in order to express how minority agency is 
fostered through reception and empathetic encounters with other racialized subjects. 
It is generally understood that humanism rests on a foundationalist philosophy; in other 
words, if humanism is in part a belief that there are shared universal conditions of being, then the 
premise born out of this assertion would hold that those conditions of being exist outside of 
culture, language, socialization, or politicization. Humanism, then, asserts a sort of “norming” 
epistemology, and in this way, the architecture of humanism looks eerily familiar to the binary 
structures I have argued my project seeks to circumvent. Critical Race Studies scholar Denise 
Ferreira da Silva specifically focuses her critique on this quandary of humanism, tracing “the 
analytics of raciality” as the historical and scientific production of Man in her 2007 monograph 
Toward a Global Idea of Race. Silva shows how the racial (as an analytic that privileges 
difference) was historically brought to the social fore through the European Enlightenment to 
define reason as a universality. Reason—as a quality universally obtainable, though mastered 
only by elite European intellectuals who are therefore endowed with the authority to conquer 
those perceived to be without reason—is thereby divined as self-evidenced freedom. Those 
“Others” who are not able to ontologically grasp reason are also unable to be universalized, or in 
other words, to be fully humanized. Thus reason becomes a logarithm of exclusion, racially 
inscribed across the globe through colonial and imperial pursuits of the 18th and 19th centuries.  
Presenting a consistent dilemma in the humanities, then, foundations—to which 
humanism is historically and ontologically trussed—take on a plethora of guises: defining the 
margin from the established center (see Lionnet and Shih), extracting the “trans” from the 
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“nation” (see Jacobsen), approaching the Other without recourse to stymied matrices of agency 
(see Chuh), and illuminating how the racial is productive of an exclusionary universality (see 
Silva). When the “nation” goes unproblematized as a claim in transnational studies its power is 
reinscribed and the potential for political transformation and social justice is cauterized. This 
logic holds for any unproblematized claim or, even, critical theory, as the function of 
unproblematizing works in the interests of hegemonic power. Any method that is based on 
normatives, foundations, or universals can just as readily function as a boundary-maker as it can 
a liberator. I have to contend with the inherent flaw of my approach: am I, too, not reinscribing 
the mechanism that has stifled liberatory theory of race relations? In response, I adopt Judith 
Butler’s stance, that “[i]f we take the field of the human for granted, then we fail to think 
critically—and ethically—about the consequential ways that the human is being produced, 
reproduced, deproduced. This latter inquiry does not exhaust the field of ethics, but I cannot 
imagine a ‘responsible’ ethics or theory of social transformation operating without it” (Undoing 
Gender 222). Any approach, any framework, any theory has weaknesses and runs the risk of 
collapsing under its own weight and being subsumed by the very thing it worked to resist (for 
example, recall Multiculturalism and its failings). My project then must take on the responsibility 
of reflectively guarding itself against such reification and foundationalization by maintaining a 
checks and balances system of inquiry into humanism as methodological approach.  
If humanism as critique is to avoid being subsumed into foundationalist philosophy, then 
it must remain open – it must be contingent, ambiguous, and vulnerable to multiple reactions and 
outcomes. This tension in the concept of the shared universal condition and its potential to incite 
unpredictable reactions is fitting for this kind of study because it is in this precise tension that 
agency is generated. As choices and ethical directions are exposed in humanist encounters, 
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action follows. Making the case for the usefulness of this ambiguity, Butler cites Levinas, who 
articulates the sense of precariousness that the face of the Other triggers. For Levinas the face “is 
at once a temptation to kill and an interdiction against killing” (Butler Precarious Life 139). It is 
worth the risk and anxiety of foundationalism to engage humanism because, frankly, we cannot 
afford not to engage: at some point we must engage, we must connect shared conditions of being 
in order to seek meaningful social justice and equity in the lived world. Said harkens this point, 
emphasizing that in a constantly shifting post-9/11 world, when even academia has been 
piecemealed and commodified perhaps beyond redemption, the role of the intellectual has never 
been more crucial. “The intellectual is perhaps a kind of countermemory, with its own 
counterdiscourse that will not allow conscience to look away for fall asleep,” Said states; and the 
work of the intellectual must be driven by the fact that “[p]eace cannot exist without equality; 
this is an intellectual value desperately in need of reiteration, demonstration, and reinforcement” 
(142).  
While humanism is the guiding principle and broad theoretical device of my project, 
interraciality is the framework through which I locate and analyze how minoritarian 
subjectivities are created in concert with other minoritized peoples.  As an analytic, interraciality 
has been widely approached through various methods and disciplines, from literary studies to 
sociology to legal history, and used to support varying claims about race relations – almost 
always the objective being to distinguish where the Other is located along the binary black-white 
format. Of course, a subtle anxiety concerning the “color line” permeated American literature 
and politics since the mid-19th century and a more explicit negotiation and hierarchy of race has 
been worked through by African American authors since the early 20th century. But the usage of 
“interraciality” is a much newer event. The proliferation of critical race studies in the academy is 
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a relatively young endeavor—Asian American departments, for example, only came into 
existence in the mid-1960s through the Civil Rights Movement, and even then were limited to 
west coast—and the academic inquiry of how minority communities connect with one another 
younger still. 
Creating the springboard for interracial frameworks is Gary Okihiro’s often-cited chapter 
“Is Yellow Black or White” in his 1994 monograph Margins and Mainstreams: Asians in 
American History and Culture. Okihiro argues that African Americans and Asian Americans 
share a deep history of colonization and oppression that makes them a “kindred people,” 
claiming that “insofar as Asians and Africans share a subordinate position to the master class, 
yellow is a shade of Black, and Black a shade of yellow” (62). This sympathetic attitude has both 
been proven and falsified with numerous primary texts, especially from the early 20th century, 
that show brotherhood and hostility between the two racial groups. While many scholars in the 
1990s enthusiastically espoused interracial coalitions, others such as Daniel Kim and Julia Lee 
have come along and taken a more objective stance, cautioning that “the legitimacy and urgency 
of this anti-racist project [should] not obscure the disharmonies and suspicions that are as 
integral and formative a part of interracial histories as the convergences” and collaborations (Lee 
3). As such, recent studies of interraciality––such as Leslie Bow’s Partly Colored (2010), 
Jennifer Ho’s Racial Ambiguity in Asian American Culture (2015), and Lisa Lowe’s Intimacies 
of the Four Continents (2015)––have embraced sociological and historical methodologies, 
focusing their inquiry on how racialized representations emerged and were produced through 
contemporary historical settings through primary works such as legal documents, journalism, 
census data, testimonies, and narratives. For the aims of my research, I extend and re-envision 
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the ways that interraciality has been most popularly employed to date. Interraciality is not my 
unit of analysis, but rather it defines and qualifies my archive.  
Another methodological gap I must address is the inherent definitional conundrum that 
arises when race (or interraciality) and identity (or subjectivity) is perceived beyond the nation. 
As Michael Omi and Howard Winant have argued, a central paradigm of race is in fact the 
nation, along with the paradigms of ethnicity and class. Omi and Winant caution that the nation 
and its attendant nationalisms are paramount to an understanding of race formation precisely 
because of its “retention of an explanatory framework based on race” (47). They qualify, 
however, that “[n]ationalism is easily reduced to minority militance or separatism, for example, 
if no effort is made to specify its historical and theoretical origins in particular minority 
experiences of colonialism” (37). Thus Omi and Winant suggest that when nation, ethnicity, and 
class are not considered within the context of one another there are only “partial encounters and 
partial ‘misses’” which limit a more productive analysis of race (49). Instead, Omi and Winant 
offer the alternative: “The effort must be made to understand race as an unstable and 
‘decentered’ complex of social meanings constantly being transformed by political struggle,” 
whereby “race is a concept which signifies and symbolizes social conflicts and interests by 
referring to different types of human bodies” (55). Their argument is widely-received and proven 
through the countless reports of violent discrimination that have reignited country-wide civil 
rights movements and protests.  
Yet, as Susan Koshy points out in her essay “Why the Humanities Matter for Race 
Studies Today,” there is a difference in disciplinary approach here. Omi and Winant develop 
their racial formation theory within and for the field of sociology, where the main sources of 
sociological analysis—maps, surveys, interviews, legal documents, etc.—are often more static 
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than narrative texts and, more importantly, used for different pedagogical aims. While 
sociologists like Omi and Winant work to define parameters that establish a “coherent and 
conscious racial subject” (Koshy “Why Humanities” 1545), my work seeks to limn out 
subjectivities that are not contingent upon those parameters which are more often than not 
designs of exclusion. Toward this goal, I situate my project primarily in literary texts that 
imaginatively explore experiences and identities not evidenced or bounded by the nation. I heed 
Koshy’s articulation of the strength of literature as archive for study of racialized subjectivity 
because “literature is more receptive to the contingencies of racial formation,” in that “the 
opacities of otherness, the partial light in which action and agency unfold, the ineluctable gap 
between intervention and outcome, and the temptations and perils of authenticity and full 
description” are brought forth narratively, not empirically (Koshy “Why Humanities” 1545). 
With this consideration we can see why Omi and Winant’s sociological model of racial 
formation is often employed in literary studies: if, as Viet Thanh Nguyen remarks, the most 
powerful and compelling aspect of Omi and Winant’s thesis is that “race has no fixed meaning” 
(71), then narrative can be a vehicle to navigate the transformations (as opposed to fixed 
formations) of race – transformations that occur not just through a proliferation of genetically 
mixed phenotypes, but through the ways that race is experienced, perceived, interpreted, and 
received.  
In this way, literature can uniquely expose the farsightedness of focusing on relationality 
to dominant discourses of the center. My analysis of narratives of interraciality often requires a 
comparative approach, “a move from specifying the boundaries and internal heterogeneity of 
particular groups to an understanding of their interarticulation” (Koshy “Why Humanities” 
1548). That being said, comparison as method has traditionally garnered an intense critical 
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pushback for being parochial and absolute – designating something as either exclusively local or 
exclusively global, for example. This criticism is well-founded and should function as a constant 
cautionary device to promote a more rigorous research and argumentation practice. Yet not 
comparing can be just as dangerous, as a lack of comparison often promotes a synecdochal 
analysis. Susan Stanford Freidman thoughtfully unpacks these pitfalls in her essay “Why 
Compare?”, noting that “the refusal to compare can potentially turn into a romance of the local, a 
retreat into the particular and identity-based, a resistance to the cosmopolitan. The political 
problem that comparison can reaffirm the universalism of the dominant as the implied standard 
of measure is real” (756). The crucial counterargument is that “there are also political 
consequences of restricting the inquiry to one cultural group, one nation, or one region of the 
world” (756). Comparison here is not a one-to-one formula that establishes a binary structure of 
myself/not-myself, right/wrong, or familiar/foreign. Comparison as an analytical approach for 
interraciality instead “defamiliarizes what one takes as natural in any given culture” (Friedman 
756) and “brings submerged or displaced relationalities into view” (Shih “Comparative 
Racialization” 1350). Privileging multiethnic texts and comparing interracial instances of 
humanist reception that are not referents of post-Enlightenment Eurocentric worldviews responds 
to the slips that have occurred in the shift from area to global studies that transnationalism has 
lead. But in another way, specifically comparing multiethnic narratives through forms of 
humanism that disregard the Enlightenment construction of Man (and the subsequent versions of 
the notion thereafter) also works to create new bastions of agency that cannot be imagined right 
now. There are infinite Others who are heterogenous to the Western world order defined by 
capital and territory; this project keys in on forms of humanism that generate more comparative 
inquires to be posed and for all those relationalities to be explored. 
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1.3 Looking Ahead: Overview  
Each of my three body chapters analyze narrative works to explore three different 
expressions of empathetic humanism: cosmopolitanism, suffering, and spatial subjectivity. 
Though I leverage terminologies and ways of thinking from multiple philosophers, my 
organizing theoretical approach is strictly situated within non-Western humanism. 
Cosmopolitanism, suffering, and spatial subjectivity are three ways that I see an interracial and 
interethnic humanism being expressed and, in that way, minority agency being revised in non-
Western terms. Each chapter explains and discusses its philosophical analytic of humanism 
separately through the terms and conditions the narrative works it is paired with provide.  
Chapter two looks at a new formation of an old trope of belonging to the world. I refer to 
two autobiographies, Barack Obama’s Dreams of My Father (1995) and Seiichi Higashide’s 
Adios to Tears (1993), to employ the philosophical notion of cosmopolitanism—the worldview 
that all humans are part of a common communal order—to consider how Others could be 
received in our current sociopolitical moment, in which all national governments must reckon 
with being under-prepared, both in terms of humanitarian resources and also empathetic 
capacity. This reading of cosmopolitanism focuses on migrants—specifically, to disenfranchised, 
displaced people—as subjects who are able to maintain roots to homeland and home people, but 
in their migration are able to assert a different agency through knowledges acquired through 
transit, not pledges to land, flags, or imagined governmental borders. Given their extraordinary 
histories and stories of travel and migration, Obama and Higashide provide narrative material 
that show transnational and cosmopolitan subject positions in a way that can be mutually 
inclusive.  
25 
Chapter three engages the notions of suffering and joy to frame two minority-authored 
American novels that also contend with usurpation of identity (and all the joys and fallouts 
therein): Monique Truong’s Bitter in the Mouth (2010) and Patricia Powell’s The Pagoda (1998). 
Digging into the underbelly of the human condition by articulating an agonistic humanism 
through expressions of suffering, and its counterpart, joy, this chapter explores narrative scenes 
in which suffering expands the frame of humanity and incites mercy and jubilation. Both novels 
feature protagonists who purposefully corrode and conflate their identities as a way of becoming 
agents of their subjectivities. Through their suffering of violation and displacement, they shed 
their masquerade of survival to subversive jubilation, locating their agency not in reason or 
knowing, but rather in their bodies, as a sort of embodied empathy. Suffering works to embody 
the subject with agency that rejects structures of logic and Reason, thereby subverting Western 
notions of humanity. In turn, these subjects are able to open themselves to pleasure and joy in 
ways that were previously inaccessible.  
Chapter four, the final body chapter, proposes an ecologically-derived form of humanism, 
which I term “spatial subjectivity.” Spatial subjectivity names a new humanism that, counter to 
normative logic, de-centers the human. This method works against Western frames of 
subjectivity by levelling the foundation of who—or what—can be imbued with agency. Focusing 
on Karen Tei Yamashita’s imaginative novel Through the Arc of the Rain Forest (1990), I argue 
that if we perceive nature as a space that both is itself a subject and engenders subjectivities, 
rather than as a rhetorical nation-building object, then we can work through covert mechanisms 
of oppression in radically productive ways. While the term “space” commonly carries 
connotations of distance, interval, or area, this chapter advocates that that perceived void is 
actually full of emanant relational capacities that resist mutative impulses of Western doctrines 
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of subjectivity. Asserting space as an emergent, full entity, as a progenitor of networked relations 
that serve each subject by connecting it to other beings, this chapter offers an approach to 
subject-formation processes that undermines the categorical hierarchy and privilege of the 
human itself, thereby engaging a minoritarian methodology of subjectivity. The concepts of 
nature and ecology as framed in Yamashita’s work make available a perspective of Others 
receiving Others unconditioned to the category of the Western construction of human/Man; by 
removing the human as the central object of analysis, the humane transpires and the 
subjectivities of those historically considered less than human come into sharp focus. 
Chapter five, the conclusion, draws together the analyses of empathetic humanism that 
chapters two, three, and four explore to consider how to put humanistic ethos into practice that 
purposely functions outside the academy and benefits the public. I argue that partnering with 
local community groups on projects that serve the public common good is one “real life” 
expression of the humanisms my dissertation explores. Furthermore, I contend that employing 
digital tools and platforms for the delivery of community-engaged work is the best methodology 
for these kind of participatory public-facing endeavors as it not only permits unmitigated access 
to research and project outcomes, but it also opens the potential for extended community partners 
to be critical co-creators in the work, positioning all contributors as equal stakeholders. 
1.4 Closing Note: My Personal Stake 
In the summer of 2012, right before I started my PhD program, my family and I made a 
pilgrimage to Heart Mountain, Wyoming, to the site of the concentration camp in which my 
family, being of Japanese descent and carrying a Japanese moniker, was imprisoned without trial 
or proof of wrongdoing during WWII. The barbed wire fences, plywood residential barracks, and 
cleared dirt roads are gone now; the land is returned to its barren, expansive state. Visiting the 
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incarceration site, new meaning came to the literature I had studied in my Master’s degree 
coursework: John Okada’s No-No Boy, Leslie Marmon Silko’s Ceremony, and Ralph Ellison’s 
Flying Home all seemingly transformed to be indicators of “real life,” not just the fictive, 
immersive worlds their stories had carried me through before. On the camp grounds, I felt the 
ever-present red fire ants crawl up my legs and leave burning bites that ached for days after, the 
sharp wind that scattered grainy dust into my eyes and chilled me to my core despite the warm 
sunshine, and I watched the Nisei gaze around the vacancy, their bodies somehow becoming 
temporarily heavier and more brittle as stories, memories, and realizations creeped up into them 
through the dirt. Though we were only there for two days, my family’s return to Heart Mountain 
has, in the time since, shaped me as a reader and scholar, and invariably affected this dissertation 
project.  
The way we write about life, the stories we tell about being and belonging, undoubtedly 
shapes individuals, communities, and generations. As such, I would be remiss not to confess my 
own stake in this dissertation: it is an academic project, but it is also a political work and a 
personal effort toward recovery of my family’s ongoing losses and pains, and it is, at heart, a 
salute to survival and a celebration of love. In other words, this project is a life writing project, as 
life is written in and through multiple mediums – it swells and seeps in all around us at all times. 
Literary works are one deliverable of life writing, which this dissertation takes as its focus and 
archive. Always, though, life writing is personal. And as many people of color know, the 
personal is political. This project, then, is meant to be participatory and ongoing, to pave some 
pathways for Others to recognize themselves in the world, and to instigate reception as a 
hallmark of minoritarian subjectivities.  
 
28 
2 TRANSNATIONAL COSMOPOLITANS:                                                                  
SEIICHI HIGASHIDE AND BARACK OBAMA 
 
We live with seven billion fellow humans on a small, warming planet.  
The cosmopolitan impulse that draws on our common humanity  
is no longer a luxury; it has become a necessity.  
– Kwame Anthony Appiah  
“There is no such thing as western civilization”  
The Guardian  
 
At the time of writing this chapter, the United States was in the immediate aftermath of 
the longest government shutdown in history. This shutdown was due to what is commonly 
referred to as “Trump’s wall.” The two political parties of the United States were in a gridlock 
over the issue of building a wall barrier along the U.S.-Mexico border, a key promise of Trump’s 
2016 presidential campaign. President Trump demanded $5.7 billion dollars for the construction 
of a wall barrier to be included in the bill that would fund the government. Democratic House 
Speaker Nancy Pelosi, crafting tight lines of loyalty amongst her Democratic colleagues (who 
have an easy majority of 235 of the 435 total seats in the lower congressional chamber), refused 
any legislation that funded Trump’s wall. After 35 days of shut down, the government reopened 
with Trump agreeing to sign a bill absent money for the wall. Days and weeks following, the 
President maintained that his decision was in no way a concession, and that he would shut down 
the government again if no compromise for a border barrier was reached, though ultimately he 
resorted to declaring a national emergency to obtain monies for the wall. In general, this was a 
costly feud for his administration, and by extension the GOP party has suffered a major political 
loss.  
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This political stalemate in part reflects the anxieties that people worldwide harbor 
because of global migration. As Bruce Robbins explains in his introduction to Cosmopolitics, 
this anxiety is also particularly American in the way it pitches global migrants as the antithesis to 
Trump’s version of American nationalism, which “sees itself as civic rather than ethnic, hence 
not really nationalism at all,” and prioritizes the “defense of the national interest – a national 
interest that gives much to the rich and little to the poor, of course, but that still favors the 
national poor over the nonnational poor” (13). Susan Stanford Friedman articulates the 
connection between migration increase and fear-based nativism in her recent study of how 
Muslim woman writers engage notions of diaspora and cosmopolitanism. “Widespread flare-ups 
of nativist nationalism, always a latent potential in the imagined homogeneity of the nation,” she 
writes, “are a direct result (indeed, a symptomatic reaction formation) of this intensification of 
human mobility” (200). While anthropological archaeologists remind us that humans have 
always been mobile, traveling across and to different lands than the one where they were born, 
there is good reason why migration occupies much of the American social psyche today. 
According to the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs Population 
Division, there were 258 million international migrants in 2017, roughly 3.4% of the world’s 
entire population. For comparison, there were 173 million international migrants in 2000, which 
means the total number of international migrants increased by roughly 50% in less than two 
decades. In other words, in recorded history there have never been more people traversing 
geographies and crossing nation-state borders as there are right now.  
This global phenomenon must inform any 21st century inquiry into humanism as 
migration is not only a human condition (and always has been), but also effects how every 
being—in transit or stasis, global Northerner or Southerner, human or non-human—is in the 
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world and works toward their own individual or collective well-being. It forces us to think 
deeply about why people migrate through imagined sovereign lines despite the odds, injustices, 
and brutalities that work against them through transit. It harkens a consideration of who gets to 
be where, and how those mandates are enforced. The institutional, governmental, and social 
reactions to the state of global migration today ultimately asks: Who has the right to pursue 
perceived safety, to move into ecologies of well-being? Moreover, when transnational travelers 
are marked as distinctly national (through race, language, war time fears, or global politics) in 
ways that render them as perpetual strangers, what other methods of belonging can migrants 
receive and offer? 
This chapter employs the philosophical notion of cosmopolitanism—the worldview that 
all humans are part of a common communal order—to consider how Others could be received in 
this current sociopolitical moment, in which all national governments must reckon with being 
under-prepared, both in terms of humanitarian resources and also empathetic capacity. As I 
examine these questions of global migration, cosmopolitanism, and how the ties and imprints of 
the nation are always present and regulatory therein, I refer to two autobiographies that provide a 
lens for this analysis: Barack Obama’s Dreams of My Father (1995) and Seiichi Higashide’s 
Adios to Tears (1993). Given their extraordinary histories and stories of travel and migration, 
Obama and Higashide provide narrative material that show transnational and cosmopolitan 
subject positions in a way, I will argue, that can be mutually inclusive.  
2.1 Cosmopolitanism and Global Migrants 
Cosmopolitanism is a rendering of humanism that is uniquely equipped to contend with 
the philosophical contours of global migration and transit. Etymologically, the term 
cosmopolitan derives from Greek and is usually interpreted as “world citizen.” It has been 
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drastically reconceived for the 21st century as postcolonial and critical race scholars have worked 
to counter its 18th century Enlightenment aloofness of the budding bourgeoisie. Writing in 2000, 
David Harvey suggests that cosmopolitanism is “now portrayed by many … as a unifying vision 
for democracy and governance in a world so dominated by globalizing capitalism that it seems 
there is no viable political-economic alternative for the next millennium” (529). Although there 
is often a sense of hope and progressiveness associated with cosmopolitanism, there is also often 
a feeling of skepticism and even threat that is loaded into the term. “The cosmopolitan possesses 
the power to unsettle,” Ross Posnock states in “The Dream of Deracination,” because the 
cosmopolitan is often perceived to purport “a refusal to revere local or national authority and a 
desire to uphold multiple affiliations” (802). In the introduction to the seminal special issue of 
Public Culture dedicated to cosmopolitanism, editors Sheldon Pollock, Homi Bhabha, Carol 
Breckinridge, and Dipesh Chakrabarty explain: 
The cosmopolitanism of our times does not spring from the capitalized ‘virtues’ of 
Rationality, Universality, and Progress; nor is it embodied in the myth of the nation writ 
large in the figure of the citizen of the world. Cosmopolitans today are often the victims 
of modernity, failed by capitalism’s upward mobility, and bereft of those comforts and 
customs of national belonging. Refugees, peoples of the diaspora, and migrants and 
exiles represent the spirit of the cosmopolitical community. Too often, in the West, these 
peoples are grouped together in a vocabulary of victimage and come to be constituting 
the ‘problem’ of multiculturalism to which late liberalism extends its generous promise of 
a pluralist existence. Cultural pluralism recognizes difference so long as the general 
category of the people is still fundamentally understood within a national frame. Such 
benevolence is often well intentioned, but it fails to acknowledge the critique of 
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modernity that minoritarian cosmopolitans embody in their historic witness to the 
twentieth century. (582)  
To wit, Susan Stanford Friedman renames contemporary migrants as “the new cosmopolitans” 
(203). This make-over of cosmopolitanism should not be mistaken as a purely intellectual foray. 
Cosmopolitanism must be taken seriously in our present day as a response to the many and 
varied ways that institutions have failed the basic rights of humans in every part of the world. In 
his 1996 work, On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness, Derrida foregrounds this perspective, 
explaining that “[w]henever the State is neither the foremost author of, nor the foremost 
guarantor against the violence which forces refugees or exiles to flee, it is often powerless to 
ensure the protection and the liberty of its own citizens before a terrorist menace” (6). The 
branch of cosmopolitanism that this chapter focuses on is the branch that has been reimagined in 
the face of ever-expanding violence against today’s global migrants. Cosmopolitans are no 
longer beholden to the 18th century’s concept of Man through Reason (even if tenants of the 
notion initially draw from Enlightenment works), nor are cosmopolitans restricted to the figure 
of the privileged, aloof European world traveler of the 19th century.1 Minoritarian scholars have 
recalibrated cosmopolitanism for the 21st century to pronounce our individual responsibility to 
the Other and our obligation to humankind as a way of being and of sharing the world. This 
chapter explores the contours of minority subjectivity evoked by this cosmopolitan spirit.  
                                               
1 Sylvia Wynter goes even further back in history than the widely-referred to marker of the 18th 
century European Enlightenment to locate Man; she instead cites Da Vinci’s “Vitruvian Man” 
circa 1490. See Walter Mignolo’s deeper discussion of this historical tracing in his essay “Sylvia 
Wynter: What does it mean to be Human” in Katherine McKittrick’s collection Sylvia Wynter: 
On Being Human as Praxis. For an example of the privileged cosmopolitan figure of the 19th 
century, see Henry James’s 1878 novella Daisy Miller. 
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Any current discussion of cosmopolitanism must include the work of Kwame Anthony 
Appiah, whose scholarship on cosmopolitanism has defined his academic career and redefined 
how every scholar after him engages a much richer, more capacious regard for cosmopolitanism. 
Appiah is often credited with pulling cosmopolitanism out of its 18th century Enlightenment box 
to expose how it can, as both a philosophy and a practice, robustly engage with our most dire 
dilemmas of modernity. Indeed, cosmopolitanism has always been locked between charges from 
both ends of the political spectrum: “The unsettling challenge of the cosmopolitan has 
historically incited the charge of deracination, especially by nationalists for whom blood and soil 
are sacred,” Posnock explains. “In the US and elsewhere cosmopolitanism has often been 
attacked by both ends of the spectrum: the Right regards it as unpatriotic and hence suspect; the 
Left finds its detachment elitist, apolitical, and hence irresponsible …both sides regard 
cosmopolitanism a betrayal of roots, hence inauthentic” (Posnock 803). Yet Appiah has led the 
way in navigating between these competing viewpoints. Appiah’s work both goes beyond the 
European Enlightenment mentality that abandoned difference and discredits his contemporary 
colleagues’ attempts to revamp the term as an updated version of multiculturalism.2 
As the inventor of the term “rooted cosmopolitanism,” Appiah clarifies that there are two 
components of the thought at play. “One is the idea that we have obligations to others, 
obligations that stretch beyond those to whom we are related by the ties of kith and kind, or even 
the more formal ties of a shared citizenship,” he states, notably emphasizing obligation as a 
connective social tissue. “The other is that we take seriously the value not just of a human life 
but of particular human lives, which means taking an interest in the practices and beliefs that 
                                               
2 See Martha Nussbaum’s “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism” (1994) and Appiah’s response, 
“Cosmopolitan Patriots” (1997). 
34 
lend them significance” (Cosmopolitanism xv). It is the second component of Appiah’s outline 
that sets his conception of cosmopolitanism apart from previous versions that focused solely on 
difference, mandating that any quality of particularity be dismissed in the name of a more 
egalitarian universal community of world citizens. Friedman explains why Appiah’s definition of 
the concept captures us as something worth working through. “Appiah’s affirmation of the 
‘cosmopolitan ideal’ as ‘our obligations to strangers’ is not just an ethical abstraction but a 
viscerally felt imperative in today’s world, when spectacles of individual suffering spread virally 
across the global mediascape” (203, my emphasis). The straightforward argument that Friedman 
makes here is that dismissing Appiah’s cosmopolitan theory is akin to dismissing the millions of 
people who are at risk and suffer greatly, who are unknown to us but are nonetheless deeply a 
part of us. 
While Appiah embraces difference, he does not see it as negating common humanity or 
the goals of humanism. His best-known earlier essay on cosmopolitanism, “Cosmopolitan 
Patriots,” identifies the core struggle of competing loyalties that new cosmopolitanism must 
navigate in order to be relevant and useful in our present time. All people are part of many 
communities that vary greatly in scope and scale: a person is loyal to both the local or particular 
(often formulated as the state or nation, “one’s own”) and to the universal or general (humanity 
writ large, across time, space, and difference). “The favorite slander of the narrow nationalist 
against us cosmopolitans,” Appiah writes in the essay, “is that we are rootless; what my father 
believed in, however, was a rooted cosmopolitanism, or, if you like, a cosmopolitan patriotism” 
(112).  Or, as Friedman notes, Appiah uniquely balances “a form of patriotism that incorporates 
an identification with both nation and the world (the polis and the cosmos), one in which 
hospitality to the stranger is nonetheless an ongoing ethical value” (204). Appiah’s concept of 
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being “rooted” has stuck with many iterations of cosmopolitanism that have been articulated by 
scholars since. It is now academically accepted that a cosmopolitan ethic can be deeply 
connected to a sense of homeland while still feeling obligations to humanity at large. This idea is 
reiterated in his monograph, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers (2006), in which 
Appiah starts each chapter with a story that expresses an ethical situation, usually personal and 
familial in scope, to pre-prove the ethical argument of the section. Appiah addresses issues 
considered to be “high philosophy” (including relativism, positivism, moral value, praxis, and 
purity) directly, but always primarily through anecdotes of lived experiences, small stories of 
people’s intimate delights and dilemmas with one another. In other words, Appiah puts the 
human before the scholar.  
The tension between the two components of cosmopolitanism that Appiah suggests is 
meant to be generative, but not necessarily conclusive. “As we’ll see, there will be times when 
these two ideals—universal concern and respect for legitimate difference—clash,” Appiah 
cautions in the preface of Cosmopolitanism. “There’s a sense in which cosmopolitanism is not 
the name of the solution but of the challenge” (Cosmopolitanism xv). There are two reasons why 
this challenge is not necessarily something to be overcome: one, cosmopolitanism cannot be 
finite – the aspect of pluralism that is inherent in the concept means it will always be expanding 
and in flux to encompass all peoples and ways of being; and two, cosmopolitanism can never be 
in stasis – it must always be working between the two components of being universal while 
being rooted because that work incites critical dialogue between those two poles which then 
enables just action. The editorial team of the Public Culture special issue have it right when they 
state that “Cosmopolitanism may instead be a project whose conceptual content and pragmatic 
character are not only as yet unspecified but also must always escape positive and definite 
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specification, precisely because specifying cosmopolitanism positively and definitely is an 
uncosmopolitan thing to do” (Pollock et al 577). That capacious mercuriality (or what critics 
may call instability) is that thing that hails us to act, for as the editors also rightly note, “[a]s a 
practice, too, cosmopolitanism is yet to come, something awaiting realization” (Pollock et al 
577).  
2.2 Narratives Structured through Global Migration 
As creative narrative works, Dreams of My Father and Adios to Tears show how 
migration and the cosmopolitan ideal interact through subjects uniquely beholden to the United 
States. Admittedly, Dreams of My Father is known by most American readers as a key text that 
launched Obama’s Democratic Party stardom, while Adios to Tears has never been on any best-
seller list and has remarkably little commentary or scholarship produced to accompany its 
popular or critical reception. These works nonetheless offer cogent explorations of this chapter’s 
underlying inquiry, inherently posing questions of national belonging and citizenship beyond the 
state structure.  
Seiichi Higashide was born in the Otoe Village in Sorachi District in Hokkaido, Japan in 
1909. His family farmed and helped lead their village of other farmers during the turbulence of 
the post-WWI global economic depression. From an early age, Higashide was never content with 
a career of farming, seeing the hardship of poverty and long-term unviability of the work through 
his community; instead, he had ambitions to go to school and become an architect. Higashide left 
his family home to pursue his goal, making his way to Sapporo and then Tokyo for school. 
Although Higashide found apprentice work in an architecture firm, he was unable to complete 
his degree. Understanding that options and opportunities were limited in Japan at the time, 
Higashide sought overseas possibilities. “My first choice was really to go to America…a great, 
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vast country based on the principles of liberty and equality,” Higashide recalls. “But some years 
earlier, the United States had completely prohibited immigration from Japan, so to go to America 
was an impossible dream” (36).3 Lured by the success of Japanese immigrants in Peru, Higashide 
immigrated to Canete in 1930, immediately settling in with the Japanese community there.4 In 
1935 Higashide married a second generation Japanese Peruvian woman (i.e. his wife was a 
natural born Peruvian citizen as her parents immigrated to Peru from Japan), moved south to the 
town of Ica, and started his family and a small goods store business. Although his business 
prospered in Ica, “the Pacific War intervened and everything was reduced to nothing” (95). Anti-
Japanese sentiment spread throughout the Americas, including throughout Peru despite there 
being no history of Japanese discrimination. Higashide was wrongly blacklisted by the Peruvian 
government as a dangerous Axis national in 19415 and in 1943 he went underground in hiding to 
evade being sent to the United States as part of a prisoner exchange program (wherein the U.S. 
would import and then exchange Japanese Peruvian “prisoners” with Japan’s American 
prisoners). On January 6, 1944 Higashide was caught in his hideout––a hole he dug under his 
family’s house––and arrested by Ica police.  
                                               
3 Higashide refers to the United States’ Immigration Act of 1924 here, which enforced a 
“national origins quota” that limited immigrant visas to two per cent of each nationality already 
in the U.S. according to the 1890 census. This law directly and disproportionately targeted 
immigrants from Asia. Erika Lee’s article “The ‘Yellow Peril’ and Asian Exclusion in the 
Americas” puts immigration legislation in context of the broader political landscapes across the 
Americas and shows how the global migratory flows of Asian peoples influenced and were 
effected by U.S. immigration policies.  
4 Higashide notes that he chose to immigrate to Peru for many reasons, including the promise of 
upward mobility away from agrarian work: “Most of the Japanese who had crossed over to Peru 
had done so as agricultural workers, but later moved to urban areas to build successful 
commercial enterprises. In that sense, at that time the Peruvian Japanese community was even 
more advanced than Japanese immigrants in North America” (39).  
5 “We learned that the [black]list had been leaked to reporters by a local U.S. agency,” Higashide 
recalls in reflecting on the turning sentiment toward Japanese Peruvians in the late 1930s (114). 
That blacklist was subsequently published in local Peruvian newspapers.  
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Higashide was shipped to an American military camp in Panama as a prisoner of war, one 
of 29 other Japanese prisoners; of these, “five or six were naturalized Peruvians and one or two 
were Nisei who had been born in Peru” (144). In Panama, the “Japanese people’s army,” as the 
American soldiers called the deportees, were forced to do hard manual labor from sun up to sun 
down. They cleared the dense underbrush around the camp, guarded at all times by two military 
policemen carrying bayoneted rifles (145). In 1944, Higashide was imported to the U.S., first 
detained at the Kenedy Alien Detention Camp in Texas, and then moved to the Crystal City 
incarceration camp in Texas, where his wife and children came to meet him and be reunited in a 
foreign, hostile land.  
After the war, Higashide remained in the U.S., refusing the alternative of going to Japan 
which would have been an entirely different world for his family (and destitute in the aftermath 
of the atomic bombs). Peru, along with eleven other Central and South American states that had 
deported Japanese people to the U.S., would not permit the deportees reentry. On the other side, 
the U.S. labeled the deportees as illegal aliens because they did not have visas when they entered 
the country, which therefore made their residence illegal. Nevertheless, Higashide, his family, 
and some other deportees were granted restricted parole in 1946 and could endeavor to work for 
a new, independent life. Seabrook Farms in New Jersey offered to be the guarantor of the 
remaining Japanese Peruvian illegal aliens. Almost 300 Japanese Peruvians moved north to 
another form of imprisonment and labor: Seabrook Farms heavily taxed their wages, charged 
unreasonable rent in their shoddy company town, and hyper-inflated store good prices at the 
company store, ultimately instituting an indentured servitude under the guise of parole guarantor.  
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In 1949 Higashide and his family escaped Seabrook by moving to the Midwest to 
Chicago, nearly broke but free from company debt.6 “Our first two or three years in Chicago was 
a time of complete and ultimate poverty,” Higashide explains (198). Every family member who 
was old enough worked multiple jobs to keep the family afloat financially.  Eventually, 
Higashide was able to convince a local bank manager to sign off on a loan so that Higashide 
could purchase a small apartment building. This property acquisition initiated a period of meager 
stability and livable quarters for the family.7 The Higashides stayed in Chicago for many years; 
all seven of the children attended primary schools and universities in the metro region. 
Eventually, though, the cold air and never-ending work of managing rental buildings became 
enough of a hardship for Higashide to consider warmer and more culturally familiar climates for 
retirement. Higashide and his wife retired to Hawaii in 1974, where two of their children had by 
then also moved and started their own families.  
In his retirement Higashide undertook the task of recording his memoir wherein he was 
able to consult many historical texts and academic works to help him remember the timelines 
and converging political and social events that instigated many of his travels. Ultimately, with 
the exception of his final move to Honolulu for retirement, every one of Higashide’s 
geographical transitions—from Japan to Peru to Panama to Texas to New Jersey to Chicago—
                                               
6 Although Higashide does not specify which areas of Chicago his family resided, it should be 
noted that post-WWII was a period of extensive immigration for the city: along with migrants 
from Europe, Central America, and Asia, African Americans were moving north as part of the 
Great Migration. See Isabel Wilkerson’s The Warmth of Other Suns (2010) for a deeper analysis 
and narrative depiction of this migratory period and pathway.  
7 Until they owned property, the Higashide family was in a perpetual state of housing insecurity: 
“Although ‘for rent’ signs could been everywhere, wherever I inquired, when it was learned that 
we were a family of eight …the landlord just shook his head …many times I went into such 
sections of the city which seemed gradually to be deteriorating into slums. But even there the 
landlord refused. In the case of apartments in the black areas, rather than the size of families or 
anything else, the main obstacle was the iron rule ‘for colored only’” (195-6). 
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were out of necessity, either as an act of economic survival (Japan to Peru, New Jersey to 
Chicago) or forcibly as a war-time commodity (Peru to Panama to Texas to New Jersey). Given 
his history of multiple forced displacements, Higashide’s autobiography is a testimony of 
international repressive biopolitics.8 In his decision to record his nomadic life, Higashide ensured 
that his testimony lends political agency to those advocating for deserved redress for Latin 
American Nikkei, as they were not included in President Reagan’s Civil Liberties Act of 1988 
that granted reparations to Japanese Americans who had been incarcerated in concentration 
camps in WWII.  
Similarly, Barack Obama’s Dreams of My Father could be read as a testimony of 
biopolitics in that it too lends political agency to minoritized people – both citizens of the United 
States and citizens of the world. Obama famously positions himself as a subject shaped by many 
different people from Kansas to Kenya, though only in America would his life story be possible.9 
Obama’s memoir was originally published in 1995 and subsequently re-released in 2004 after he 
won his Illinois federal Senate seat and provided the keynote address for the Democratic 
National Convention (an honor that historically marks the most promising rising congressional 
star of the political party). In many ways his autobiography follows a traditional bildungsroman 
arc, wherein the narrative starts when the protagonist is young and progresses through his early 
adulthood, cataloguing life events that shaped his emotional and psychological development to 
stand testament to the fact that he has indeed “come-of-age.” Though for Obama, his life was 
                                               
8 Ignacio López-Calvo describes in detail how Adios to Tears functions in the genre of Latin 
American testimonio (see chapter 1).  
9 Obama’s ancestry elicited as much criticism as it did solidarity. Linda Selzer writes that “the 
difficulty of fitting Obama into preexisting conceptions of Americanness made it easier for 
opponents to represent the candidate as two-sided and suspect rather than singularly American 
…Obama’s representational ambiguity also provided opportunities for supporters to praise him 
for embodying something radically new in politics and national life” (22).  
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organized as much by geography as it was by time.10 Divided into three parts, Dreams of My 
Father suggests a life order and worldview that is sieved through his many depictions of 
geographical, epistemological, and political transit.  
The first section is titled “Origins,” which describes his childhood in Hawaii with his 
mother and maternal grandparents, his years spent in Indonesia with his mother and step-father, 
his undergraduate semesters on the California coast, and his first truly independent move, to New 
York, to figure out his post-degree life. All of these places, which span the Pacific Ocean and 
over the continental United States, inform his origin. Reflecting on the story his mother would 
tell him as a young boy about why his father left the two of them early on, Obama writes, “the 
path of my father’s life occupied the same terrain as a book my mother once bought for me, a 
book called Origins, a collection of creation tales from around the world” (10). As a boy, Origins 
provided the framework of explanation that defies logic but is nevertheless positioned as 
absolute truth—“stories of Genesis and the tree where man was born, Prometheus and the gift of 
fire, the tortoise of Hindu legend that floated in space, supporting the weight of the world on its 
back” (10)—and offer great security and comfort in their telling. That same framework was 
conveniently used to explain his absent father, gone to Harvard for his PhD and back to Alego, 
Kenya to combat the after effects of colonization in his fatherland. Although he makes clear that 
he was always protected and loved, Obama remembers a turning point in his childhood when he 
read an article in Life magazine about a black man who tried to peel off his skin. The article had 
a profound impact on Obama’s own understanding of himself as being phenotypically different 
from the rest of  his boyhood household in Hawaii, but he recalls feeling the need to hide the 
                                               
10 See Robert Kruse’s “The Geographical Imagination of Barack Obama: Representing Race and 
Space in America” for more on how Dreams of My Father, as a geographical text, uniquely 
spatializes racial identities. 
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magazine article from his mother: “I still trusted my mother’s love – but I now faced the prospect 
that her account of the world, and my father’s place in it, was somehow incomplete” (52). Just as 
a child eventually questions how a giant tortoise might float around in space, Obama naturally 
sought a more holistic understanding of how he fit into the world. 
As Obama grew older and matured, he realized that race changes with geography, or 
rather, that the social expressions of race are dependent in part on one’s location. Part two is 
titled “Chicago” and focuses on his time spent as a community organizer in the Midwest 
metropolis. Obama’s account clearly shows the rigidity of the social and governmental housing 
system not only in Chicago, but also throughout the United States, as he traces many of the low-
income housing issues in inner-city neighborhoods to be common to a federal system that has 
purposefully turned away from the insecurity and displacement that many minority communities 
confront.11 Walking to community meetings in the evenings, Obama would glance down any 
given street in the Altgeld neighborhood in Chicago and see “boarded-up homes, the decaying 
storefronts, the aging church rolls …loud congregations of teenage boys, teenage girls feeding 
potato chips to crying toddlers, the discarded wrappers tumbling down the block” (157). The 
communities he came to know and advocate for in Chicago informed his outlook on black 
identity within a national American and experiential framework. “By the time I reached 
Chicago,” Obama tells us, “the phrase self-esteem seemed to be on everyone’s lips…it was a 
handy catchall to describe our hurt, a sanitized way of talking about the things we’d been 
                                               
11 Glenda Carpio’s “Race and Inheritance in Barack Obama’s Dreams of My Father” further 
analyzes Obama’s national and world view of race. She argues that “Obama may have survived 
the obstacles to black self-realization, but throughout his autobiography, he is acutely aware of 
the gap between him and other young black men …[who] have inherited their predicament in 
ways that may be measured through the ‘hard statistics’ of prison records, unemployment, and 
health and housing disparities that have come down the generations” (82).  
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keeping to ourselves” (193). A frequent criticism of Obama during his campaign was his 
understanding and support of black nationalism even in its more virulent forms.12 But in this 
section of his memoir, Obama develops a more nuanced articulation of American black identity 
politics than his critics ever cared to understand. He saw the fissures and deep cracks in the 
message of value and upliftment that some of his black nationalist friends and neighbors in 
Chicago championed: “It was a message that ignored causality or fault, a message outside 
history, without a script or plot that might insist on progression” (198). These messages of 
solidarity are necessary and based in truth, though often do not have the capacity to carry the full 
rooted story of being connected to others who are not you. Being black in the South Side of 
Chicago was not the same experience or identity of being black in Hawaii, or Jakarta, for that 
matter. Obama had to migrate to Chicago to understand the critical tension produced when 
groups of people loyal to one another create messages of common survival – here, by way of 
being poor and black in Chicago in the 1980’s, though it could just as easily be said of Jews in 
New England in the 19th century or Hispanic undocumented migrants today.   
Finally, in the last section of the book, “Kenya,” Obama recounts his travels to his 
father’s homeland, where he meets all of his father’s side of the family and gradually develops a 
more complex understanding of who is father was. In doing so, he realizes that the problems of 
the American black community that he articulated in his work in Chicago cannot be reduced to a 
simple a loss of culture, as so many of his neighborhood colleagues subscribed. In Kenya, 
Obama immediately and unexpectedly accesses the deep, unique connection with the land of his 
paternal ancestors that, perhaps, had always already been residing in him. Upon his arrival to the 
                                               
12 See Linda Selzer’s discussion of Obama’s affiliation with Reverend Jeremiah Wright, who 
gained national attention during Obama’s presidential campaign for videos of him saying “God 
Damn America!” in sermons (17-18). 
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Kenyatta International Airport, Obama is helped by a staff person in locating his luggage. She 
easily recognizes his surname as his father, a doctor, had helped many families in the area. “That 
had never happened before, I realized,” Obama writes, struck by the allegiance to one another 
formed through the simple recognition of a name. “For the first time in my life, I felt the 
comfort, the firmness of identity that a name might provide … My name belonged and so I 
belonged, drawn into a web of relationships, alliances, and grudges that I did not yet understand” 
(305). Accompanied by his half-sister, Auma, an intelligent, self-questioning professor at the 
University of Nairobi, he travels through urban and rural Kenya and grapples with the 
convolutions and complications of family ties, identity, human flaws and failings, and the history 
of how global power has been executed over time. He finds no easy answer to his questions, but 
his understanding deepens and he cultivates a new hope and embodies a newfound cosmopolitan 
spirit.  
2.3 Cosmopolitanism of Old and New 
The term cosmopolitan often connotes one who has no national attachments or 
prejudices. The philosophical underpinnings and intellectual history of the notion, however, are 
predictably convoluted and unstable, as many ancient worldviews that have been rebirthed and 
reinterpreted over the course of many centuries tend to be. Most scholars of cosmopolitanism 
trace the intellectual use of the term from Immanuel Kant forward through time, as Kant is 
credited for espousing cosmopolitan principles through the European Enlightenment. Bridging 
Kant’s 18th century groundwork for cosmopolitan thinking to our current sociopolitical moment 
must be done with caution and skepticism, though, as his work was deeply ethnocentric and 
helped establish a foundation for a worldview of racial hierarchy. Thomas Jefferson, for 
example, relied on aspects of Kant’s work in “Query XIV” in his Notes on the State of Virginia, 
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in which he argues that Africans should have no permanent place in democratic nations as they 
are less human than the white people to whom they belonged, as “their griefs are transient” and 
their “difference is fixed in nature” (145). The Enlightenment, to which Kant’s work was a 
central pillar, largely hinged on the construction of (white) Man developed through a knowledge 
system of (Western) Reason. 13  To wit, in his 1784 essay “What is Enlightenment?”, Kant 
declares that “Enlightenment is man’s emergence from his self-incurred nonage,” wherein 
“Nonage is the inability to use one’s own understanding without the guidance of another” (54) – 
a worldview that is clearly extended through Jefferson’s depraved belief that “in reason [the 
African slave population is] much inferior [to whites],” as “their existence appears to participate 
more of sensation than reflection” (146, my emphasis). According to the equation of exclusion 
that Kant composed and Jefferson enacted, people of African ancestry in the United States 
lacked the gumption to intellectually draw themselves out of their natural inferiority through 
intellectual might of reason and reflection, therefore never emerging as Enlightened Man, always 
only a child-animal that had to be tamed, broken, and controlled by the superior, self-
emancipated white class of masters. With this in mind, Kant seems to be an oxymoronic 
foundation for cosmopolitan ethics. Nevertheless, scholars of cosmopolitanism have used a 
selection of Kant’s work to articulate a starting point of revising terms of sovereignty and 
political power beyond the nation-state. 
Kant’s Perpetual Peace, written and published in 1795, is often cited in cosmopolitan 
discussions because he lays out a new set of principles for sovereign states to assure their 
                                               
13 Although “Enlightenment thinking” was not homogenous, either. Of particular note is Johann 
Gottfried Herder, who was Kant’s pupil and contemporary, and deviated from the “rationalist” 
construction of the Enlightenment (Kant’s camp). See “Johann Gottfried Herder Revisited: The 
Revolution in Scholarship in the Last Quarter Century” by  Zammito, Menges, and Menze. 
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security – principles seen as radical for the 18th century (and for the 21st century, for that matter), 
in that they are not based on their ability to make and sustain war. Although cosmopolitanism is 
often and understandably pitched against nationalism in current discourse, the two have not 
always been antagonistic. In his essay “Kant’s Project for Perpetual Peace,” Allen Wood points 
out that Kant wrote Perpetual Peace after the 1795 Treaty of Basel between Prussia and France, 
which effectively ended the War of the First Coalition between the monarchical states of Europe 
and the French Republic (59). Given Kant’s contemporary historical context, Perpetual Peace 
can be read as an endorsement for the new republic of France and its burgeoning capacity to lead 
a cosmopolitan federation in Europe.  
Peng Cheah, co-editor of Cosmopolitics, notes the events that likely incited Perpetual 
Peace predate “the period between 1825 and 1831 when nationality, in search of statehood, 
emerges for the first time, as the primary basis of revolution” (23). In other words, 
cosmopolitanism as outlined by Kant came before nationalism. Cheah argues that Kant wrote 
Perpetual Peace in an effort to quell the disorder of the newly formed independent states in 
Europe as his “vision of cosmopolitical right … attempts to provide an ideal institutional 
framework for regulating the anarchic behavior of states” (24). As Ross Posnock confirms, 
“[c]osmopolitan civility arose as the behavior of an emergent bourgeois class now permitted to 
participate in the public sphere unregulated by aristocratic privileges of birth or land” (803). The 
guidance that Perpetual Peace intended to provide was sorely needed in Kant’s eyes. In one of 
his most famous passages from the essay, Kant calls for caution and broad-sightedness as new 
republics emerged. “The peoples of the earth have entered in varying degrees into a universal 
community, and it is developed to the point where a violation of laws in one part of the world is 
felt everywhere,” he writes (107). Kant sees cosmopolitanism as a moral-political project that 
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extends beyond an ethics of common humanity into a global political community premised 
through right. “The idea of cosmopolitanism law is,” he continues, “a necessary complement to 
the unwritten code of political and international law, transforming it into a universal law of 
humanity” (107). Recalling that Kant is writing Perpetual Peace at a time when revolutionary 
proletariat are casting off the rule of imperialists and monarchs, we see how cosmopolitanism 
gives name to the belief that every person has equal right to exist anywhere on Earth and is 
actually enacted through pre-existing political structures that connect disparate groups of people, 
such as trade, commerce, and the arts. Cheah confirms this logic, writing that “Kant’s notion of 
cosmopolitan right is not anti- or postnationalist,” but “is instead a form of right based on 
existing attachments that bind us into a collectivity larger than the state” that “is not in the least 
an ideal of detachment opposed to national attachment” (24). Cosmopolitanism, then, was not 
initially imagined to float above national alliances or state allegiances (again, the concept of 
“national” as we know it today was in an embryonic stage during Kant’s time), untethered to any 
loyalties of social governance and local particularity. Cosmopolitanism was imagined as a way 
of re-attaching––or even an ongoing series of reattachments of––people to one another through 
common rights that both included and extended beyond absolute state models.  
It follows, then, that cosmopolitans are loyalists in multiple senses. They are loyal to the 
idea that all humans are fundamentally connected to one global community; they are loyal to the 
belief that there are rights inherent to every human; and they are loyal to the institutions (nation, 
state, governments, and other forms of social organizing) that are best able to ensure those rights. 
Cosmopolitanism should not be mistaken to be an altruistic identity, though. Rather, it is a 
practice that requires rigorous cultivation and commitment by those who espouse its worldview. 
Bruce Robbins explains that the “willingness to consider the well-being of people who do not 
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belong to the same nation as you is not … something that is mysteriously pre-given by the 
simple fact of belonging to the human species” (6). As with face-to-face, interpersonal, 
individual relations, loyalty is established through process, usually earned through deed and act. 
“Larger loyalties can either be there or not be there,” Robbins writes, “[t]hey have to be built up 
laboriously out of the imperfect historical materials … that are already at hand. They do not 
stand outside of history like an ultimate court of appeal” (6). In other words, we may all be 
connected by virtue of being part of the same species that shares the same Earth, but that in itself 
does not guarantee a fraternal or ethical loyalty to one another. Therefore, to return to Kant’s 
phrase, some “universal law of humanity” must be established, wherein “[p]olitics must be 
forced to include the variable power of sympathetic imagination to define collectivities of 
belonging and responsibility” (Robbins 9). This is where forms of new cosmopolitanism actively 
come into play. If Kant deemed what was required in the changing political landscape of the 
West’s Enlightenment, cosmopolitans of modernity reckon with how to ethically practice that 
worldview. Paul Gilroy states the case well in his monograph Postcolonial Melancholia when he 
contemplates “how we might invent conceptions of humanity that allow for the presumption of 
equal value and go beyond the issue of tolerance into a more active engagement with the 
irreducible value of diversity within sameness” (55). 
Many versions of cosmopolitanism have sprung forth from the intellectual cornerstone 
provided by Kant, including Appiah’s aforementioned idea of rooted cosmopolitanism, that 
implicitly seek to respond to Gilroy’s inquiry. Walter Mignolo, for another example, argues for a 
“critical cosmopolitanism” that is grounded in the history of colonialism and the lived 
experiences of global migrants today; Scott Malcomson largely aligns with this strategy, naming 
his extension “actually existing cosmopolitanism.” Mignolo sums up how the historic shifts of 
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human rights necessitates consistent foregrounding in works of cosmopolitanism, in “that the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries rights were discussed in relation to humans and (Christian) 
believers, that from the eighteenth century onward rights were discussed in terms of man and 
national citizenship, and that since World War II right have been discussed in terms of 
humanity” (725). Because rights have been perceived in such divergent ways over the centuries, 
Mignolo argues that critical cosmopolitanism today “must negotiate both human rights and 
global citizenship without losing the historical dimension in which each is reconceived today in 
the colonial horizon of modernity” by remembering that “human rights and global citizenship 
[need] to be defined across the colonial difference” (725). Other scholars show similar concern. 
In his article “Cosmopolitanism and the Banality of Geographical Evils,” David Harvey 
recognizes the potential of cosmopolitanism to fail the people who today most aptly embody the 
cosmopolitan project: global migrants. Harvey contends that “it boils down to this: [minority 
peoples] have to reform themselves to qualify for consideration under the universal ethical code 
(thereby flattening out all geographical differences), or the universal principles operate as an 
intensely discriminatory code masquerading as the universal good” (535). Harvey argues that, 
although all part of the same human species, people are undeniably different, hailing from 
different parts of the planet, different nation-states and governments and cultural histories, and if 
these differences are ignored then cosmopolitanism becomes just another rendering of systematic 
world-wide oppression. 
Gilroy suggests that one way to ensure a safeguard against the potential failing of 
cosmopolitanism is to emphasize “civic and ethical value in the process of exposure to 
otherness” (55). This “vulgar or demotic cosmopolitanism,” as he calls it, “glories in the ordinary 
virtues and ironies—listening, looking, discretion, friendship—that can be cultivated when 
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mundane encounters with difference become rewarding.” Gilroy looks to the eighteenth century 
French political philosopher Montesquieu to further define the complexity of estrangement from 
self: 
The cosmopolitan position from which Montesquieu wrote suggests that imaging oneself 
as a stranger in a limited and creative sense might instructively be linked to actually 
becoming estranged from the cultural habits one is born to … Montesquieu seems to have 
been among the first thinkers to suggest that we must learn to practice a systematic form 
of disloyalty to our own local civilization if we seek either to understand it or to interact 
equitably with others formed elsewhere. (57-58) 
Exposure to otherness enables both detachment and reattachment to a range of communities you 
belong to as it not only detaches you from nativist nationalism that prohibits empathy for others 
unlike you, but it also simultaneously reattaches you to particular differences in others through 
ordinary living. The proximity to strangers that demotic cosmopolitanism calls for produces self-
knowledge, which has of course always been a dominant goal of Western philosophies, 
particularly in the Enlightenment era (recall my earlier critique of Kant). The cosmopolitanism of 
the 21st century—the migrant’s cosmopolitanism—uses tools of empathy and attachment to 
difference to reconstruct the frame of humanity via self-knowledge. However, Gilroy cautions 
that this self-knowledge, though “certainly precious” and “worthwhile,” is “no longer the 
primary issue” and “must take second place” to a commitment to “consider how to cultivate the 
capacity to act morally and justly not just in the face of otherness—imploring or hostile—but in 
response to the xenophobia and violence that threaten to engulf, purify, or erase it” (55-56). A 
“principled and methodical cultivation of a degree of estrangement from one’s own culture and 
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history” then is “essential to a cosmopolitan commitment” “especially in turbulent political 
climates” such as the one we occupy today (55). 
For as many revisionist champions there are of cosmopolitanism such as Gilroy, there are 
still other scholars who argue against it. On one hand, there are competing views of how and 
why cosmopolitan beliefs are employed. For example, Linda Selzer explains that Obama 
“frequently posits a cosmopolitan ethic understood as both a practical response to a world that is 
increasingly marked by shared risk and as an idealistic appeal to principles that can function as 
regulative ideals for future action” (28). Selzer draws this conclusion from her analysis of 
Obama’s speeches abroad during his presidency, which foreground Obama’s attitude toward 
policy and international relations rather than his personal, familial life. Selzer is right to point out 
that President Obama recruited international allies by emphasizing an increasing level of shared 
global risk, which in turn necessitated alliances to be formulated through a central understanding 
of common human dignity for planetary survival.14 On the other hand, another counterargument 
to cosmopolitanism can be incited against its outcomes. Katherine Hallemeier, for example, 
argues outright that the contemporary common practice of engaging cosmopolitan readings 
through sympathy relies on “problematically normative definitions of the ‘human’” that actually 
“works to foreclose the very differences that it purports to embrace” (88). Her critique notably 
extends the previously mentioned concerns articulated by David Harvey. More broadly, though, 
Hallemeier’s thesis is indicative of an overarching hesitation that scholars have when admitting 
cosmopolitanism’s capacity to be a form of globalization. Sheldon Pollock and his co-editors of 
Public Culture clarify the philosophical trap when they write “All the derring-do between the 
                                               
14 See “A New Beginning,” the speech that Obama gave in June 2009 in Cairo, in which 
advocated for cooperation between the U.S., the West, and the Muslim world.  
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local and the global in the dialectic of worldly thinking should not conceal the fact that neoliberal 
cosmopolitan thought is founded on a conformist sense of what it means to be a ‘person’ as an 
abstract unit of cultural exchange,” which is itself a direct outcome of a neoliberal worldview 
that emphasizes “individualist aspirations and universalist norms” through which “a genuine 
desire for equality as a universal norm is tethered to a tenacious ethnocentric provincialism in 
matters of cultural judgment and recognition” (581). 
In ever-increasing frequency, national boundaries and state borders conflate, cement, and 
collapse as more and more people travel from location to location, across vast expanses and deep 
differences in pursuit of well-being, exposing how opportunistic neoliberal globalization and 
myopic ethnocentric nationalism remain major world powers. So, given this contemporary 
moment that is largely defined by varying global migrants, what does a cosmopolitan ethic 
reveal itself to be today? Here again Pollock and his co-writers articulate how 
“Cosmopolitanism, in its wide and wavering nets, catches something of our need to ground our 
sense of mutuality in conditions of mutability, and to learn to live tenaciously in terrains of 
historic and cultural transition” (580). Admittedly, cosmopolitanism has been justly critiqued to 
be “a project whose conceptual content and pragmatic character” are “yet unspecified,” but this 
is but a perceived weakness, the co-authors argue. Keeping this mercurial form, cosmopolitanism 
is a political project, ethical imperative, social ordering, intellectual abstraction, lived experience, 
and infinite ways of being all in one livening breath. Cosmopolitanism endeavors to imagine 
“ways of living at home abroad or abroad at home – ways of inhabiting multiple places at once, 
of being different beings simultaneously, of seeing the larger picture stereoscopically with the 
smaller” (587), despite the fact that, as a practice, “cosmopolitanism is yet to come, something 
awaiting realization” (577). 
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2.4 Locating a Cosmopolitan Ethic 
In the conclusion of his autobiography, Obama spells out questions that are not only 
wrestled with throughout his entire memoir, but also deeply resonate in Higashide’s own life 
account: “What is our community, and how might that community be reconciled with our 
freedom? How far do our obligations reach?” (Dreams 438). These questions are at the heart of 
cosmopolitan inquiry, inciting varying camps of cosmopolitanism in scholars’ efforts to 
respond.15 Obama’s and Higashide’s creative narrative works focus these questions not only 
through their lived experiences, but also through an adamantly geographical lens. Their narrative 
framing links up with Harvey’s argument that any consideration of cosmopolitanism must 
include an investment in geography, as geography is the key factor that instills particularity 
across both space and time, and it is particularity that must guide ethics. Harvey contends that 
putting cosmopolitanism and geography into critical conversation forces each system of thought 
to be more self-reflective and rigorous, going beyond a litany of smart sub-sets of either school. 
He asks, “What kind of geographical knowledge is adequate to what kind of cosmopolitan 
ethic?” and argues that a “[f]ailure to answer that deeper question condemns cosmopolitanism of 
any sort to remain an abstracted discourse with no tangible meaning other than the … 
opportunistic application of universal principles to particular geographical instances” (547). 
Recalling the statistics of migrants’ global travels from the introduction of this chapter, coupled 
with the premise that global migrants most aptly embody cosmopolitans today, Harvey’s 
insistence on a geographical approach to cosmopolitanism offers an incisive way to read 
                                               
15 Bruce Robbins’ chapter “Comparative Cosmopolitanisms” in Cosmopolitics offers a robust 
discussion of sub-branches of cosmopolitanism as a way of confronting the charges against 
literature departments that their efforts to “universalize” courses (i.e. make syllabi more 
reflective of minority communities) without updating their pedagogical approach is a disservice 
to the subjects they seek to include. 
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Obama’s and Higashide’s narratives that illuminates how they presuppose our current academic 
discussions of a patriotic and rooted cosmopolitan ethic.    
In his travels through environments of disenfranchisement––from the dirt roads and 
shacks on the outskirts of Jakarta, the systems of displacement that form the projects of Chicago, 
to the mud-walled homes and tall steel buildings that comprise the wonder of Kenya––Obama 
recognizes how imperial pursuits and oppression have made colleagues in strangers (though 
perhaps not always comrades, as tribalism, colonial powers, and history still hold on). He 
perceives a cosmopolitan order that flows through minority and disenfranchised groups, even if 
they themselves never see it or travel to see themselves in others. In the final and most 
philosophical section of his autobiography, Obama muses about a passerby he encounters during 
one of his daily strolls through the urban surroundings of his sister’s apartment in Nairobi. 
Giving an empathetic account of the subject position of a stranger’s life, Obama specifies the 
draining struggle of another man who is not him, but very well could be, and who is nonetheless 
a part of him: 
He’s learned that the same people who controlled the land before independence still 
control the same land, that he still cannot eat in the restaurants or stay in the hotels that 
the white man has built. He sees the money of the city swirling above his head, and the 
technology that spits out goods from its robot mouth. If he’s ambitious he will do his best 
to learn the white man’s language and use the white man’s machines, trying to make ends 
meet the same the computer repairman in Newark or the bus driver back in Chicago does, 
with alternating spurts of enthusiasm or frustration but mostly with resignation. And if 
you say to him that he’s serving the interests of neocolonialism or some other such thing, 
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he will reply that yes, he will if that’s what’s required. It is the lucky ones who serve; the 
unlucky ones drift into the murky tide of hustles and odd jobs; many will drown. (314-15) 
Clearly, there is little optimism here. Neither is there a sense of Obama’s infamous hope that 
flourishes in the face of adversity. Rather, there is a man who is born to a land that will never be 
his, to the possibility of privileges and opportunities for which he will never be eligible. What’s 
more, this man is the same man in Lagos as he is in Newark or Chicago: they are all connected, 
despite their different geographies. Indeed, quite the opposite comes to the fore here, as Obama 
leverages geography to prove both common global community and individual particularities of 
national belonging. But disenfranchisement is not the only thing common between these 
hypothetical people; it is moreover the fact that he/they see the system of which they are a part 
and they know themselves to not be alone, not only in class or skill or paygrade, but in 
enthusiasm, frustration, and resignation. However gloomy it may be, there is undeniable 
attention given to both the universal and the particular in this scene, and there is a generative 
tension palpable between the two.  
During his time organizing in the South Side of Chicago, Obama contends with a social 
outcome of that tension. He notices that the concept of self-esteem was often cited in black 
revitalization conversations around his neighborhood. Instead of solely seeing his community’s 
lack of self-esteem as something robbed by another, more privileged, group, Obama includes an 
internal critique, suggesting that his community was also failing itself by not always actively 
engaging “[t]he continuing struggle to align word and action, [their] heartfelt desires with a 
workable plan” (204). Obama believes that black American’s self-esteem could not be supported 
by statements of racial or cultural purity (in accordance to the foundations of black nationalism). 
Instead, he writes, “Our sense of wholeness would have to arise from something more fine than 
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the bloodlines we’d inherited. It would have to find root … in all the messy, contradictory details 
of our experience” (204). Later in the same section, Obama qualifies the universal yearning that 
he sees as inherent to humankind, which cogently foreshadows his narrative of the gloomy 
stranger. “I find myself thinking that somewhere down the line both guilt and empathy speak to 
our own buried sense that an order of some sort is required,” Obama tries to articulate. He 
clarifies, though, that this is “not the social order that exists, necessarily, but something more 
fundamental and more demanding … that one has a stake in this order, a wish that, no matter 
how fluid this order sometimes appears, it will not drain of out the universe” (270). In this 
passage Obama most directly answers his conclusive question about obligation. His answer: all 
peoples are threaded together in global systems of labor and inherited systemic struggles, which 
forces us all to be in the tension of being both universal and individual. Our obligation, then, 
reaches to each corner of the spectrum of connection, as the tension that is generated by 
inhabiting both poles is generative and maintains the energy required for one to recognize their 
“stake in this order” and keep hoping that the order—the tension of being both universal and 
particular—will not “drain out of the universe.” 
  While Obama shows what may be the darker version of how cosmopolitanism might 
look on the ground and through everyday lives of people, Seiichi Higashide demonstrates a 
rosier version of cosmopolitanism in two key passages. First, Higashide describes how Japanese 
migrants participated in the building of Peru’s Presidential Palace in the early 1920’s. Higashide 
explains that there were many architects vying for the construction project, but “the time allowed 
for the project was so short that even companies backed with large amounts of capital from 
England and the United States had hesitated to undertake it” (39). A Japanese immigrant 
architect, Mr. Tominaga, also competed to build the Presidential Palace, and eventually won the 
57 
contract (though whether or not he was chosen as a last resort is left ambiguous to the reader) to 
the great excitement and pride of the local Japanese Peruvian community. “When they heard of 
the news,” Higashide explains, “the Japanese in Peru spontaneously came forth to offer their 
assistance and approached the construction as a cohesive group … The project was completed 
without incident by its deadline. Mr. Tominaga received a letter of commendation from the 
President and the project greatly enhanced the reputation of the Japanese in Peru” (39). What 
makes this passage such a compelling example of a cosmopolitan ethic is how it illuminates 
nationalism in non-statist terms. Recalling that Kant’s interpretation of cosmopolitanism is not 
antithetical to nationalism––not only does Perpetual Peace predate usages of nationalism per se, 
but also, as Appiah explains in “Cosmopolitan Patriots,” nationalism is a form of rooted, 
patriotic belonging (96-97)––Higashide’s narrative shows how allegiances to multiple nations in 
different geographies “can entertain the possibility of a world in which everyone is a rooted 
cosmopolitan, attached to a home of his or her own, with its own cultural particularities, but 
taking pleasure from the presence of other, different, places that are home to other, different, 
people” (Appiah “Patriots” 91).16 Clearly, the Japanese Peruvians who come together to 
complete the honor of building the Presidential Palace do so because of their pride that a fellow 
Japanese national immigrant was awarded the bid, but in their efforts to ensure Mr. Tominaga’s 
success (and by extension their success as a migrant community), they participate in a distinctly 
                                               
16 This should not be confused to be an absolute endorsement of nationalism. As my introductory 
chapter argues, as an ideology, nationalism has prohibited equity for many disenfranchised 
people. Sheldon Pollock and his co-authors confirm that “nationalism, whether of an ethnic or 
religious or other stripe, has lost little of its power for producing evil in the world.” That being 
understood, though, it is also important to recognize the modes of agency that nationalism has 
enabled when produced by minority groups. “In recognizing the harm that nationalism does in 
promoting territorially based identities, we do not suggest that it has always and only been a 
negative force,” Pollock et al write. “It is famously Janus-faced, and nowhere more so than in the 
non-West” (578). 
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Peruvian national project – after all, presidential residences are as much, if not more, a national 
cultural site as they are a central seat of state government. Here, across geographical differences, 
the Japanese Peruvian community sees their stake in contributing to a sense of order that places 
them both separate from the countrymen of their adopted home of Peru and a critical part of that 
national culture and community. The Japanese Peruvians joyously embrace both ways of being, 
implicitly understanding the internal relation between geographically-based difference and a 
cosmopolitan ethic. And yet it must be said that, recalling Obama’s more glim perspective, the 
Japanese Peruvians’ cosmopolitan pride was capped to their internal community and ethnic 
memory; the Peruvian government does not recognize Mr. Tominaga or the Japanese Peruvians’ 
contributions to any part of the palace construction.17 When it comes to an ethnic minority 
community envisioning itself as being part of the larger community wherein it resides, there are 
parameters of what is permissible and, as Obama’s reflections attest, oftentimes the national 
master narrative does not permit a minoritarian cosmopolitan ethic to be acknowledged. 
Nevertheless, Higashide holds fast to that ethos, even if he himself had not expressly planned to 
do so.  
Another way that Higashide situates himself as a cosmopolitan comes through when he 
begins his narrative by stating in the first line of his preface, “I feel that in my life I have come to 
have ‘three motherlands.’ Although I am aware that a person can’t have three motherlands, 
please allow me to say so because that is truly how I feel” (7). While Higashide did indeed have 
three major and distinct chapters of his life in three very different communities and countries of 
                                               
17 See Peru’s government website, which has a page dedicated to the architecture of the palace: 
“Historia De Palacio De Gobierno.” Tominaga is not the only example of a minority architect 
going unacknowledged in historic national constructions; Benjamin Banneker, the 18th century 
surveyor and urban planner of the U.S. national capitol, was likewise erased from official 
national memory until the latter half of the 20th century. 
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the world, it is worth considering a more cosmopolitan interpretation of his opening lines. For in 
another way, Higashide sees himself as a continuous part of all three environments, including the 
people, political and social events, and overarching pathos that have defined each land for him. 
We see this more clearly in the way he chooses to close his life story. In the final paragraph of 
his memoir, Higashide reflects on where and how he ended up in Hawaii. Consistent with his 
ever-appreciative outlook, he is in just as much awe of the deep blue ocean waters and green 
mountainous slopes that surround him as he is of his extraordinary life journey. To sum up his 
feelings of gratitude and connection, he shares how he has embraced the Hawaiian notion of 
aloha. “I have heard that ‘aloha’ basically means ‘love,’” Higashide writes, “but in this case it 
differs from the Christian understanding of ‘love.’ Here, the term seems to be more directly 
connected to the earth that sustains us and to acceptance of human emotions. In that sense, 
‘aloha’ includes everything that I have sought for over many years. If that is true, I need not now 
write more words” (244). It is clear that Higashide recognizes a spirt of aloha in all beings 
around him and throughout his life. As a reader, I am keen to take him for his word. In this 
passage, Higashide uses the personal plural pronoun “us” in a way that includes and implicates 
the reader, a grammatical use of “us” that he applies nowhere else in his memoir. So too is this 
the only passage in which Higashide mentions “human emotions,” saluting the common, inherent 
obligation that we all have to one another in a very real and experiential way. 
Perhaps unknowingly and unintentionally, Higashide and Obama clearly position 
themselves as cosmopolitans in their respective autobiographies. Harvey argues that 
“geographical and anthropological knowledges play a crucial, though often hidden, role in 
defining what any cosmopolitan project might be about in theory, as well as in practice” (532). 
Obama and Higashide give narrative testament to Harvey’s thesis: through their extensive travels 
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and migrations they developed an experiential epistemology of peoples, cultures, nations, and 
places that ultimately shaped their worldviews.  
2.5 Receiving Strangers 
Skeptics ask cosmopolitans how we could possibly care about every human being. Their 
doubt carries a sharp double-edged logic: first, no one actually knows every human being, and 
second, how could someone actually care for another person who is unknown to them? What 
skeptics are really asking is how can someone have a sincere, emotional and material investment 
in the well-being of a stranger whose individual existence they may never actually know? In 
Cosmopolitanism, Appiah understands what drives those skeptics, agreeing that “the objection is 
not that we can’t take a moral interest in strangers, but that the interest is bound to be abstract, 
lacking in the warmth and power that comes from shared identity,” because ultimately 
“[h]umanity, in the relevant sense, is not an identity at all” (98). We are all strangers, connected 
by our common humanness, but that in itself has weak cohesive ability to situate us in belonging 
to either one another or to the Earth. The central issue here, then, is the concept and perpetual 
presence of the stranger. Yet cosmopolitanism does not ask its participants to base their 
commitment to a shared global community on a theoretical abstraction of a stranger; it instead 
demands an intellectually creative and open approach. Appiah reminds those skeptics that “the 
great lesson of anthropology is that when the stranger is no longer imaginary, but real and 
present, sharing a human social life, you may like or dislike him, you may agree or disagree; but, 
if it is what you both want, you can make sense of each other in the end” (Cosmopolitanism 99). 
The principles of international right that are binding on all human beings collectively depend on 
a capacity to recognize and receive the stranger, to cultivate some sense of shared identity. 
Obama and Higashide’s narratives provide rich, often nuanced, accounts of this reception. This 
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process takes many forms and necessarily shifts from person to person and time to time (if it 
cemented into a single prescribed set of ethical rules, then it would no longer be 
cosmopolitanism), but examples of how the stranger can be received through a cosmopolitan 
ethic are readily available if we choose to be curiously open to their reading.  
Adios to Tears provides the most tangible examples of this ethic. Stories of strangers 
being received are peppered throughout the narrative, giving the reader a sense that they help 
Higashide navigate his memories of his three motherlands. His earliest account is from his 
boyhood in Hokkaido. Higashide remembers walking through town with his father and seeing 
shirtless, dirty, underweight men digging trenches and building brick barriers. “According to 
father, nearly all of the laborers were young Koreans who had been tricked into coming there 
from Tokyo,” Higashide recalls, ashamed that slave labor was responsible for constructing the 
irrigation system that his Japanese hometown took such pleasure and pride in (19).  Even as a 
child, Higashide recognized that there was something wrong with the scene of clearly abused 
people being coerced to work by other people standing guard over them. Higashide’s father also 
recognized the injustice being committed against the Korean laborers and chose to aid “two 
laborers [who] escaped from the nearby construction site and suddenly appeared at [Higashide’s 
family home] seeking help” (19). The escaped slaves did not speak Japanese and had no other 
connection to Higashide’s father or family. But their foreignness did not prevent Higashide’s 
father from risking his own safety to give them shelter. Higashide recounts, “Father silently took 
them over to the stable and hid them … Before they left for an unknown fate, Father gave them 
some old shirts and pants and, handing over one or two yen in cash, warned them to be extremely 
careful” (19). Many years later, when Higashide was in a WWII military labor camp in Panama 
as a prisoner of war, he made friends with a fellow Japanese Peruvian prisoner, Mr. Yagi, who 
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reminded him of his father. Mr. Yagi’s hometown was in Lurin, outside of Lima, in between the 
capitol and rural farmland area that had many “contract immigrants” who worked on cotton 
farms and sugar cane plantations. These immigrants’ working conditions were extremely harsh, 
subject to “inhumane treatment” from their “employers,” which sporadically incited small groups 
to attempt to escape to Lima. Their escape efforts were notoriously dangerous as they would 
often go many days without food only to be “caught by pursuers, beaten and returned” to their 
owners. Some, though, made it to Lurin, and “Mr. Yagi would take them into his home and 
provide them with food and clothes” (148). Mr. Yagi never asked their name or where they were 
from. Instead, he did everything he could to treat them with decency, believing that although he 
did not know them they deserved aid. Higashide explains that “if [the escapees] were sick, [Mr. 
Yagi] took them by horseback to the Chorillos Hospital in the suburbs of Lima. He found jobs 
for those who were still healthy” (148). In these examples, Higashide’s father and Mr. Yagi 
recognized the lives of strangers – not just their physical existence, but their right to live in safety 
and pursue their well-being. The way that they expressed their belief in that right was by aiding 
escapees to work against the capitalistic institution that sanctioned slave labor.  
Assisting indentured laborers’ escape was not the only way that Higashide cites as a 
method of receiving strangers, though. Another possibility is through giving medical and end-of-
life care to strangers in need. For example, Mr. Yagi would not only give shelter to runaways, 
but also “for those who died in [Mr. Yagi’s] home, he would take care of funeral arrangements” 
(148). Here, Mr. Yagi follows-up the human right to life and safety by recognizing the stranger’s 
dignity through death. Providing proper burials for the deceased conveys that those lives were 
recognized to be worth something, connected to others somewhere, and to be worthy of 
mourning. Higashide notes that Mr. Yagi was not alone in this ethic of care as he recounts one of 
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his own caretakers when he first arrived to Peru and became very ill. Madre Francisca was a 
French nun who left France for Peru in 1899, the same year that the first Japanese immigrants set 
foot in Peru. Madre Francisca devoted over 50 years of her life “to aiding and nurturing Japanese 
immigrants,” working in the Dos de Mayo Charity Hospital where she attended thousands of 
patients from immigrant populations, as they were particularly susceptible to contracting serious 
diseases such as malaria, typhus, and dysentery when they arrived to Peru. As most immigrants 
had little capital or knowledge of local healthcare networks, they ended up at Madre Francisca’s 
charity hospital. Higashide reflects on Madre Francisca’s loyalty and generosity in her care, 
noting that the “Madre used her own funds to purchase necessary items and medications. She 
even went out to buy meat and eggs for the patients” (231). Away from their homeland, without 
resources or recourse to local language, often invisible in their status of imported laborers, these 
immigrants were utterly alone, true strangers, unrecognized in their humanity. Beyond the 
material necessities like nutritious food and basic medicines, Madre Francisca also tended to her 
patients’ emotional ailments, especially for “the many Japanese immigrants who spent their last 
hours at the hospital,” many of whom, “in high fever, grasped her hands and called out, 
‘Okaasan!’ (Mother!), as she kept vigil over them” (231). Taking care of other strangers: this too 
is a possible outcome of a cosmopolitan ethic. It is no coincidence that Higashide’s father, Mr. 
Yagi, and Madre Francisca all chose to espouse a cosmopolitan ethic and receive the strangers in 
their midst. They were all strangers themselves, in a foreign land, uniquely poised to recognize 
other strangers as humans with distinct and uncompromising rights and inherent dignity that was 
worthy their recognition and personal investment.  
While Higashide provides examples of actual strangers and how they can be received, 
Obama provides a more nuanced portrayal of strangers and estrangement in his narrative. When 
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Obama was in his 20s and living in New York, his mother and sister, Maya, came to visit him 
from Hawaii. Obama recalls that one evening his mother was reading the paper and saw that 
Black Orpheus (1959) was playing across town. In a rush of excitement, she pulled both of her 
young adult kids into a cab and rushed to the revival theater where the movie was being 
screened. Obama describes the event in vivid detail as something that made him recognize his 
difference, not only in his mother’s understanding of the world at that time, but also in himself. 
He recounts:  
The film, a groundbreaker of sorts due to its mostly black, Brazilian cast, had been made 
in the fifties. The story line was simple: the myth of the ill-fated lover Orpheus and 
Eurydice set in the favelas of Rio during Carnival. In Technicolor splendor, set against 
scenic green hills, the black and brown Brazilians sang and danced and strummed guitars 
like carefree birds in colorful plumage. About halfway through the movie, I decided that 
I’d seen enough, and turned to my mother to see if she might be ready to go. But her face, 
lit by the blue glow of the screen, was set in a wistful gaze. At that moment, I felt as if I 
were being given a window into her heart, the unreflective heart of her youth. I suddenly 
realized that the depiction of childlike blacks I was now seeing on the screen, the reverse 
image of Conrad’s dark savages, was what mother had carried with her to Hawaii all 
those years before, a reflection of the simple fantasies that had been forbidden to a white 
middle-class girl from Kansas, the promise of another life: warm, sensual, exotic, 
different. (123-24) 
As he does numerous times throughout his book, Obama gently reveals the complexity of 
difference with a non-judgmental spirit, yet names it for what it is: prejudice, here in the form of 
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racial exoticism.18 To prevent a presumptive reading of his mother as only having a surface 
investment and aesthetic fascination with hyperbolic Brazilian culture, Obama tempers his story 
by locating her history as “a white middle-class girl from Kansas” which produces that exotic 
perception through her. Glancing at his mom’s “wistful gaze” during the movie, Obama sees the 
Western master narrative in which she places the movie characters in order to make sense of 
them, in order to recognize those strangers who are so different from herself and receive them 
into her worldview. More than that, though, in witnessing his mother’s investment in that master 
narrative of exoticized race, Obama also sees how he, too, is a stranger: first, he realizes he is a 
stranger to his mother because her worldview at that time was based on her terms of recognition, 
not his subjective lived experiences; and second, he realizes a part of him is a stranger to himself, 
in that he had not yet discerned where he belonged locally and how that informed his 
commitment to a global order of human rights. In other words, Obama understood in that 
moment with his mother that a stranger can be “real and present,” “sharing a human social life” 
not only as a person-who-is-not-you, but also as a dynamic within one’s family, community, or 
self.  
Obama and Higashide’s autobiographies help us investigate how minorities practice and 
experience reception with and through other minorities in the context of geographical transit. 
                                               
18 Lucia Nagib explains the history of Black Orpheus production as film and how it was morphed 
into a Western depiction of the exotic. Marcel Camus, a French filmmaker, created and directed 
the 1959 film version of Black Orpheus, adapted from Vinicus de Moraes’s original 1956 play 
“Orfeu de Concieção.” Moraes rejected Camus’s production, refusing to sign off as a co-author 
of the script, as it only served the filmmaker’s taste for “exoticism which, intending to portray 
the blacks as a free people in their spontaneous creativity, in reality imprisoned them in a 
musical ‘ghetto’” (95). It was not until 1980 when Brazilian filmmaker Carlos Diegues 
reimagined Camus’s film production that the play was brought back to de Moraes’s vision of an 
“entirely black universe where the Afro-descendent transcends his condition [of the favelas] and 
equals the gods” (96).  
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Both authors extend existing paradigms and perceptions of migrants to foreground a 
cosmopolitan ethic of self-knowledge through empathy for difference with Others. Obama and 
Higashide’s stories are dynamically different, the former based in a self-reflective critique of 
race and the human condition while the latter offers an outward gaze of geo- and bio-politics; yet 
both gesture to a broader phenomenon in the world, wherein many disenfranchised peoples 
uniquely access an empathetic humanism despite their often precarious well-being. The 
cosmopolitan ethic that Obama and Higashide’s narrative works reflect is relevant, and even 
imperative, today in ways that has not been realized in the past in part because global migration 
informs all our lived experiences in unprecedented ways. It makes sense, then, that 
cosmopolitanism is best expressed through life writing, as it champions the multiplicity of 
people’s connection and belonging to both local ties and the global community of humankind.  
Ultimately, as a lived condition and way of being, the cosmopolitan ethic is best told 
through stories, and although I chose autobiographical accounts, “[f]olktales, drama, opera, 
novels, short stories; biographies, histories, ethnographies; fiction or nonfiction; painting, music, 
sculpture, and dance,” are all equally viable vehicles of story-telling as they all “reveal to us 
values we had not previously recognized or undermine our commitment to values that we had 
settled into” (Appiah Cosmopolitanism 30). The value of being human is uniquely expressed 
through story-telling in ways that other modes of expressing human lives—through quantitative 
data sets that catalogue conditions of well-being to empirical analyses of cultural change—
simply cannot capture. Appiah speaks to this power and necessity of telling stories about our 
lives as it is common across geographies, races, cultures, and time – “it is part of being human 
…it’s just one of the things that humans do,” he writes. “People tell stories and discuss them in 
every culture …they were discussed, evaluated, referred to in everyday life. We wouldn’t 
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recognize a community as human if it had no stories, if its people had no narrative imagination,” 
Appiah further contends; stories “align our responses to the world” when we evaluate and 
respond to them, which “is, in turn, one of the ways we maintain the social fabric, the texture of 
our relationships” (Cosmopolitanism 29). In other words, story-telling, especially the telling of 
one’s own stories, proves a common humanity and integrity of a shared way of being. It confirms 
humanity and paves the path for a cosmopolitan ethic that rejoices in difference and fights for the 
rights of all members in the global community of world citizens. Stories have the capacity to 
change lives, and, if we recognize the right of all strangers to narrate and receive their subjective 
experiences, then stories could also have the power to change the social ecology of the world.  
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3 SUFFERING AS SUBVERSION                                                                                         
IN BITTER IN THE MOUTH AND THE PAGODA 
 
  
Let’s face it. We’re undone by each other.  
And if we’re not, we’re missing something.” 
 – Judith Butler, Precarious Life 
(2004) 
 
In an interview on NPR’s All Things Considered program in August 2016 discussing his 
Emmy Award nomination for RuPaul’s Drag Race, RuPaul Charles made a poignant 
clarification about how mainstream identity in the world of drag is used to undermine social 
norms. “Drag at its core is about challenging the idea of identity. It actually mocks identity. So it 
could never be mainstream. Mainstream is about pick what you’re gonna be and stick with it, 
because you’d make us feel very uncomfortable if [you] started shapeshifting and changing 
‘cause that will wreck my head. So drag will never ever ever ever be mainstream.” While our 
current milieu is keen to construct compact boxes of identity that define whom and what one is 
and, further, should want to be, drag essentially complicates and muddies those straight lines and 
right angles. Later in the interview, RuPaul’s explanations about the intention of his show 
become an insightful political commentary on what drag offers to both the participants and 
viewers: the aesthetic transformation—the wigs and makeup, the tucks and augmentations, the 
platform heels and sequin dresses, the talk and the walk, the character—is merely a vehicle of 
undermining the mainstream (where here, “mainstream” is synonymous with “identity”). The 
costumes and such are accessories, but do not constitute or define the act of drag. Ultimately, 
drag is not about the performance (though drag queens are certainly professional performers)—it 
is not about masquerading about dressed up as the opposite gender of your own sex and 
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hyperbolically mimicking gendered tropes; rather, at least according to RuPaul, drag is a 
calculated, conscious act of subversion. In his recent article in The Atlantic on RuPaul in the 
Trump-era, Spencer Kornhaber succinctly states the core of RuPaul’s political contribution: 
“drag’s real purpose has less to do with passing for another gender than with highlighting 
gender’s artificiality” (n.p.). That drag is more closely aligned with the genre of parody rather 
than performance heightens its capacity to critique both society and self. And this strain of 
parody, as it depends on a hyper self- and social awareness to assert its subversive intent, situates 
itself as dangerous and threatening to the heteronormative collective consciousness.  
In RuPaul’s Drag Race, not only does drag deliberately misuse a major governing social 
norm, in doing so it also offers refuge to those outside the status quo, which enhances its 
threatening potential. In the show, this curation of communal safety through usurping 
heteronormative conventions is laden with traumatic sadness (the young gay men contestants on 
the show are often thrown out by their family and community and are prone to various forms of 
harm and abuse) but it is matched by a keen, humorous jubilation. This particular aesthetic of 
mourning and joyful solidarity inspires this chapter and serves as the prelude for two minority-
authored American novels that also contend with usurpation of identity (and all the joys and 
fallouts therein): Monique Truong’s Bitter in the Mouth (2010) and Patricia Powell’s The 
Pagoda (1998). Both novels feature protagonists—Linda and Lowe, respectively—who 
purposefully corrode and conflate their identities as a way of becoming agents of their 
subjectivities. Linda and Lowe suffer greatly due to their alterity, perpetually struggling to 
manage their outsider status, which upsets and threatens the norms of their local communities. I 
argue that through their suffering of violation and displacement, Linda and Lowe shed their 
masquerade of survival to cultivate a subversive jubilation. Surely, there is great pain in that 
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transformation. Ultimately though both protagonists locate their agency not in reason or 
knowing, but rather in their bodies, as a sort of embodied empathy.1  
Bitter in the Mouth, Monique Truong’s sophomore novel, is set in Boiling Springs, North 
Carolina, a small town that has a dwindling population of old-timey folk who are mostly set in 
their ways and beliefs. The main character, Linda, is adopted by Thomas and DeAnne 
Hammerick when her Vietnamese migrant parents are killed in a mysterious fire of their trailer 
home. The rest of Linda’s adoptive family includes Iris, DeAnne’s harsh mother, and Iris’s much 
younger gay brother, Baby Harper, who unconditionally adores Linda. Loved by her father 
Thomas and tolerated by her mother DeAnne in her adolescent years, Linda is given the guest 
room of their upper-middle class home, staring at the decorative framed prints of sailboats hung 
on the plaid patterned wallpapered walls. At eleven years old, Linda is sexually abused and raped 
by the teenage boy who DeAnne employs to mow their lawn. Linda brings the reader along 
through her growing up years in North Carolina to her early adulthood when she goes to 
Connecticut for university and then to New York, where she stays to pursue partnership at a 
prestigious law firm, effectively avoiding any return to her home that was never really home. As 
an adult, Linda reckons with another physical assault, this time in the form of cancer, which 
totally unhinges the professional and personal ambitions hid behind for so long. 
Linda adjusts to her adoptive world quietly, most successfully through her letters with her 
best friend, Kelly, who lives down the street.2 The written word is much easier for Linda to 
                                               
1 My use of “embodied empathy” should not be connoted to or confused with Octavia Butler’s 
imagining of “hyperempathy,” a fictional condition of transference, in which her protagonist, 
Lauren Olamina, literally feels the pains and pleasures of those around her. Rather, I argue for an 
empathy that is corporeally promoted and situated. 
2 Bitter in the Mouth is inspired by Truong’s 1991 short story, “Kelly,” which focuses on the 
friendship between the two young girls growing up in Boiling Springs, North Carolina.  
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digest rather than the spoken word, as Linda has the unique capability to literally taste the words 
that she hears – a secret she entrusts only to Kelly while growing up, and much later to DeAnne. 
Linda has a neurological condition known as auditory-gustatory synesthesia, wherein words 
incite an involuntary taste reception. Linda’s synesthesia transforms how she knows the world: 
her name, for example, tastes of mint, while “Jesus” tastes like fried chicken. In this way, Linda 
both perceives the world and is perceived by the world (here, the town of Boiling Springs and the 
U.S. south) in non-normative terms.  
Linda is a stranger to her Boiling Springs community in many ways, though Baby Harper 
stands out as a site of belonging and refuge to Linda. As a “singing-talker,” as Linda describes 
him, Baby Harper’s cadence and tone of voice register as song instead of speech and because of 
this Linda has no “incomings” of tastes when he speaks. Linda and her great-uncle Baby Harper 
form a quick allegiance to one another relationally, too, as they both intimately understand the 
hardships and heartaches of being outside the realm of white, upper-middle class, southern social 
acceptability. Unable to change the expressions of her phenotypes, Linda instead masks her 
Asian markers by donning heavy make-up and wearing dark clothes from punk and emo shops, 
fashioning herself into “a visual expletive, a sartorial expression of the bile, acid, and longing 
that would have otherwise stayed locked inside me,” seeking “different ways to hide” from 
others and herself (148). Linda explains, “One way [to hide] was to disappear into a crowd. 
Counterintuitively, another way was to stand out in a crowd. People saw only your costume and 
your mask, and they turned a blind eye to all that was underneath” (146). Baby Harper also hides 
by covering himself up, though his method of choice is to blend into normativity. As an adult, 
Linda reflects on the way Baby Harper presented himself to the world, retrospectively noting 
how he maintained his deepest secrets. “If he had lived in an earlier era, he would have worn 
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gloves and a hat every day. If he had lived in a big city, he would have worn dark sunglasses,” 
Linda surmises. “I understood that my great-uncle, Harper Evan Birch, if he could have chosen, 
would have inhabited a body different from the one that God had given him. His body wasn’t his 
temple” (120). Rather than exposing his body, “[e]ven on the muggiest of summer days, he never 
wore shorts and never rolled up his sleeves,” Linda observes (120). If Baby Harper had dressed 
for the hot weather, his shaved arms and legs would have revealed his preference for embodied 
femininity. Linda and Baby Harper both devote enormous energies to camouflaging into their 
community through their masquerades. They know that hiding their alterities is crucial to their 
survival. It is only later in their relationship, after Linda confesses her traumatic sexual abuse to 
Baby Harper, that they both shed their veneers and become agents in their otherness, engaging 
subversive jubilation.  
 Patricia Powell’s The Pagoda likewise is a text that renders analysis of agency 
manifested through suffering and joy. The novel takes place in mid-nineteenth century rural 
Jamaica, the adopted home of Lowe, a Chinese immigrant who owns a general store and 
attempts to make a life for himself and his daughter, Liz. Lowe presents himself as a man to his 
community, but the reader comes to learn that he is actually a woman masquerading as a man in 
order to survive. Lau A-yin, Lowe’s given name, first disguised herself as a man to escape her 
impending marriage to an aging, stifling man that was arranged by her father to settle a debt. 
Though just a teenage girl, she stole away on a cargo ship heading to the Caribbean pretending to 
be a deckhand.3 Eventually taking ill on board, Lowe was discovered by Cecil, the ship’s 
captain, who became his abuser, healer, rapist, impregnator, benefactor, and match-maker. Using 
                                               
3 Although biologically a woman, Lowe is identified both in his fictional community and 
narratively to the readers through the masculine pronoun. Therefore, this chapter will follow 
Powell’s use of “he/him/his” when referring to Lowe henceforth. 
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the autonomy provided by Lowe’s masculine cover, Cecil does his best to control and protect 
Lowe and their child, setting Lowe up with a shop in Jamaica and bringing Liz gifts whenever 
his cargo shipments bring him back to the area. Cecil even arranges for Lowe to marry a wealthy 
octaroon woman (who passes for white), Miss Sylvie, to be mother to Liz – though this 
arrangement also comes with the demeaning expectation that Lowe be fully partnered to Miss 
Sylvie and keep her sexually satisfied. The novel begins some twenty years after this backstory, 
though, commencing with a devastating scene of Lowe’s shop burning down, taking Cecil (who 
was in the back sleeping off a drunken night) and Lowe’s personal sense of place and purpose 
along with it.    
Assuming the arson was by the hands of the native-born black townsfolk, Lowe bitterly 
comes to understand his foreigner status. Reckoning with his perceived betrayal by the people he 
most closely identified with in his town, Lowe realizes that the collegiality and neighborliness he 
felt with the townsfolk, while not false, did not compete with the institutionalized segregation 
and expulsion of settler colonialism that prevailed over Jamaica for generations before he came 
to the island community.  “He was there only on sufferance,” the narrator describes, “Himself 
and the other five thousand Chinese on the island. He realized now how the Negro people must 
have secretly despised him for being there, how secretly they must have envied him and his shop 
and his relationship to Cecil and Miss Sylvie, for here now was the proof” (13). Early on, then, 
Lowe exhibits a self-conscious awareness of his racial and social trespassing – an awareness that 
festers throughout the novel into rage, resentment, paranoia, and reclusiveness. The arson made 
Lowe see himself as trapped between the black and white racial poles of his community, in 
which he believed that “the whites didn’t give one blast if the [black] others burned [his shop] 
down. So long as their houses were untouched” (13). Lowe retreats into himself, obsessively 
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planning to rebuild his shop into a pagoda-style meeting hall for the other Chinese residents on 
the island. Lowe’s retreat becomes a phenomenal, though painful, self-discovery in that he rebels 
against his constructed, false identity of hyper-masculinity as he figures out how to survive this 
second round of betrayal (first, by his father; then, by his community). Lowe begins appreciating 
more feminine aesthetics such as ladies’ hats, ribbons, and slippers. Opening himself to learning 
sensual pleasure with a trusted townswoman, Joyce, Lowe even redefines the use and purpose of 
sex to go beyond debt-betrothal, rape, or payment for marriage. But Lowe’s choice to embrace 
some feminine features is not a return to his biological sex. Rather, it is a release of the bonds he 
tied himself to in order to escape the patriarchal order. Lowe recognizes that as a man, he is an 
individual and free agent, at least in public. As a woman, he is always just a commodity, in 
which sex was payment, either for debt, passage, or safety.  
Lowe’s public gender persona, then, is instigated by survival. Initially, Lowe ensures his 
survival by publicly projecting himself as male. It is only when Lowe is confronted with the 
decimation of that male identity—the burning of his shop, the perceived betrayal by his 
community—that Lowe sheds his false, heteronormative masquerade. Confronted with the 
realization that his life is a mere veneer to living, Lowe transgresses his own, self-styled front of 
being a man and opens himself to the counter-logical precarity of embracing some pleasures that 
he associates with femininity, like wearing “pretty things” and seeking sensuality. And when he 
finds pleasure in doing so, this too is subversive. Lowe is fully aware that undermining certain 
tenets of his masculine identity is a major risk to his own safety: Miss Sylvie will leave him if he 
does not choose to embrace performing fully as either a man or a woman; his fellow Chinese 
countrymen will abandon him if they see him as a man parading around as a woman. Yet he 
chooses that pleasure nevertheless.  
75 
To understand how a subversion of identity issues forth through suffering, we must first 
engage the contours of suffering, then trace how identity can be disrupted, and finally consider 
how that disruption is confronted. Though Linda and Lowe inhabit very dissimilar narrative 
worlds, they both understand themselves to be outside—or rather, in between—the codified 
poles of belonging within their respective communities. Bitter in the Mouth and The Pagoda 
specifically explore Asian American subjectivities in important, historically under-scrutinized 
ways.4 But what uniquely situates these novels within multiethnic and interracial contemporary 
literature is how they usurp constrictive identity conditions and instead employ an empathetic 
humanism instigated by common suffering. Being neither black nor white, both protagonists 
reject articulations of self that are defined either through racialization or along the color line; 
rather, they locate agency in the body that is inclusive of but not conditional to racialized 
knowledge. The cataloging and understanding of suffering is paramount in this chapter, as 
ultimately it becomes the alternative, sturdier foundation of self-knowledge and deep social 
connection that elides the constraints of identity yet still supports agency. Suffering remakes 
these characters into something unconditioned by traditional social epistemologies of labeling, 
categorizing, and ordering into containable hierarchy. It is the grounds of a new variation of 
humanism based in bodies, not knowledge, and through empathy, not Cartesian logic.  
                                               
4 Truong engages and extends the transracial adoption narrative genre that Asian American 
literary scholars have robustly contended with; similarly, Powell’s narrative traces the lesser-
known Chinese diaspora in the Caribbean and engages the instability of belonging to a 
community when gender norms are shed. See, for example, Begoña Simal-González’s “Judging 
the Book by Its Cover: Phantom Asian America in Monique Truong’s Bitter in the Mouth” and 
Tzarina T. Prater’s “Transgender, Memory, and Colonial History in Patricia Powell’s The 
Pagoda.” 
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3.1 Suffering 
If humanism of old sought to define and defend what comprised and qualified as Human, 
then the humanism of new seeks to identify the most basic common grounds that foster ethical 
conduct. Political scientist and democratic philosopher Bonnie Honig describes this push for “a 
newer variant” of humanism as “one that reprises an earlier humanism in which what is common 
to humans is not rationality but the ontological fact of mortality, not the capacity to reason but 
vulnerability to suffering” (“Antigone’s” 1). If recent discourse on the so-called ethical return to 
humanism is populated by the notions of a capacity to suffer and a disposition of vulnerability, 5 
then Linda and Lowe highlight the major failing of early humanism: how the very category of 
being is dictated and prescribed by knowledge. What kind of knowledge one has, how one is 
known, if one came to know things in the right way and have the same accepted truth outcomes – 
these facets of knowledge are the sieve for early versions of humanism. Linda and Lowe not only 
have atypical environmental knowledge (both being Asian in predominantly black and white 
communities) but also have atypical bodily knowledge (Linda’s synesthesia and Lowe’s 
masculine embodiment). Their unique epistemologies, beautifully described in often sorrowful 
detail, make them susceptible to suffering and vulnerable to pain.  
                                               
5 While the philosophical tradition of ethics traces back to Ancient Greek thinking, the modern 
idea of “the ethical turn” can be rooted in Levinas’s work (especially Humanism of the Other 
[1972] and Ethics and Infinity [1982]). Articulating a new, different sense of the Other from his 
predecessors and contemporaries, Levinas steps away, or beyond, the phenomenological works 
of Husserl and Heidegger. His theories are often thought of as “an ethics of ethics,” as Jacques 
Derrida notes in his 1967 essay “Violence and Metaphysics,” which he wrote on the work of his 
dear friend. Many philosophers and critics, such as Judith Butler, Hannah Ardent, Gilles 
Deleuze, and Giorgio Agamben—all of whom are referenced to varying degrees in this 
chapter—often springboard from Levinas in their work. Perhaps more importantly, though, the 
idea of a return to ethics is pervasive beyond academic or philosophical contexts. In popular 
print, see Anne-Marie Slaughter’s excellent political dissemination of the ethical turn in her 2016 
Foreign Policy article, “The Only Way Forward.” 
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Honig situates this turn to a new humanism not only as a revised critical approach, but 
also as a new way of knowing, which follows Judith Butler’s methodology in her 2004 
monograph, Precarious Life.6 Butler clearly addresses the instability of “human” as 
philosophical subject and the corresponding reach of her project when she defines her use of the 
term, stating that she is “referring not only to humans not regarded as humans, and thus to a 
restrictive conception of the human that is based upon their exclusion. It is not a matter of a 
simple entry of the excluded into an established ontology, but an insurrection at the level of 
ontology” (33). The new humanism that Honig and Butler work through is nothing short of a 
new ontology, which itself resonates in other contemporary philosophical works.7 Where both 
philosophers locate their impetus and meaning for engaging humanism, though, lies far beyond 
the realm of the philosopher. “If the humanities has a future as cultural criticism, and cultural 
criticism has a task at the present moment,” Butler portends in the closing segment of Precarious 
Life, “it is no doubt to return us to the human where we do not expect to find it, in its frailty and 
at the limits of its capacity to make sense. We would have to interrogate the emergence and 
vanishing of the human at the limits of what we can know, what we can hear, what we can see, 
what we can sense” (151). Bitter in the Mouth and The Pagoda narratively present those 
“emergences and vanishings” at the limits of perception described by Butler. Both Linda and 
Lowe have been displaced from their birthplace and birth families and often are not recognized, 
                                               
6 Although Precarious Life is not considered one of Butler’s major works––its recognition and 
notoriety do not come close to the ubiquitous Gender Trouble (1990), Bodies that Matter (1993), 
or the follow-up Undoing Gender (2004)—it is nevertheless a major insight to Butler’s long-
reckoning with the philosophical subject. Allowing her focus on feminist and queer theory to 
rest, Butler broadens her consideration of human lives by concentrating on what makes human 
lives human (precarity, vulnerability, suffering) rather than how humanness is conditioned and 
embodied (performativity, gender). 
7 For example, see Sina Kramer’s “On Negativity,” Moya Lloyd’s “Toward a Cultural Politics of 
Vulnerability,” and Ann Murphy’s “Corporeal Vulnerability and the New Humanism.” 
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much less understood, to be individuals in their communities: “chink” is often used as 
placeholder for “Linda” by the children in Boiling Springs, while “Chin-ee” for “Lowe” on his 
Caribbean island. They are also both victims of rape, forced to hide their assaults from their 
family and communities. Our protagonists are frail, both from what they bear and from our limits 
as readers to fully appreciate their conditions. Their expressions as agents emerge and vanish in 
expected ways and times throughout the narratives, always carried through by their 
psychological and physical suffering.  
3.1.1 Language  
There are multiple ruptures from the safety of heteronormativity that instigate suffering 
and thereby harken Linda and Lowe’s transformations as agents. Both protagonists disconnect 
from their heteronormative worlds primarily through language. Indeed, their indices of meaning 
and relation are disconnected from normative understandings of self in their respective 
communities through breaking with language – or rather, perhaps, they are severed from the 
domain of normality because language fails them phenomenologically, in that the structures of 
their consciousness are not trussed through language.  
Bitter in the Mouth most clearly delineates the failure of language in this schema. Linda 
admits that in her augmented perceptual world, in which meanings are in perpetual sensory flux 
and contradiction, one-to-one correlations between taste and word are instable. Recalling her first 
memory, a taste, Linda cannot ascribe to it a mere single noun. “I have not yet found a 
corresponding flavor in food or in metaphor,” she states, “[b]ut such a ‘match,’ even if identified, 
would only allow me the illusion of communication and you the illusion of understanding” (15). 
Language fails, as Linda freely admits, and risks producing false intimacies of understanding on 
both sides of interlocution. In an inverted way, Lowe is also estranged through language. 
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Language is Lowe’s foremost tool for his appropriation of masculinity. His survival depends on 
completely embodying the male version of himself, so he not only assimilates the movements 
and gestures common to men in his community (such as heavy walking, belching, and grunting 
responses), he even changes his voice into a lower, gruffer register. Lowe adapts in order to 
survive, taking on every aspect of manliness that he is able and internalizing it in every way 
possible: “he wore his costume [of masculinity] like a glove, a second skin. After forty years 
there was nothing womanly about him, not even his voice, which was a soft harsh bark, its 
octaves mellowing with time” (118). When Lowe thinks about trying to sound more feminine, he 
feels his vocal chords constrain and get sore. Lowe is not just masquerading in men’s clothes and 
a masculine bearing; rather, Lowe’s performance of being a man is a subversive act as it does not 
permit an outside knowing of him.  
Just as the break instigated by language permeates throughout Lowe’s body, it also seeps 
deeper to a relational level between Linda and her most cherished friend, Kelly. Describing how 
she and Kelly built their long-lasting friendship through their letter-writing, Linda explains the 
more nuanced understanding of one another they gain through their writing: “Anger, 
disappointment, and shame at times have slowed [the letters’] comings and goings, but we 
understood, without really fully understanding, that the words that we wrote to each other 
couldn’t have existed in speech” (26). Writing is unencumbered with taste for Linda and 
therefore grants her access to use language to make unencumbered meaning. Still, there is more 
going on in Linda and Kelly’s implicit understanding of the limits of speech. Words are 
unspeakable not only because the words themselves are too overwhelming for Linda given her 
synesthesia, or because vocalization of trauma is too intimate, but also because language itself 
could not hold such pains and complications that Linda and Kelly experience. Writing letters is 
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the most direct and honest lingual mode for Linda and Kelly when they were school-age girls. 
But later, as adults, the best friends find an even purer method of communication: in silence, 
sitting side by side, being patient with the other’s hurt. When Linda returns to Boiling Springs as 
a woman in her early thirties for Baby Harper’s memorial service, Kelly picks her up from the 
Greyhound bus station and the women spend the next few weeks relearning the contours of their 
friendship as adults. One late evening Kelly admits to Linda that the father of her 13-year-old 
son is Linda’s first love, Wade, whose name tasted of orange sherbet.  
While this adolescent affair may seem trivial, the recognition of Kelly’s betrayal—the 
first and only betrayal between the two women—deeply effects Linda. “‘I think it’s 
timecottagecheese to goboiledcarrots’,” Linda says to Kelly after Kelly admits her one-night 
tryst with Wade. “‘I said nograpejelly. We’re goboiledcarrotsing to sit herehardboiledegg until 
youcannedgreenbeans forTriscuitgive me, Lindamint’,” Kelly retorts. After a long silence, Linda 
gets the courage to name the cruelest part of Kelly’s affair: “‘Did youcannedgreenbeans 
knowgrapejelly about Wadeorangesherbet and me?’,” she asks, knowing that Kelly was always 
jealous of Wade’s obvious affection for Linda when they were all growing up. “‘Yes,’ Kelly 
replied.” Consistent with all the dialogue in the novel, this scene of tense conversation carries the 
accompanying tastes that Linda experiences with certain words. The disruption of the tastes here 
though, in a scene of such a common, ruthlessly bitter betrayal, highlights the failure of language 
more than any other scene in the narrative. There is a dismal double-revelation in the terse 
language between Kelly and Linda. As the words provoke tastes (a gustatory-sensory reaction in 
the body) that in no way reflect the intense heaviness lodged in Linda’s heart (an emotional 
reaction in the body), language itself is revealed as the more humiliating betrayer.  
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The conversation over, Linda narrates what the remainder of the night brought forth for 
them. “We sat on that bench until the stars faded, until the birds began their songs,” she recalls. 
“Kelly fell asleep with her head on my shoulder . . . my ears full of the steady breathing of my 
best friend” (264). The last idyllic imaginings of her adolescent years smashed, Linda confronts 
the fact that the only fantasy she had ever permitted herself—of pure, sweet, and trusting 
desire—was taken from her by her most trusted companion. Sitting there through the night, 
though, shoulder-to-resting-head with her best friend, she is able to find gentleness and 
understanding for Kelly. “I knew she wasn’t the cause for what I was feeling,” Linda eventually 
admits. While growing up in Boiling Springs, the townsfolk (metonymically the South) made 
sure Linda understood that her place in their social order was to be the perpetual outsider. “The 
truth was that I believed that it was this place and its people who had kept the orange sherbet boy 
and me apart,” Linda explains (264). And although Linda is too sophisticated to entirely excuse 
Kelly’s secret-keeping, she lets “the steady breathing of my best friend” fill her senses and 
bandage the long-festering wound that finally broke open between the two of them.  
Bitter offers a rare rendering of how, when sieved through the interior, psychological 
condition of synesthesia, language can be a disruptor of normativity and can instigate suffering. 
But when language is affected communally, how does it break a subject’s perceptual world and 
cause them to endure pain? What about when language is forgotten, stolen, or silenced, either 
through self-shame or social strangulation? In this, The Pagoda offers valuable insight. Toward 
the end of the novel, Lowe is reunited with his now-adult daughter and meets his grandson. Liz 
brings her family over to Miss Sylvie’s estate for a family dinner, providing Lowe an opportunity 
to visit with his grandson. In the study, Lowe and the boy are surrounded by maps, artifacts, 
architectural drawings, watercolors, and books scattered throughout the space. The boy draws 
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some boats on paper, compelling Lowe to reach back into the recesses of his memory to help him 
sketch out an entire fleet. Thoroughly enthralled with his grandfather’s artful hand, Lowe takes 
advantage of the boy’s attention to explain to the boy an abridged version of their origin story. 
Lowe “deftly produced the huge sleepy duck that was the outline of China,” turning the drawing 
activity into a lesson plan, he “dotted in the names of the coastal provinces and of his own, 
Kwangtung.” Slowly adding narrative to the geography, Lowe “penciled in the circuitous route 
of the Yellow River and explained how it got its color from silt and loess and was a river most 
notorious for rising above its bed and breaking through dikes and drowning millions of people 
and inundating their fields” (185). He continued: 
‘We are Hakka,’ he told the boy, who stared at him unblinkingly. Lowe proudly drew for 
him the yellow dragon of the Chinese flag. Then he was silent, aghast, for he had no 
authentic word for his grandson; nothing to prove he was indeed Hakka, he had so 
successfully erased his language. He had so successfully forgotten. Was that possible? 
For if language was the carrier of culture, then he’d erased his culture too, and so now 
what was a person without language and without culture? What was he there on that 
island, what had he become? (186) 
Lowe’s panic from his sudden realization that he could be further unmoored in his life on the 
island than he had ever realized is understandable, though falsely premised. That Lowe is so 
deeply committed to building a pagoda for the Chinese diaspora on the island, that he is so 
singularly intent on curating a dedicated space for his ethnic community to gather, educate, and 
promote their interests, shows that he has not lost his home culture. By that logic, Lowe proves 
that language is not the sole carrier of culture. Further, it makes sense that Lowe remembers the 
geography of his homeland through its waterways—after all, his father was a boat maker and the 
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family’s livelihood depended on understanding the rivers and the appropriate vehicles for 
navigating them.  
Yet it is telling that his inability to recall the vernacular of his birthplace instigates such 
alarm. Lowe went through great pains to remake himself into the respectable townsman and 
business owner that he is. The other Chinese on the island also struggle to overcome the shame 
of being sold by their own Chinese kinfolk into the indentured labor force and to forge a 
worthwhile life despite those psychological and physical hardships. Still, Lowe is deeply 
ashamed when he forgets his mother tongue. He feels fraudulent, given his efforts to build the 
pagoda, and undeserving to teach his grandson about their ancestors.  
Language fails Lowe as thoroughly as it fails Linda – both protagonists’ suffering is 
anchored in their displacement of self through language. Their inability to engage language in 
heteronormative terms causes them to be distrustful of their agency thereby rendering their 
subjectivity to be, at best, perpetually insecure. These protagonists suffer through myriad 
manifestations of violence against them, so horrific it cannot be scaled. By first situating their 
lingual break I do not suggest that the brutality done to their bodies is in any way secondary to 
their internal disruption through language. The fact that language fails Linda and Lowe, 
however, leaves a residue of interiorized displacement of self that pervades all the other bodily 
transgressions enacted against them. Importantly, this lingual rupturing of normativity delineates 
a profound grief in Linda and Lowe that ultimately transforms them as actors. If the limits of 
language testify to suffering and even precarious mortality, it also harkens the implementation of 
subversive transformation through empathetic encounters. 
84 
3.1.2 Vulnerability 
Butler contends that a critical approach to suffering has the capacity to reformulate our 
understanding of humanity. As a human trait and experience, unconditioned by physical or 
intellectual or social markers, and therefore inherent in all persons, suffering is always instigated 
by loss – loss of safety, love, belonging, home, comfort, or security. “Loss has made a tenuous 
‘we’ of us all . . . each of us is constituted politically in part by virtue of the social vulnerability 
of our bodies,” Butler explains. In this way, “[l]oss and vulnerability seem to follow from our 
being socially constituted bodies, attached to others, at risk of losing those attachments, exposed 
to others, at risk of violence by virtue of that exposure” (20).8 More often than not, however, the 
exposure to threat trumps all other considerations of others. If we are physically and socially 
vulnerable to other said vulnerable bodies, then it does not immediately make sense that our 
vulnerability incites alliance, empathy, and protection. In this, Butler turns to Levinas. 
Any biologist or Freudian psychoanalyst will confirm that the primary purpose of living 
things is to survive, and thus survival becomes a universal biological instinct. In this way, a 
primary human instinct is to eliminate what could be a threat to you, what is not you. Levinas 
                                               
8 Butler is cautious in her use of “vulnerability,” as she recognizes that it can be used as an index 
to determine who qualifies human enough to be embraced humanitarianly. She concedes: “A 
vulnerability must be perceived and recognized in order to come into play in an ethical 
encounter, and there is no guarantee that this will happen. Not only is there always the possibility 
that a vulnerability will not be recognized and that it will be constituted as ‘unrecognizable,’ but 
when a vulnerability is recognized, that recognition has the power to change the meaning and 
structure of the vulnerability itself. In this sense, if vulnerability is one precondition for 
humanization, and humanization takes place differently through variable norms of recognition, 
then it follows that vulnerability is fundamentally dependent on existing norms of recognition if 
it is to be attributed to any human subject” (42-3). Butler speaks to the persistent, reigning 
weakness of humanism as a literary theory and method. Perhaps more than any other critical 
approach, humanism must be handled with extreme care—it must always be positioned with 
counterarguments and caveats, otherwise it can quickly and quite easily be used against itself, 
conditioning the very thing it seeks to liberate (the human subject).  
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contends that the Other—the one that is not you—activates this instinct. Yet he argues that 
seeing “the face” of the Other creates a tension that wars against that kill instinct. This tension in 
one’s psyche of fighting against the perceived need to kill the other is the kernel of the seed of 
ethics and empathy. In the opening of Ethics and Infinity, Levinas explains the theoretical 
contours of the face: “The Other is the sole being I can wish to kill. I can wish. And yet this 
power is quite contrary to power. The triumph of this power is its defeat as power. At the very 
moment when my power to kill realizes itself, the other has escaped me . . . I have not looked at 
him in the face, I have not encountered his face” (9). It is in the tension of the desire to kill, “the 
temptation to murder and the interdiction against it,” that the face can truly be recognized (Butler 
139). “The temptation of total negation . . . this is the presence of the face. To be in relation with 
the other face to face is to be unable to kill” (Levinas 9). In The Pagoda, Lowe exhibits a direct 
manifestation of the struggle to overcome the temptation of total negation. Increasingly 
threatened by Miss Sylvie’s manservant, Omar (who not only knows Lowe’s biological secret 
but also, it is revealed, destroyed Lowe’s shop and has information to blackmail to Miss Sylvie), 
Lowe plots his elimination. Knife in hand, Lowe ambushes Omar early one morning, intent to 
eliminate the heavy anxieties of deception that Omar threatens to weaponize against Lowe and 
Miss Sylvie. Tackling Omar in a surprise attack, Lowe pins Omar on the ground, blade pressed 
intently at Omar’s throat: 
‘What I do to you, man?’ He pressed the point deeper into the soft hollow at the base of 
Omar’s throat. ‘What I do to you? The food you eat come from the shop there. And you 
burn it down . . . You so full of grudge and hate, you burn it down. Flat flat. Just now I 
should just cut off you blasted head and lean it up by the pot there. Just now I should just 
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slice off you blasted balls and feed them to the hogs. Just now. If you move, you blood 
run like river this morning. Run like river.’ (161) 
Lowe desperately wants to kill Omar. Although he had been sharpening his knife and imagining 
his revenge for many nights, he does not go through with the murder. Lowe does not actualize 
his power to negate the Other. Something stops Lowe from following through with his fatal 
intention. What makes Lowe abandon violence to privilege mercy? What permits Lowe to see 
Omar as the face of the Other, rather than the threat to his survival that he had been up to this 
narrative scene? Butler leverages this shift from threat to mercy to position her call for empathy 
based on recognizing the precarity of the Other. She writes: “the face—which is the face of the 
Other, and so the ethical demand made by the Other—is that vocalization of agony that is not yet 
language or no longer language, the one by which we are wakened to the precariousness of the 
Other’s life” (139). Butler notes that in Levinas’s essay “Peace and Proximity,” “the term ‘face’ 
operates as a catachresis” in that it refers to expressions in the human body that speak of 
vulnerability and pain (Precarious 133). Levinas describes a story of a line of political detainees 
in Moscow eagerly gathering to hear the latest news, “a line where one can only see the backs of 
others”: “A woman awaits her turn: [she] had never thought that the human back could be so 
expressive . . . craning their neck and their back, their raised shoulders with shoulder blades like 
springs, which seemed to cry, sob, and scream” (“Peace” 167). Seeing the face of the Other, 
then, also requires an openness to perceive vulnerability.  
Pinning Omar down, Lowe knows he has complete dominion over Omar’s existence. 
Crying out in hot, vengeful anger, “plucking the blade into the warm soft skin, picking away at 
the flesh,” Lowe feels “a jigger of blood” spurt into his hands and spread across Omar’s chest 
(162). The morning remains quiet, a stark contrast to the intensity of the scene. Lowe becomes 
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aware that Omar understands his own mortal contingency that morning. He perceives Omar’s 
vulnerability through his body when “Omar started to cry. No sounds at all, just the trembling 
stomach underneath Lowe’s rump . . . his stomach chopped. And the heart battered against his 
shirt” (162). Seeing and feeling Omar as a breathing body, a life, though still a cruel and spiteful 
man, Lowe starts to think about what brought them to that scene of such harrowing power. Lowe 
“saw how they all were in this together . . . all together, some innocent, some not so innocent . . . 
And now here they were killing and killing and killing to cover up more deceptions, more lies. 
Here he was fighting Omar for land and for property that didn’t even belong to them, that was 
still damp from prior bloodshed” (162). Recognizing the land they were on was already super 
saturated with the blood from slaves and imperial conquest, Lowe sees that they were all in a 
bloody web of subterfuge and evil—they all had lost and suffered and sinned and a tenuous “we” 
had been made of them all, together. Perceiving Omar’s bare, corporeal vulnerability and 
recognizing the cry of agony that sliced through them all, Lowe “lifted his weight and released 
him” (162). Vulnerability expresses itself in the body in ways often unconscious of the person 
who harbors such strife. Nevertheless, that corporeal vulnerability is at once a demand and a 
plea, and it reconstitutes the addressee in the asking. 
Levinas’s notion of the face is revolutionary in that it defines a new sense of ethics based 
on engaging empathy activated by the desire for violence. Yet his thought teeters on the edge of 
being consumed by that which it means to destabilize: dehumanization, or what he thinks of as 
the ability to kill. Butler articulates this impasse through inquiry: “is the face humanizing in each 
and every instance? And if it is humanizing in some instances, in what form does this 
humanization occur, and is there also a dehumanization performed in and through the face?” 
(143). The issue here is that one must first be perceived—recognized to be in the metaphorical 
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line of people with pained backs—for vulnerability to be acknowledged, empathy incited, and 
the kill instinct quelled. Butler wonders if Levinasian faces end up becoming “images that, 
through their frame, produce the paradigmatically human, become the very cultural means 
through which the paradigmatically human is established” (143). In his monograph The Problem 
with Levinas, Simon Critchley extends Butler’s critique into an assessment of the limits of 
philosophy itself, arguing that the “notion of totality is identical to the notion of philosophy—
[that philosophy] is premised on the reduction of multiplicity to totality. Philosophy is based on 
the sameness of thinking and being that yields the conceivability of the All, of totality” (2). The 
issue, then, is not with Levinas’s thinking per se, but in the very structure by which he operates. 
Critchley further clarifies, “It’s not that Levinas is wrong, but what he’s trying to do cannot be 
done philosophically. To try to speak philosophically about an experience of otherness is to 
always collapse the other into the same” (2).9 Here again, this is where literature intervenes, or 
rather, shows itself to have always already paved the epistemological grounds for philosophy. 
What cannot be done philosophically, in other words, has already been imagined narratively.10 
Through Levinas’s example of a line of people all facing forward and through Butler’s 
notion of framing the image of personhood, both philosophers suggest that perceiving the face of 
                                               
9 In her work For More Than One Voice, Italian philosopher Adriana Cavarero also highlights 
the limits of philosophy: “The philosophical tradition does not only ignore the uniqueness of the 
voice, but it also ignores uniqueness as such, in whatever mode it manifests itself . . . Uniqueness 
is epistemologically inappropriate” (9). In turn, Bonnie Honig leverages Cavarero’s thought in 
her work on Antigone and tragedy (“Antigone’s Two Laws” which she expanded into her book 
Antigone, Interrupted).  
10 I recognize that The Pagoda and Bitter in the Mouth do not chronologically precede Levinas’s 
work in dates of publication, though Powell’s novel does predate Butler’s Precarious Life as 
does Truong’s short story “Kelly,” from which Bitter in the Mouth was born. What I mean in this 
statement is that literature is produced in an imaginative realm that philosophy does not equally 
access. In that they are not limited to accepted perceptual worlds, stories and storytelling, 
structurally, are inherently better equipped to perceive conditions and outcomes of possibility 
than any other study.  
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the Other occurs at a moment of actual, physical (or visual) proximity and bodily awareness of 
another person external to your own self. Powell provides a harrowing description of how violent 
that recognition can be. But I argue Truong offers an extension to how Levinas and Butler 
position an apprehension of vulnerability. Bitter in the Mouth provides the grounds to imagine 
how the Other—who is not you, who threatens your very life by their existence—also resides 
internally, within a single psyche, narratively portrayed through Linda’s unusual linguistic 
relation to the world. “Food and taste metaphors were complicated for me,” Linda explains, “By 
complicated I mean that they were of no use to me. They shed their figurative qualities, their 
diaphanous layers of meaning, and became concrete and explicit. They left me literal and naked” 
(102). The common use and meaning of words for Linda is nothing more than a masquerade. She 
cannot use spoken language to make collective meaning with others in a way that does not leave 
her vulnerable to the involuntary tastes that words trigger. Though there is another facet to how 
her vulnerable state is rendered. In her “literal and naked,” precarious state, Linda “would lose 
[her] ability to absorb what was happening” wherein her “body would respond to the taste, 
whether pleasant or unpleasant, with a twitch or a tremor, or an expletive would escape from 
[her] mouth” (103). She has two warring experiential bodies – one that receives tastes unbidden 
and one that reacts without control. Linda’s synesthesia effectively renders her as Other to 
herself.11  
If language is understood to be a public tool for the understanding of private life, then 
language is critical to the process of self-knowledge in which language is often philosophically 
                                               
11 An internalized doubling is not a new concept in critical race studies, of course. See W.E.B. 
DuBois’s notion of double-consciousness in The Souls of Black Folk (1903). 
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positioned as an arsenal and a gatekeeper of meaning.12 It follows, then, that releasing language, 
releasing meaning, is a conscious decision of self-exposure to harm in that one positions oneself 
as the unknown and being unknowing, bereft of meaning. It is an example of the Other within 
oneself and it opens oneself to fear and anxiety. Linda felt this dynamic as a young girl, even if 
she did not fully understand it then. Linda describes the intense feeling of precarity she 
experienced when she started to understand that her relation to words made her into someone 
other than who she was in her public world. This other version of herself—the version that 
wanted to hear words for their taste, not their meaning, and to revel in the pleasures of their 
sweet and savory qualities first in her mouth and then through the rest of her body as the words 
digested—was incommensurate with the process of growing up and engaging her community in 
the ways expected of her. This other version of Linda threatened her in that it laid her bare to a 
different world in which she was utterly alone. Linda reflects on her ontological linguistic 
rupture in the following passage:  
I too had to disregard the meanings of the words if I wanted to enjoy what the words 
could offer me. At first, the letting go of meaning was a difficult step for me to take, like 
loosening my fingers from the side of a swimming pool for the very first time. The world 
suddenly became vast and fluid. Anything could happen to me as I drifted toward the 
deep end of the pool. But without words, resourceful and revealing, who would know of 
the dangers that I faced? I would be defenseless. I would drown . . . Maybe our first 
words all had the same meaning: Save me! A plea that, if answered, reinforced our desire 
                                               
12 While the context of language being the gatekeeper of meaning falls outside of the intention of 
this chapter, these canonical philosophers of language are useful referents: Wittgenstein (on 
private realms), Saussure (linguistic sign and signification), Foucault (political use), Fanon and 
Spivak (language as site of oppression).  
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to acquire more, to amass a vocabulary that could be our arsenal against the unknown 
terrors of life. To let go of meaning was to allow for the possibility that words didn’t hold 
within them this promise of salvation. Or, because of my misuse of the words, I alone 
wouldn’t be saved. (74) 
To be sure, Linda played with mild attempts to annihilate that other version of herself, within 
herself. In middle school, she smoked heavily, dulling her taste senses. In high school, she 
dressed in head-to-toe black, slugged around in heavy shitkicker boots and wore heavy dark 
makeup to ensure few people would approach her for casual conversation. In college, she had a 
lot of sex with partners she did not know well—“sex overrode the incomings entirely. The 
multiple and multiplying sensations of the body demanded all of my attention,” Linda explains 
(154)—and drank heavily. But none of these tactics eliminated the Other within herself. Again 
expanding beyond the structural limits of philosophy, Linda’s moment of being awakened to the 
precariousness of the Other does not follow the procedural map described by Levinas and Butler. 
Instead, Linda sees the face of the Other within herself as a reflection through Baby Harper’s 
eyes. In her final year of high school, after one of their weekly dinner dates, Linda and Baby 
Harper have a confessional conversation. Baby Harper tells Linda that he was in love with his 
brother-in-law, her adoptive father, Thomas. Linda reveals to Baby Harper that she was molested 
and raped as a girl by the yard boy, her cousin Bobby. Sitting together on Baby Harper’s divan, 
they were on a home-base of safety, even though “[s]pinning around us was more than one circle 
of grief. Like the rings of Saturn, the circles weren’t solid and were composed of many shattered 
things” (117). But on the divan, they could allow themselves to be absolutely bare and 
vulnerable to one another, exposing their heaviest secrets. Linda reflects deeply on this exposure 
and precarity, noting how their suffering cemented their solidarity with one another: “My great-
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uncle said that there was no shame worse than silence . . . He mourned for what had been stolen 
from me . . . The crime was the taking away of my right to choose. Included in this grief was 
Baby Harper’s right to choose. He lived through my body in many ways” (120). Linda sees how 
difficult it is for Baby Harper to carry her pain—not because he is not strong enough to endure it, 
but because seeing her vulnerability and suffering compounds his own. Linda recognizes this 
because she, too, feels that near-paralyzing grief through him as he mourns his lost love. She 
sees that “[i]ncluded in his grief were the hidden rooms of his life,” those doors revealed and 
slightly cracked open (121). In reflecting and experiencing each other’s pain, they recognize the 
precarity of the Other and hail its ethical demand. Linda’s own Other within herself comes to the 
fore as Baby Harper sees its “face,” reflecting back to Linda her Levinasian self. Too, Baby 
Harper teaches Linda how to withstand such intense pain, knowing since she first came to his 
family that her burden of grief would be great enough to break her. “He told me that hurt was 
bad enough and that I should never add loneliness to it. That’s why we get together and dance, he 
said. I didn’t understand until then what my great-uncle had been teaching me since our earliest 
days together. We got together and moved our bodies because it exorcized our pain” (121). For 
Linda, that moment of exposure with Baby Harper was ultimately an instance of suffering 
transformed into strength through empathetic connection to one another.  
3.1.3 Framing the Vulnerable 
We may all be able to admit to being vulnerable to varying degrees, yet rarely do we have 
such dramatic encounters like Lowe’s near-murdering of Omar or Linda’s estranging synesthesia 
to snap our focus to the precarity of others. The people we come to know and how we come to 
know other people increasingly is fostered through digital and visually-based platforms (rather 
than physical platforms). Encountering the Other and being in the position to “see” the “face” of 
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the other is not only a one-on-one event – it is commonly mediated and distilled through news 
reports, clickability, and ideologies that garner attention. Our first apprehension of another 
person is often through an image; this image is always framed, and that framed image of the 
Other is the central mechanism of humanization and dehumanization. The power of framing does 
not solely fall in the purview of that mediation, however. Butler explains that the issue with 
framing is not what image is framed, but rather the viewer’s skill at discerning how the frame 
functions. She argues that “[t]he media’s evacuation of the human through the image has to be 
understood . . . in terms of the broader problem that normative schemes of intelligibility establish 
what will and will not be human, what will be a livable life, what will be a grievable death” (146, 
my emphasis).  In these laudable and necessary efforts to define and dismantle the racialization 
of ethnic-minority subjectivities, at times critique has collapsed into framing, which in turn 
calcifies identities so that they can be judged in their “humanness” and therefore worth.13  
Butler contends that there are “two distinct forms of normative power” that siphon the 
intelligibility of framing. The first form “operates through producing a symbolic identification of 
the face with the inhuman, foreclosing our apprehension of the human in the scene.” Perception 
is narrowed and swayed, as this normative power articulates “something that has already 
emerged into the realm of appearance [and] needs to be disputed as recognizably human.” The 
second form of normative power “works through radical effacement, so that there never was a 
human, there never was a life, and no murder has, therefore, ever taken place.” It is a type of 
erasure in which “the public realm of appearance is itself constituted on the basis of the 
exclusion of that image.” Butler argues that it is the critics’ task “to establish modes of public 
seeing and hearing that might well respond to the cry of the human within the sphere of 
                                               
13 See Kandice Chuh’s Imagine Otherwise: On Asian Americanist Critique (2003). 
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appearance, a sphere in which the trace of the cry has become hyperbolically inflated to 
rationalize a gluttonous nationalism, or fully obliterated, where both alternatives turn out to be 
the same” (147). We must not only ask who fits in the frame of being human, but we must also 
consider how that frame is built and how it conditions both what we are visually exposed to and 
our ontological ability to “see the face” of the image, of the Levinasian Other.  
Bitter in the Mouth has been critically lauded for how it brings two common themes in 
the contemporary literary studies—race and region—into new light in a remarkably simple way, 
as the narrative places its Vietnamese protagonist in the U.S. South. While this juxtaposition may 
initially seem one-dimensional (after all, a narrative should not get a gold star just for upsetting 
stereotypes), scholarly work on the novel has nonetheless largely focused on said juxtaposition.14 
As Denise Cruz remarks, “the regional forms of Bitter in the Mouth offer a new epistemology of 
race and region that compels us to reexamine the primacy of the national in the creation of 
politicized identities and communities—manifested in either the US nation-state’s imperial or 
                                               
14 See, for example: Jennifer Brandt’s “Taste as Emotion: The Synesthetic Body in Monique 
Truong’s Bitter in the Mouth”; Amanda Dykema’s “Embodied Knowledges: Synesthesia and the 
Archive in Monique Truong’s Bitter in the Mouth”; and Michele Janette’s “‘Distorting 
Overlaps’: Identity as Palimpset in Bitter in the Mouth.” Scholars have been correct to analyze 
how the novel extends beyond the tidiness of being a case study of American Southern 
nationalism just as it elides the mythic single-story of South Asian immigrants. Denise Cruz 
writes, “the novel highlights imperial histories of pain and violence that tie South Vietnam to the 
US South” and that the national political history weighs on how Linda navigates American 
institutions (729). It is clear that the political dictates Linda’s life, especially in the part of the 
novel that features Linda’s backstory. But the imperial history of pain and violence between the 
U.S. and Vietnam that Cruz cites is not actually reflected in the novel through Linda’s perception 
of her world. Although Linda’s narrative may gesture toward a broader recognition of the 
historical racial background of imperialism, Linda herself does not engage this trajectory. 
Truong’s refusal to root her story through the context of the U.S. and Vietnam War is, I think, 
one of the strongest Asian Americanist stances that literature can take in our contemporary 
moment. Linda’s silence on her national origins parallels the portrayal of U.S. imperialism as a 
mere bitter aftertaste in the novel’s structure: although present, it does not drive the novel’s 
narrative arc. 
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domestic violence, or the rubrics of ethnic cultural nationalism,” encouraging readers to “resist 
the dominant structures of racial visibility and heteronormative affiliations that have determined 
the terms of national belonging in the US” and in doing so “pointedly questions our ability to 
represent race and racialized subjectivities at all” (720, 718, 721).15 This point is crucial, given 
that in the historical cultural imagination of the United States, ethnicity and race have been 
perceived through Western codes of Otherness and on the terms of socio-political powers based 
on whiteness. Scholars have rightly focused on the ways synesthesia reflects a more nuanced 
analysis of racial and regional politics. Yet I read this scholarly approach to be unintentionally 
engaging the pitfalls of the framing process that Butler describes.16  
One of the novel’s most powerful counterforces to heteronormative terms of national 
belonging is its iterations of empathetic humanism – when Linda is seen for her vulnerability and 
capacity to suffer, not for the way she mismatches the looks of her guardians or how she is 
perceived by her southern neighbors. A poignant scene about half way through the novel exposes 
the complicated contours of race dynamics in the fictive rendering of the small town of Boiling 
Springs. In the following extended excerpt, Linda reflects on her racial place and visibility in her 
community when she was a girl: 
                                               
15 To readers from the discipline of Asian American studies, this statement may read as obvious 
as it is generally accepted that Asian American identities are not just politicized, rather they are 
political creations. In their contribution to the recent publication of The Cambridge Companion 
to Asian American Literature, Kandice Chuh and Karen Shimikawa explain that “Asian 
American” is a name created through legal and political maneuvering: “it is a sociopolitical 
identity that does not precede and then simply become available to manipulation by the law but 
is instead one that is constituted by and through it” (30). 
16 Michele Janette’s “Alternative Historical Tetherings” is an important exception to my critique 
of much of the scholarship that engages Bitter to date. In this article, Janette argues that Truong 
writes against the overdeterminations of the Vietnam War faced by Vietnamese American 
writers, purposefully denying her narrative arc to be fastened to militaristic destructions or 
exclusive nationalisms.  
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I was still taken aback, startled, I suppose, that it was the outside of me that so readily 
defined me as not being from here (New Haven, New York, New World) nor there (the 
South). How could I explain to them that from the age of seven to eighteen, there was 
nothing Asian about me except my body, which I had willed away and few in Boiling 
Springs seemed to see anyway.  
If Boiling Springs had been a larger town, it wouldn’t have been possible. But 
Boiling Springs wasn’t. The dwindling population there was small and insular enough to 
behave as one microorganism. These were the adults of Boiling Springs . . . More 
specifically, these were the white men and women of Boiling Springs . . .  
There was, of course, a parallel adult world in my hometown that I came into 
contact with, but only in passing. These black men and women knew of me too, 
especially the women. When DeAnne would take me with her to the Piggly Wiggly or to 
Hudson’s department store, the women who worked there looked at me with eyes that 
always made me feel uncomfortable. These women actually saw me, and what they 
wondered about me—why one of my own hadn’t taken me in—made their hearts tender. 
I learned early on not to meet their eyes, dark and deep as a river. If I saw them, I would 
have to see myself. I didn’t want a mirror. I wanted a blank slate. (169-170) 
While black Southern women saw Linda, she was just a blind spot to almost all other townsfolk 
(i.e. the white population of Boiling Springs). This scene is not key because it showcases two 
racial minorities visually encountering one another, showing a sort of sliding-scale of color, but 
rather because of the recognition of social vulnerability and the attendant capacity to suffer that 
occurs in that witnessing: “These women actually saw me,” Linda says, “their hearts tender” (my 
emphasis). Granted, this moment is fleeting, and both Linda and the black women presumably do 
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not break stride to acknowledge their shared encounter of racial Otherness but rather continue to 
perform the roles that was normal for their society. Their intimate, silent encounter was a product 
of their unwilled adjacency, nothing more. And yet this glance, which evokes such tenderness 
and reciprocal raw self-awareness, is made possible in this particular scene by virtue of both 
parties being racial minorities. It is their race that promotes a more generous consideration of the 
subject under the racial stereotype. Truong acknowledges the limitations of interracial 
revelations as all parties ultimately retreat to normalized racial roles, but this gesture is not a 
disappearance of race. Instead, I read this scene with an extra dose of generosity as an 
unburdening of stymied reflections of racialized bodies. 
However, there is a catch: Truong also places her reader in the stance of seeing with 
empathetic, tender hearts, because she does not expose Linda to be an adopted Vietnamese girl 
until right before this interracial scene. There are slight, covert allusions to Linda’s racial 
difference in the first half of the novel, but the first-time reader is undoubtedly surprised when, at 
the mid-point in the narrative, Linda’s full legal name is revealed: Linh-Dao Nguyen 
Hammerick. The revelation of Linda’s history issues forth a revised understanding of Linda’s 
place within the novel. Linda is not just an adopted girl, she is an immigrant foreigner, displaced 
and orphaned by traumatic familial and national tragedies. The reader now understands Linda to 
be an adoptee and a stranger in a multitude of ways: in the home of Thomas and DeAnne, under 
the surname of Hammerick, in the town of Boiling Springs, in the use of the English language, 
through the tastes of the U.S. South, and in the country of the United States.  
Truong’s narrative play in revealing Linda’s racial ancestry is a benevolent checkmate to 
her readers as she exposes their own unconscious assumptions about race as a defining feature of 
place and belonging. And as Butler reminds us, representation is often dictated by assumptions 
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of “who counts” in the category of human. She writes, “When we consider the ordinary ways 
that we think about humanization and dehumanization, we find the assumption that those who 
gain representation, especially self-representation, have a better chance of being humanized” 
(141). And, most importantly for this unique scene of interracial framing, Butler adds, “those 
who have no chance to represent themselves run a greater risk of being treated as less than 
human, regarded as less than human, or indeed, not regarded at all” (141). Recalling the black 
townsfolk’s “dark and deep as a river” gaze, the reader becomes aware of the empathetic 
humanism that Truong fosters between the reader and Linda and how the text becomes a self-
reflective mirror: readers not only “really see” Linda, but also “really see” themselves.  
Baby Harper also sees Linda with the same trueness and tenderness, though through a 
very different lens than the black townspeople of Boiling Springs. Baby Harper is a solitary, 
though adoring figure in Linda’s life when she was growing up. A “perpetual bachelor,” he 
always lived close-by to his older sister, Linda’s grandmother, Iris. As a hobby, Baby Harper 
takes egregious amounts of photos of things he finds beautiful – his family, primarily, and the 
natural landscapes around him. Linda recalls Baby Harper milling around every family event 
with at least two cameras hanging on his neck. Baby Harper documents intimate, un-posed 
details of the family: an unevenly worn shoe, a mouth open wide in uproarious laughter, eyes 
creased downward in annoyance, or a naked earlobe missing its pearl earring. “Baby Harper was 
always there to document us, but because he never allowed anyone to take his place behind the 
camera nor bothered with a tripod, he was never documented,” explains Linda (41). “By 
excluding himself, he ensured that our official history was a false one. Or, at least, an incomplete 
one. He never hid that fact from me. My great-uncle always suggested that his photographs 
weren’t to be trusted, that the real points of interest were elsewhere” (41). A meticulous and 
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thorough cataloguer of his work, Baby Harper has seemingly endless volumes of photo albums, 
all of which he shares with Linda. Every week after their dinner date they sit down on his 
luxurious teal green velvet divan and look at the photo books, Baby Harper narrating the context 
of each captured moment. In this way, Baby Harper ensures that Linda “truly sees” her family, 
too, teaching her another empathetic iteration of seeing the Other. 
Through his photos, Baby Harper bears witness to his family by compiling evidence to 
attest everyone’s frail and flawed humanity and to keep them all honest in what they are. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, his penchant for the visual, Baby Harper understands that the 
image of oneself that the world sees, the image that becomes framed, to use Butler’s term 
(whether it be sexuality, race, gender, age, or upbringing) is just a cloak of conditions demanded 
to be donned to minimize social vulnerability. Linda realizes Baby Harper’s deeper insight when, 
as an adult, she goes through a set of secret albums he sent her, all self-portraits of him 
beautifully dressed in women’s style clothing. Linda remarks, “the existence of these albums 
disproved my long-held beliefs that Baby Harper disliked being photographed … that he was 
uncomfortable in his own skin. As it turned out, my great-uncle Harper was uncomfortable only 
in his day-to-day clothes” (204). When Baby Harper shares that other, truer aspect of himself, he 
does so to give Linda another frame of perception. He exposes himself in his cross-dressing, 
consciously deciding to embrace the larger risk of social vulnerability (even if he was confident 
that Linda would love him all the more for it) in order to subvert the normative power form that 
made him publicly conscribe to appropriate displays of his body (by wearing acceptable clothes 
for his age, sex, and region) or erase himself out of the frame by omission (by always keeping 
himself behind the camera). The moment Linda sees those photos, she revises her frame of Baby 
Harper and the world at large; and it is in that moment Baby Harper’s cross-dressing becomes 
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not only an act of subversion (in the doing), but also one of agency (in the sharing) and joy (in 
the receiving).   
Through Baby Harper we see how the frame of (de)humanization is akin to the boxes of 
identity that Butler argues to expose. For Lowe, this entire process occurs internally. He 
constructs his frame of being a man, husband, and business owner so completely for so many 
decades he forgets that he buys into the normative power apparatus of gender. After his shop 
burns down and he is forced to contemplate what his life has become, Lowe slowly perceives the 
frame he created for himself when he was just a girl. Refocused, Lowe realizes that “[t]here 
seemed to be no ending whatsoever to the masquerade. The layers just seemed to pile up more or 
harden” (106). Similar to Linda recognizing the Other within herself as invoked through her 
synesthesia, Lowe comes to see that, through his masculine self-framing, he also has created his 
own sense of otherness. When he decides to release his piles of masquerades he too feels adrift in 
the deep end of unknowingness, unsecure, his vulnerability exposed to all. The night Lowe 
decides to break his frame of self, “he locked and bolted the door and hid the keys . . . he took off 
his boots, caked with mud, and the wet socks and left them outside the door. He hung his hat 
among the others on the peg on the wall. He peeled away that bristly mustache and vowed never 
to wear the disgusting thing again” (82). Lowe literally sees the face of the Other which is his 
bared self—the self that was sold as a bride to pay a debt, the self that was raped and held 
prisoner on a ship, the self that bore a beautiful daughter, the self that threatened his ability to 
live—for the first time in over forty years. “Piece by piece he undressed, with care and without 
haste, laying the accoutrements of his masquerade on the dresser . . . That night he carried the 
face of a person who had suffered a hundred indignities and betrayals” (82). Lowe had always 
known that his Chinese compatriots were saddened and ashamed of their status amongst the 
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black and white populations on the island because they were there by the betraying hands of their 
own people and “[i]t seemed as if nothing could be as bad as that, as bad as being sold to this 
bondage by your own” (45). But the indignities and betrayals he sees on his exposed face have 
little to do with the disgraceful, liminal status of his race. Instead, he sees in his face that he has 
suffered his survival, and then became complacent with it. Eventually, he presents himself to the 
public shed from his masculine persona in small, incremental details: 
He couldn’t pinpoint exactly when he began to discover that he liked things of flowing 
silk and neat lines, when his appreciation for subtle colors instead of dark solemn ones 
crept up on him. He did not know when he began growing fussy over the quality and tone 
of cloth, about the cut of trousers, the cascade of their fall on his thin limbs . . . The black 
felt hat he wore in the evenings to prevent cold from seeping into his head and giving him 
pneumonia was now exchanged for a wide brimmed straw with a blue ribbon. He decided 
that he liked the touch of color, that it added an air of distinction to his sallow face. He no 
longer soaked his neck with sandalwood, for all of a sudden its pungent bite was no 
longer odorous, and so he daubed drops of oleander and hibiscus and other scents he’d 
remembered from Joyce’s embrace. (165-66) 
This passage does not indicate some return a feminized female form. As Butler contends, the 
demand “for images that convey the full horror and reality of the suffering has its place and 
importance,” yet “it would be a mistake to think that we only need to find the right and true 
images, and that a certain reality will then be conveyed” (146). Rather, as Lowe sheds his 
masculine identity, he embraces materials that foreground a life of pleasure (albeit cautioned and 
sporadic), as opposed to his previous existence comprised solely of suffering. It may seem 
convenient to read Lowe as adopting a gendered standard of his biological sex, but that would 
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only play back into a structure of normative power that his newfound pleasure of aesthetics 
actually undermines. Continuing Butler’s argument, we must conscientiously foreground the fact 
that “reality is not conveyed by what is represented within the image, but through the challenge 
to representation that reality delivers” (146). And that, I argue, is precisely what Lowe does in 
his choice to use feminized aesthetics to expose and challenge the frame of representation that 
has conditioned his body and being, and, in that subversion, cultivates joy. 
3.2 Joy 
This chapter has taken its primary direction from Butler’s perspective of humanism 
defined through suffering and vulnerability. She is in part responding to an earlier posited 
antihumanism rooted in a Nietzschean nihilism. “But are these the only options?” asks Bonnie 
Honig in her use of Butler’s theory. “A humanism of universal or principled suffering versus an 
antihumanism of death-driven, desiring monstrosity?” (Antigone, Interrupted 19). Honig does 
not suggest that Butler’s mortalist humanism is wrong, or even flawed. Rather, she offers another 
entry approach that compliments Butler’s work. The third option is what Honig thinks of as an 
“agonistic humanism.” Honig cites Wittgenstein and Ranciere as situating us to theorize a 
humanism “that sees in mortality, suffering, sound, and vulnerability resources for some form of 
enacted universality, but also sees these as no less various in their significations than are the 
diverse languages that unite and divide us” (Antigone, Interrupted 19). While those listed 
experiences and feelings may be universally accessible to humans, how they are perceived and 
received are not universal experiences. Once that distinction starts to disintegrate, the goal of 
humanism to establish basic grounds of ethical conduct is lost. “Moreover,” Honig continues, 
“agonistic humanism is not centered on mortality and suffering; it draws as well on natality and 
pleasure, power not just powerless, desire not just principle, in quest of a politics that is not 
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reducible to an ethics nor founded on finitude” (Antigone, Interrupted 19). Averting the 
antihumanist approach that defines itself as a retaliatory opposition to ethics, Honig instead seeks 
the counter position to mortality. She considers the idea of natality and builds on the concept 
from the philosophy of Hannah Ardent. Leveraging Ardent’s third human condition that is based 
on natality, commonly referred to as “Arendtian action,” Honig counters Butler’s position of 
primarily locating humanist potential in violence, vulnerability, and mourning and argues that “a 
natal’s pleasure-based counter to grief that supplements solidarity forged in sorrow and points in 
the direction of generative action rather than ruminative reflection or ethical orientation” 
(“Antigone’s Two Laws” 9). Importantly, natality’s pleasure is supplemental, not alternative, to 
grief. The two universal experiences—perhaps the only two experiences that are actually 
universal, inevitably experienced by every human throughout history—are not just used to define 
one another in opposition to the other. Rather, I read the two experiences sharing common 
meaning: “suffer” is a closely related, if not synonymous, term to both “natality” and 
“mortality.” The Proto-Indo-European root of the infinitive verb “to suffer” is bher, meaning to 
bear, to carry. Etymologically, then, “suffer” connotes an enduring of pain, but also a bringing 
forth, a mortality and a natality. It makes certain sense that we can locate empathetic humanism 
in both precarity and jubilation. 
Joy, laughter, and pleasure are all viable harbingers humanism, complementary to and 
contingent on suffering. For example, Baby Harper and Linda laugh and dance together, partly 
for the sheer delight of feeling joy in their bodies, and partly to strengthen themselves to bear 
their pain. Linda remarks, “I never thought it contradictory that the man who taught me how to 
do the Watsui, arms swinging, hips thrusting, hair flying, would find pleasure inside of a funeral 
home. Joy and grief were physical in nature, and Baby Harper was a man capable of appreciating 
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both” (152). Locating these empathetic qualities of joy and grief in the body, Linda knows that 
they herald, not oppose, one another, just as she and Baby Harper reflect the Other back to one 
another through their empathetic gaze. In this view, the story can now be seen not only as one of 
family, place, and identity, but also as what the first lines of the text proclaim itself to be – a love 
story. “I fell in love with my great-uncle Harper because he taught me how to dance,” Linda 
confesses in the first lines of the novel. “He said that rhythm was allowing yourself to feel your 
blood coursing through you. He told me to close my eyes and forget the rest of my body. I did, 
and we bopped our nonexistent selves up and down and side to side . . . We twisted, mashed-
potatoed, and winked at each other whenever we opened our eyes. My great-uncle Harper was 
my first love. I was seven years old. In his company, I laughed out loud” (3). 
Surprisingly, Linda never discloses her synesthesia to Baby Harper. As readers, we never 
question Baby Harper’s faith and devotion to Linda—surely, he would have believed her, 
supported her struggle, and celebrated her otherworldly transference of senses—but her 
condition remained unrevealed between them. This is not some burdensome, dark secret Linda 
keeps against Baby Harper though; rather, he simply did not need to know about it. He perceived 
and accepted her vulnerability despite not knowing the specifics of her synethesia, and that was 
enough. As Linda explains, “my great-uncle, the singing-talker, never knew the taste of my 
name. I never told him because my secret sense wasn’t an issue when I was with him. As he 
would say, I was right as rain when I was with him. When we were together, he was right as rain 
too” (Truong 114). 
As in Bitter in the Mouth, The Pagoda also ultimately depicts joy through suffering as 
way of articulating humanism. Lowe seeks his neighbor Joyce to learn how sex can be 
pleasurable in his body, rewriting how it had been used as a tool of control and power (by Cecil 
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when he was repeatedly raped), or as payment for a service (through the social stability Miss 
Sylvie offers through her light skin and money) or to satisfy a debt (to his betrothed in China). 
Going over to Joyce’s house late one evening, Lowe seeks a warm companionship. Knowing that 
it would cause scandal if Joyce’s husband saw Lowe pursuing Joyce, he sneaks through her yard 
to try to peer into her window. When her guard dogs run out, he sprints to the other side of the 
yard fence, scraping and bruising himself in his scramble. Alerted to the commotion outside, and 
somehow half expecting Lowe to be making his way to her anyway, Joyce calls off her dogs and 
ushers Lowe inside to tend to him: “She uncorked the vial again and began to spread the 
ointment on the cuts one by one; he savored again the gentle touch” (154). Honoring the pain he 
had undergone to get to her, which she knows goes much deeper than the surface scratches he 
acquired in the bushes, she tends his vulnerability with care and affection. Joyce “leaned over 
him and her breasts rested on his chin, sometimes on his neck . . . she pressed even deeper in 
those places that produced the sweetest pleasure” (154). Lowe allows himself to be completely 
exposed to Joyce—she removes his clothes when she settles him to rest and sleep through his 
pain, confirming that Lowe is biologically female. But his exposure ends up being a comfort to 
both of them. His secret becomes subversive and joyful with the aptly named Joyce. Knowing 
that Joyce was only half-surprised when his sex was revealed to her, Lowe asks how she knew 
his secret. “‘I could just tell’,” Joyce replies, causing Lowe a moment of panic, wondering if he 
was as transparent to everyone else as he was to Joyce. Again anticipating his fear, Joyce quickly 
follows-up: 
“But most people would never notice a thing as that,” she said.  
“No?” He so badly wanted to believe her.  
“No,” she said, and touched him again with the soft hands. He relaxed.  
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“It was because of the way you laugh,” she said.  
“Laugh,” he cried, cover his mouth and making a mental note never to laugh again.  
“It was such a beautiful shy undercover laugh,” she said. “As if you holding something 
back.” She was massaging him again. “And I thought, What could Mr. Lowe be holding 
back? And I just decided it was that. It wasn’t anything in you clothes or you gestures.” 
(153) 
Interestingly, there is no scene in the novel in which Lowe laughs – indeed, the greatest joy he 
allows himself, the building of the pagoda, is secreted away and carefully guarded, capable as it 
is of being turned into a poisonous bite of disappointment. But the fact that Joyce recalls and is 
so considerate of moments of seeing Lowe in merriment suggests that she has been receptive of 
his vulnerability for decades. In a similar way, the most powerful rendering of humanism based 
on jubilance in the novel is shown through Lowe’s greatest heartache, his fraught relationship 
with his daughter Liz. Throughout the novel Lowe goes through fits and starts of writing a letter 
to Liz to confess his history of deception and her true parentage. Only at the end of the story is 
Lowe able to put steady hand to paper. In the closing pages of the novel, Lowe tells Liz about 
her own precarity as an infant and how she suffered it. Writing Liz, he explains: 
Did I ever tell you you never wanted to live? You took one look at the world and it 
mashed you. For one whole year, you hung on by just a thread . . . It was the customers 
that brought you back . . . The men who talked stories to you, though they were black-up 
with rum. Still they put you on their knees and sang rum songs to you . . . You remember 
that? How they wrapped your little soft hands in their rough chapped-up ones and 
clapped? They were the ones brought you back to life those early days when you weren’t 
certain you should stay. Especially if it was just going to be me and you, me and you 
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solely. But it must have been with those songs that you decided maybe you could laugh. 
(243-44) 
Working endless hours in the shop when they first arrived on the island, Lowe recognizes the 
sense of natality and life force in his infant daughter when local townsmen made her giggle and 
delight. Through Liz, Lowe ensures that the violations and suffering he endured are transformed 
into something much more powerful than his abuse: the ability and freedom of laughter. The fact 
that Lowe perceives his daughter being wooed into life through laughter marks this memory as 
redemptive and situates it within empathetic humanism. Although Lowe cannot fully embrace 
actual jubilation (he can accept and even revel in pleasure, but he never reaches a state of pure 
joy), he can recognize it and wish it for his daughter, whom he loves much more than himself. 
Ultimately, this chapter has worked to dig into the underbelly of the human condition by 
articulating an mortalist humanism through expressions of suffering, and its counterpart, joy. 
Suffering works to embody the subject with agency that rejects structures of logic and Reason, 
thereby subverting Western notions of humanity. In turn, these subjects are able to open 
themselves to pleasure and joy in ways that were previously inaccessible. Exploring narrative 
scenes in which suffering expands the frame of humanity and incites mercy and jubilation, both 
novels feature protagonists who purposefully corrode and conflate their identities as a way of 
becoming agents of their subjectivities. Shedding their masquerade of survival, they subvert their 
suffering of violation and displacement and transform it into vestiges of delight, locating their 
agency not in reason or knowing, but rather as a form of embodied empathy, in and through their 
bodies.  
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4  “WOUND INTRICATELY THROUGHOUT MY SPHERE”:                          
SPATIAL SUBJECTIVITY IN THROUGH THE ARC OF THE RAIN FOREST 
 
 
So, reader, join us as we ramble through these worlds of wonder.  
––Jakob von Uexküll 
A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men  
(1934) 
 
The challenge to our civilization, which has come from our knowledge of the cosmic 
energies that fuel the stars, the movement of light and electrons through matter, the intricate 
molecular order which is the biological basis of life, must be met by the creation of a moral and 
political order which will accommodate these forces or we shall be destroyed. It will try our 
deepest resources of reason and compassion. 
––Heinz Pagels 
The Cosmic Code: Quantum Physics as the Language of Nature  
(1982) 
 
In the grand narrative of the United States, nature has historically been used as an 
ideological device of building the nation “from sea to shining sea” to be the home of the God-
fearing free and the liberated brave. So when Japanese American author Karen Tei Yamashita 
published her first novel Through the Arc of the Rain Forest in 1990, in which she locates her 
story in the depths of Brazil and questions the very nature of what is “natural,” she radically 
opened the genre of Asian American literature to question its conventional focus on U.S. 
nationalism. 1 Often categorized as magical realism, Yamashita’s work consciously 
transnationalizes her critique of capital, corporation, culture, community, technology, and 
environment as she narratively weaves her fictional world. At the heart of Yamashita’s narrative 
is ecology, in that it can be read as an intimate study of living beings and their environment. 
                                               
1 Yamashita’s oeuvre has received much critical attention for disrupting U.S.-centered discourses 
of American Studies and transnationalism. See Chuh, “Of Hemispheres and Other Spheres: 
Navigating Karen Tei Yamashita’s Literary World.” 
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Bringing together the characters of the novel is the mysterious appearance of the “Matacão,” a 
massive polymer land substance, which egresses from the depths of the earth’s core in the 
Amazon rainforest. Upon its discovery, the Matacão material is soon found to be highly 
transformable and lucratively manipulated. As described mid-way through the novel, “When the 
means of molding and shaping this marvelous material was finally discovered, the possibilities 
were found to be infinite. Matacão plastic could be molded into forms more durable and 
impenetrable than steel; it was harder than diamonds and, at the same time, could be spread out 
in thin sheets, as thin as tissue paper with the consistency of silk” (142). The Matacão is quickly 
made into an industry, not just a material: “In the next few years, Matacão plastic would infiltrate 
every crevice of modern life—plants, facial and physical remakes and appendages, shoes, 
clothing, jewelry, toys, cars, every sort of machine from electro-domestic to high-tech, buildings, 
furniture—in short, the myriad of commercial products with which the civilized world adorns 
itself” (143). As such, it became “a national monument—no, an international monument” (113), 
and its immense material capital could only be outweighed by its cultural capital. Through the 
Arc presents the natural in uncertain, unstable terms: as the polymer material, the Matacão is 
manipulated as an object to promote capitalistic, intellectual, religious, and mythical global 
pursuits that undergird nationalisms; yet as a space, the Matacão is constituted as a series of 
intermingling relations between humans, organisms, sentient beings, things, and beliefs that 
engage a subject formation process untethered to the Western yoke of nature and nation. While 
the term “space” commonly carries connotations of distance, interval, or area, this chapter 
advocates a more nuanced approach to the noun.2 Rather than conveying disconnection or 
                                               
2 For the complete etymology and definitional use of “space,” see its entry in the Oxford English 
Dictionary.  
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blankness as traditionally employed, I argue that that perceived void is actually full of emanant 
relational capacities that resist mutative impulses of Western doctrines of subjectivity. “Space” is 
not empty, it is emergent. This particular sense of space is what I call “spatial subjectivity,” 
which the following sections of this chapter work to elaborate.  
I argue that if we perceive nature as a space that both is itself a subject and engenders 
subjectivities, rather than as a rhetorical nation-building object, then we can work through covert 
mechanisms of oppression in radically productive ways. The concepts of nature and ecology as 
framed in Yamashita’s work make available a perspective of Others receiving Others 
unconditioned to the category of the Western construction of human/Man. In other words, by 
removing the human as the central object of analysis, the humane transpires and the 
subjectivities of those historically considered less than human comes into sharp focus. My 
proposal engages what Asian Americanist Kandice Chuh defines in her book Imagine Otherwise 
as “subjectless discourse,” which works to destabilize the structures in which subjects are only 
permitted their subjectivity by “conforming to certain regulatory matrices” such as race or nation 
(9). Writing some thirteen years prior to Chuh’s publication, Yamashita attends to the mire of 
constituting identity via nationalism.3 The novel provides ample nationalistic rhetoric and tropes 
that could easily be used as bases of identity; but rather than situating subjects through national 
alignments, Yamashita imagines inter-relational subjectivities brought forth through the Matacão 
(which, notably, is itself outside of national jurisdictions). 
To clarify how the space of the Matacão engenders subjectivities, I incorporate Estonian 
ecologist Jakob von Uexküll’s notion of the “Umwelt,” defined by theorist Giorgio Agamben as 
                                               
3 While I focus Yamashita’s critique of nationalism through her positioning of the natural, it 
should be noted that race-based identity formation is tightly wound into constructions of nation. 
See Omi and Winant, Racial Formation in the U.S. for further discussion on this matter. 
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“an infinite variety of [individual] perceptual worlds that, though they are uncommunicating and 
reciprocally exclusive, are all equally perfect and linked together as if in a gigantic musical 
score” (40). Through the Arc exemplifies Uexküll’s theory when read as a series of intermingling 
Umwelten. A subject, then, is its sets of relations to other entities, and can not only be human or 
nonhuman, but can also be space itself––represented in Yamashita’s text by the Matacão––
thereby engaging my notion of spatial subjectivity. This chapter employs Yamashita’s novel to 
weave together the ecological and social theories that Uexküll and Chuh articulate and 
demonstrate not only how the merging of these two theories how forms the conceptual 
foundation of spatial subjectivity, but also how it plays out in fictional form. As a theoretical 
approach, spatial subjectivity privileges the ways that space constitutes relations between beings, 
things, and ideas; as an analytical practice, spatial subjectivity incites an acknowledgment of 
agency that resides in the webs of such relations. When space is understood as both subject and 
constituter of subjectivities, it disrupts Western ideologies that traditionally locate agency in Man 
or man-made institutions.  
While nationalism certainly can be a method of social solidarity, its cohesive practice is 
also inherently an exclusionary one, which is what Yamashita narratively works to counter. 
Western ideologies have historically been promoted through a participation in and allegiance to 
nationalisms, an understanding of non-Western subject formation is ultimately a theory of 
liberation beyond the reach and scope of nation-based methodology and meaning. And this 
alternate understanding of subject formation is what, at its heart, spatial subjectivity seeks to do. 
Yamashita’s novel asks us to extend our conception of the subject beyond the human, 
destabilizing an anthropocentric worldview. As spatial subjectivity functions outside this 
worldview, it directly participates in Chuh’s call for subjectless discourse, and provides the 
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analytical opportunity to incorporate Uexküll’s Umwelt as a framing device. As it resides at the 
intersection of critical race and ecological discourses, spatial subjectivity reconceptualizes the 
very domain of viable subjectivity, promoting a framework of social (and, for that matter, 
ecological) justice. 
4.1 Nationalism and the narrative of the (un)viable subject  
In the final pages of Through the Arc, the funeral procession of a young Brazilian 
spiritual leader, Chico Paco, is described. Accidentally caught in an assassin’s line of fire, Chico 
Paco’s death is a shock to his followers and the world. They move him from the site of his death, 
deep in the rainforest, back to his hometown on the northern sea coast of Brazil. The mourners’ 
trek is hundreds of miles; they carry their leader through the manifold ecologies of the variegated 
country:  
Retracing Chico Paco’s steps, the mourners passed hydro-electric plants, where large 
dams had flooded and displaced entire towns. They passed mining projects tirelessly 
exhausting the treasures of iron, manganese and bauxite. They passed a gold rush, losing 
a third of the procession to the greedy furor. They crossed rivers and encountered fishing 
fleets, nets heavy with their exotic river catch of manatee, pirarucú, piramatuba, mapara. 
They crowded to the sides of the road to allow passage for trucks and semis bearing 
timber, Brazil nuts and rubber. They passed burning and charred fields recently cleared 
and parted for frantic zebu cattle, long horns flailing and stampeding toward new 
pastures. They passed black-pepper-tree plantations farmed by immigrant Japanese. They 
passed surveyors and engineers accompanied by excavators, tractors and power saws of 
every description. They passed the government’s five-year plans and ten-year plans, 
while all the forest’s splendid wealth seemed to be rushing away ahead of them. They 
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passed through the old territorial hideouts of rural guerrillas, trampling over unmarked 
graves and forgotten sites of strife and massacre. And when the rains stopped, they knew 
they had passed into northeast Brazil’s drought-ridden terrain, the sun-baked earth 
spreading out from smoldering asphalt, weaving erosion through the landscape. (210) 
Yamashita lyrically highlights a brutal double entendre: while the procession mourns the loss of 
their spiritual guide, they are confronted with the equally devastating, slow killing of the earth. 
Being stripped of its natural resources for the benefit of capital and government, Yamashita 
evidences how nations are often built at the expense of the land to which they lay claim. Yet the 
travelers of the procession are not shocked at nature’s death-in-process, despite their presumed 
meditation of death while in transit. Indeed, although the demise of the natural is blatant in the 
passage, the mourners care only for their grief and loss—and even that devotion is limited in 
many, who cannot resist an opportunity to mine the land for material wealth.  
The mourners’ apparent blindness to the ravaging of nature/building of nation should not 
come as a surprise. After all, nation and nature have long been yoked, almost always at the 
expense of the latter. 4 As environmental theorist Christopher Manes contends, “Nature is silent 
in our culture (and in literate societies generally) in the sense that the status of being a speaking 
subject is jealously guarded as an exclusively human prerogative” (339). This silencing and, as 
Yamashita demonstrates, erasure of nature can assume a plethora of guises. For instance, in the 
U.S. institute of public education, we are taught the history of mankind, which can also be 
projected into a larger history of the world, where (certain categories of) man is at the top of the 
hierarchy of the animal kingdom, at the teleological summit of beings of consciousness and 
                                               
4 For the purposes of this chapter, I refer specifically to Western nationalisms. Indigenous 
nationalisms, such as those of the Pacific and the Americas, often centralize nature and 
sea/landscapes in their formation of identity and nation.  
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reason. Asian Americanist and cultural theorist Lisa Lowe extends this frame of the “natural 
order” further into a more politicized scope: terming the Western anthropocentric 
epistemological model as “modern humanism,” she clarifies the idiom to mean “the secular 
European tradition of liberal philosophy that narrates political emancipation through citizenship 
in the state . . . that confers civilization to the human person educated in aesthetic and national 
culture” (192). The grand narratives of nation and human subject, then, rely on the common 
internal logic of opposition to nature.5  
Yamashita is keenly aware of nation-based humanism that Lowe articulates. In her 
author’s note, which precedes and contextualizes the narrative form of the novel, Yamashita 
remarks that Through the Arc of the Rainforest assumes the contours of novelas—“Brazilian 
soap opera[s]”—which “occup[y] the imagination and national psyche of the Brazilian people on 
prime-time TV.” That Yamashita perceives the telenovela as tool of nationalism is explicitly 
marked by her observational anecdote of the years she lived in Brazil: “In traveling to the most 
remote towns, one finds that a single television in a church or open plaza will gather the people 
nightly to define and standardize by example the national dress, music, humor, political state, 
economic malaise, the national dream, despite the fact that Brazil is immense and variegated.” 
Thus Yamashita initiates the first of numerous brilliant inversions and elisions of the novel: the 
very structure and recurring narrative motifs of the novel consciously work beyond the 
boundaries of nationalism through the very conventions that instill and define it. Yamashita 
reimagines and opens the possibility of geographies of identity and embodiment in the way she 
                                               
5 The concept of being in opposition to nature is exemplified in some of the earliest narratives of 
the U.S., such as William Bradford’s Of Plymouth Plantation and the novels of James Fenimore 
Cooper.  
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weaves the narrative in the style of a Brazilian telenovela. And she does so precisely through her 
use of the natural, which is later shown to be likewise supernatural – the Matacão. 
Yamashita foregrounds her novel with the caution that nationalism can be a tool of 
oppression, as it constrains identities, regulates citizenship, and sanctions belonging. In this way, 
nature has also been used as a tool of exclusion: national identity, citizenship, and belonging 
have historically been available only to a specific category of subjects that are naturally endowed 
with those rights. It is here that debates about legal subjects and place-based belonging can come 
to dominate discourses about nature, society, and the environment. Therefore, it is also here that 
we should heed Judith Butler’s warning that “oppression works not merely through overt 
prohibition, but covertly, through the constitution of viable subjects and through the corollary 
constitution of a domain of unviable (un)subjects” (20, my emphasis). The matter of nationalism-
as-oppressor is not so much rooted in man’s (mis)use of nature, but rather that man and nature 
are positioned as singular (usually) opposites in the construction of the domain of viable 
subjects. 6 “For half a millennia,” Manes reflects, “‘Man’ has been the center of conversation in 
the West. This fictional character has occluded the natural world, leaving it voiceless and 
subjectless” (350). Environmental Studies, Environmental Ethics, Deep Ecology, 
Bioregionalism, and other fields dedicated to nature have long recognized of the strangling 
dangers of a single anthropocentric worldview but in order to deconstruct and reposition “Man,” 
we must also do so with nature, as both notions are often defined in oppositional relation to one 
another. 7 The need to expand and reframe the process of subject formation is not only espoused 
                                               
6 For more on how “Man” has occluded the natural world, see Manes, 350. 
7 To enter the discourse of environmental studies and its affiliate fields, start with The 
Ecocriticism Reader: Landmarks in Literary Ecology, eds. Cheryll Glotfelty and Harold Fromm; 
The Future of Environmental Criticism by Lawrence Buell.   
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in Through the Arc, it is also the epistemological spirit of contemporary critical race theory in the 
field of Asian American Studies.  
4.2 Asian American Studies and Subjectless Discourse 
In 2003 Kandice Chuh published her highly acclaimed critical text, Imagine Otherwise. 
During a time of critical self-reflection in the field of Asian American studies, Chuh tackled an 
impasse in the field: how to defend and espouse Asian American subjectivity without 
reinscribing the methods of oppression and erasure that it works against. Chuh acknowledges 
that we are at the breaking point in social history in which we must go beyond Western 
epistemology of who (or what) qualifies as a subject; 8 to go off the grid of the nation-based 
matrix of viable subjects. This means extending notions of subjectivity to go beyond—and even 
to dismantle—traditional Western forms. It means engaging what Chuh calls “subjectless 
discourse,” which destabilizes the structures in which subjects are only permitted their 
subjectivity by “conforming to certain regulatory matrices” (9)—matrices that, as Butler points 
out, can be subtle and elusive. Chuh articulates how asserting the Asian American subject, or an 
Asian American subjectivity, only works to reify the power relations that have flattened Asian 
American agency by conceiving subjects solely within the framework that limits, marginalizes, 
and constrains them. As Nhi Lieu reflects in her review of Imagine Otherwise, “Chuh brilliantly 
takes apart assumptions about ‘Asian America’ in order to further a ‘subjectless analysis’ that 
challenges Asian American representation as uniform, stable, monolithic, and essentialist” (492).  
To date, social critics have been working diligently against the machinery of Western 
subjectivity. Now, social criticism must forego the aspects of subjectivity that the Western 
                                               
8 Chuh’s study is directed specifically toward Asian Americans and people of Asian ancestry. 
However, I believe we can adopt some tenants of her thesis and method to consider minority 
discourse more generally. 
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epistemological machine creates, as asserting that particular subjectivity only serves to reify the 
machine. Chuh’s call is not one for simple negation and erasure of the subject (after all, the very 
act of writing renders moot that desire or possibility); instead, Chuh “unravels the limits of an 
identity-based paradigm as the foundational basis for Asian American studies and suggests that 
‘critique’ replace the subject as the object of inquiry” (Lieu 492), arguing that the subject as an 
analytic be replaced with critique: 
Subjectlessness as a discursive ground for Asian American studies can, I think, help to 
identify and trace the shifting positionalities and complicated terrains of U.S. American 
culture and politics articulated to a globalized frame, by opening up the field to account 
for practices of subjectivity that might not be immediately visible within, for example, a 
nation-based representational grid, or one that emphasizes racialization to the occlusion 
of other processes of subjectification. (Chuh 11)  
Working toward social justice, Asian American criticism has actually constructed the Asian 
American subject as an “epistemological object” (9). In other words, if the traditional 
Eurocentric ways of knowing (epistemology) are simply recycled, even in “new” contexts such 
as critical race or transnational studies, then the outcome of what is known (object) will always 
be the same; the architecture of hegemony remains intact. With this acknowledgement, Chuh 
calls for a critique of epistemology and the desire for specific representations of subjectivity. To 
be clear, Chuh does not suggest a negation of agency or an erasure of the subject (after all, the 
very act of writing renders moot that desire of possibility). Rather, she insists that by 
“emphasizing the internal instability of ‘Asian American,’ identity of and as the other—the 
marginal, the marginalized—is encouraged to collapse” (9), allowing for a construction of Asian 
American identity not based in the binary logic of the (often hegemonic) subject and the (often 
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marginalized) object. In this distinction, Chuh’s theory harmonizes with environmental theories 
that counter anthropocentric worldviews, as the limiting subject/object framework parallels the 
Man/nature episteme. Of course, allying nature and subject-formation is understandably 
precarious ground for minority scholars, as nature, territory, and nation are so easily a 
triumvirate of hegemonic authority.9 Just recall, for example, this chapter’s opening paragraph 
reference “sea to shining sea” from Katherine Lee Bates’ 1893 poem “America the Beautiful,” 
which identifies the land of America to be a “Thoroughfare of freedom beat / Across the 
wilderness,” ruled by “pilgrim[s],” “heroes,” and “patriot[s]” “Who more than self their country 
loved.” Not only is man meant to rule over nature, it is only natural that he does so. It is in this 
sense of naturalization as a form of identity that the nation becomes a method of exclusion and 
covert prohibition for peoples who do not resemble the type of man described, for example, by 
Bates. Yet despite these qualifiers, I maintain that there is a liberatory potential in relating nature 
and subjectless conceptions of agency.  
While environmental studies at large have attended to the manifold ways humans have 
subjugated nature in their consistent pursuit of nation and its conscriptive powers, I approach the 
interweavings of ecology and subjectivity more ideologically. My focus is not seated in 
ecocriticism; rather, I consider how a space of emergent, though not always fathomable 
connections, engender subject-formation. I align with Chuh’s discernment that “the inadequacy 
of nation as conceptual parameter for understanding the complexities of subject-formation” is not 
only “a question of accuracy,” but also a “specifically ideological” issue (88). I participate in 
Chuh’s project of subjectless discourse, by way of reimagining how nature, space, and 
                                               
9 While not the focus of this chapter, it should be noted that territory and nation can be mutually 
inclusive. Chuh in particular stresses that “[t]erritoriality literalizes nation, lending to it a 
palpability that contributes to its sense of inevitability” (86). 
120 
subjectivity functions in Yamashita’s novel. However, while Chuh organizes her critique of 
Asian American studies by providing literary analyses that are not organized by an identity-
based analytical category,10 I suggest that it may still be useful to attend the subject/object 
framework, if and only if we can radically revise the construction and qualification of “subjects” 
and “objects.”  
“Space” again intervenes here as a productive response to Chuh’s call for subjectlessness 
as Through the Arc imagines manifold spaces articulated as various capacities for relations, 
upending traditional philosophical distinctions between subject and object. For instance, recall 
the first part of this chapter’s title: “wound intricately throughout my sphere.” This phrase is 
uttered by the omniscient narrator of the novel, who is embodied by a small animated orb that 
tangibly spins inches in front of the main character’s, Kazumasa Ishimaru, forehead. Kazumasa’s 
ball turns out to be made of the same material as the Matacão but is also an intelligent nonhuman 
being endowed with consciousness and memory, guiding the reader through Yamashita’s tale 
with first person perspective and authority. It is telling, I think, that the novel’s narrator is a ball. 
While “sphere” as a noun often connotes an empty three-dimensional circular area, Kazumasa’s 
ball challenges its assumed state of vacancy because of its otherworldly sentience: it positions 
itself as a self-aware miniature of the Earth, homogenously connected to the Matacão and its 
infinite emerging capacities; it defies any established framework of subjectivity. Kazumasa’s 
ball’s agency is manifested through omniscient intelligence, critical consciousness, and exists 
more intricately in nature than what humans can comprehend, exceeding the four dimensions of 
                                               
10 Instead, critique of the subject is Chuh’s focus, rather than the subject itself (or, oftentimes, 
reinscribed object). For example, Chuh organizes her study of Asian American texts by 
analyzing fluxuating categories of citizenship (chapter 1) and assessing how transnationality 
underpins racialization, which is itself a technology of hegemonic power (chapter 2).  
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humanity even if we don’t quite have the biological, semiotic, or narrative ability to describe it. 
Kazumasa’s ball is revealed as the most knowing and affective character of the novel, 
shepherding the reader through the complicated relational web of everything and everyone 
engaging the Matacão. Spatial subjectivity, then, emerges as a potential to not only indelibly 
reinscribe the agency of nature, but also to challenge the Western forging of the figure of all-
powerful Man in whom epistemology is self-reflexive and stationed as an absolute. Chuh limns 
out how “knowledge” is used as a device to ensure hegemony and limit agency, which is a 
crucial aspect of how agency is viciously guarded for those who count as legitimate makers of 
meaning. She contends, “Those from whom information flows are sedimented into objects of 
(area) study, whereas those from whom knowledge flows are coetaneously empowered with the 
subjective authority to evaluate that information” (90). By locating intelligence and design in 
nature and tracing other (human and non-human) beings’ subjectivities through their relation to 
natural space, we transpose the genesis of subjectivity to the biosphere, so that human ontology 
is but one node of sentience amongst a vast, ever-changing sea of other subjectivities. 
4.3 The Umwelt and Spatial Subjectivity 
Let us return to ecologist-turned-biosemotician Jackob von Uexküll to more deeply 
investigate how the space of the Matacão engenders its own subjectivity and constitutes the 
subjectivities of other beings. Specifically, we focus on Uexküll’s notion of the “Umwelt,”11 
which he defines as the individual ecology of a living being that is comprised only by its 
                                               
11 In German, Umwelt translates more directly as “environment” or “surroundings.” It should be 
noted that Uexkull’s use of “Umwelt” predates Martin Heidegger’s famous notion of the term. 
Publishing most of his work between the early 1890’s through the late 1930’s, it is widely known 
in the fields of biosemiotics and theoretical biology that Uexkull also directly influenced 
philosophers such as Ernst Cassirer, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and Gilles Deleuze, in addition to 
Heidegger; see Kull 12. Likewise, however, Uexkull dedicated many of his works to Immanuel 
Kant; see Buchanan 19-21.  
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interactions with its local environment that hold significance to that specific being. Uexküll often 
refers to the Umwelt as a “subjective-self-world,” or, more endearingly, a being’s “soap bubble” 
of existence. As Uexküll’s understanding of subjects aptly situates subjectivity beyond the 
anthropocentric worldview, his theory of meaning poises us to reread nature, nation, and the 
space that links both. Classical science holds “the” worldview of a single world in which all 
living organisms and species are contained, systematically ordered in hierarchy from the 
simplest, most basic of species up to the higher forms. Uexküll, however, does not ascribe to this 
single world theory. In A Stroll Through the Worlds of Animals and Men—his eloquent “picture 
book of invisible worlds”—Uexküll explains the detriment that attends such a single-sighted 
register of life. “We are easily deluded into assuming that the relationship between a foreign 
subject and the objects in his world exists on the same spatial and temporal plane as our own 
relations with the objects in our human world,” Uexküll posits, presupposing the grounds of 
current-day environmentalism. “This fallacy,” he continues, “is fed by a belief in the existence of 
a single world, into which all living creatures are pigeonholed. This gives rise to the widespread 
conviction that there is only one space and one time for all living things” (A Stroll 327). Instead, 
Uexküll contends that there are infinite perceptual worlds, in which each living being (all of 
which Uexküll regards as subjects) is the master of its own subjective-self-world. The Umwelt 
proves the possibility that there is no objectively fixed realm of existence––the natural world is 
neither a singular entity, nor an empty receptacle for various life forms. Although the Umwelt is 
still based on a binary construction of subjects and objects (between actors and their stimuli), the 
category of viable subjects is expanded beyond humankind, and the understanding of world is 
multiplied infinitely. 
Importantly, though, while these perceptual worlds—these “Umwelten”––are 
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uncommunicating and exclusive of one another, so that “all animals, from the simplest to the 
most complex, are fitted into their unique worlds with equal completeness” (A Stroll 324), all are 
linked together as if in some purposeful, enormous musical score. To illustrate this expanded 
sense in which Umwelten participate, I turn to the presence of a fig on a tree. Although a single 
fig exists on a tree, which itself is amongst other flora of a particular location, the fig has 
different relations depending on the being with which it interacts. In addition to there being the 
fig-of-the-growing-tree, there is also the fig-of-the-harvesting-human, the fig-of-the-snacking-
bird, and the fig-of-the-spawning-wasp. In this way, there are multiple, intermingling Umwelten 
all in one place (the tree), created by a single subject (the fig fruit). The final example of the 
Umwelt of the fig and the wasp is of special note, in that it demonstrates a harmonic composition 
in nature—what Uexküll alludes to as nature’s “unknowing intelligence” and I suggest is the 
inherent “spirit” of spatial subjectivity—in which all Umwelten are interweaved. The symbiotic 
relationship between fig trees and wasps has long been celebrated by environmental biologists as 
perfect co-evolution.12 The fig, being an inflorescence plant, contains its flowers and seeds 
within the flesh of the fruit. Its pollination, therefore, has to be specially delivered into its core. 
By some magic evolutionary design, female wasps have determined the inner florets of a fig fruit 
to be their nesting sites. After the wasp has selected her ideal fig, she squeezes through the apex 
of the fig, most oftentimes losing her antennae and wings in the process, and navigates her way 
to the florets, where she deposits her eggs. As she crawls around inside the fig, she sheds the 
pollen she collected from the other fig trees she visited while searching for her chosen fruit. The 
fig fruit and the female wasp are unknowing of one another, yet the apex of the fruit is just large 
                                               
12 For an engaging overview of the fig/wasp relationship, see Katie Kline’s post on the 
Ecological Society of America’s blog, EcoTone, where she also has linked documentary video 
clips of the duo.   
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enough to admit the determined wasp, and in kind the wasp is specially equipped to sense a fig 
fruit that is not only the specific species of Ficus (fig tree) her species of wasp is designed for, 
but also to determine which fruit is uninhabited and unripe. Fig seeds now pollinated and wasp 
eggs laid, the female’s job is done, and the fruit’s acids are induced to consume the female’s 
carcass and, thereby, ripening the fruit. Her eggs hatch, the newly-born male and female wasps 
mate, then the males carve passages out of the fig for the females to take flight to search for their 
own fig (though the males never make it: they spend their entire life inside the flesh of a fig 
fruit). The fig fruits, ripened by its consumption of the wasp carcasses, are now edible for 
animals and birds to eat; the pollinated seeds of the fig travel in the belly of the critter until it 
defecates somewhere else, its excretion the perfect vessel and fertilizer for the seeds to take root. 
The fig and the wasp are unaware of the other as a subject (the fig uses the wasp as its object and 
the wasp uses the fig as its object in their respective Umwelten) yet are clearly intelligently 
designed to enable a grand plan for the survival of nature. This unknowing intelligence is 
precisely what Uexküll refers to when he describes the compositional harmony of nature:  
This force of Nature we have called conformity with ‘plan’ because we are able to 
follow it with our apperception only when it combines the manifold details into one 
whole by means of rules. Higher rules, which unite things separated even by time, are 
in general called plans, without any reference to whether they depend on human 
purposes or not . . . we have before us a coarse-meshed tissue, which can be 
comprehended only from a standpoint higher than those afforded us by individual, 
community, or species. This all-embracing interweaving cannot be referred to any 
particular formative impetus. Here at last we see the action of life as such, working in 
conformity with plan. (Theoretical Biology 175-76, 258) 
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To be clear, spatial subjectivity employs Uexküll’s Umwelt theory, but the two are not 
the same. Where the Umwelt incites agency through the aspects of an environment that carry 
significance to the subject (think: only the species of wasp that is designed for a particular 
species of fig tree can squeeze herself inside the fruit to pollinate and ripen it) and forms its 
subjective-self-world, spatial subjectivity names the subject formation process that occurs within 
Umwelten and fosters the unknowing intelligence of harmonic relations.  
Likewise in the Rain Forest, the Matacão is not only as a specific geographic place, but 
more dynamically has agency in itself, in that it emanates multiple relations to and amongst other 
object-beings. The narrative that develops around the presence, use, and eventual failing of the 
Matacão plastic shows intricate systems of connectivity: spirituality, technology, media, 
capitalism, material production, and social consumption are all overlaid through an international 
cast of characters who travel to the Matacão and end up convening into a community, as they 
recognize that each person and being has their own relation with the baffling, magical polymer 
substance. The Matacão stimulates each of the novel’s characters in very different ways, though 
all are equally and fatefully tied to its emergence. The ways that each character is tied to the 
Matacão and the ways that each character’s storyline consistently works toward interconnection 
substantiate the method of spatial subjectivity that Uexküll articulates. In addition to Kazumasa 
and his attendant sentient floating orb, there is a host of other equally magical characters. J.B. 
Tweep, a three-armed American CEO who figuratively embodies neoliberal corporation, holds 
Kazumasa hostage for his satellite’s ability to geo-locate other sites of Matacão surfacings. The 
“native” character, Mané Pena, capitalizing on his perceived indigenous authenticity, becomes an 
expert in the healing science of “featherology,” and his position as the local father-figure to 
newly arrived Matacão-opportunists. He mentors Batista Djapan, who begrudingly supports his 
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partner Tania Aparecida as she builds an empire through international pigeon-carrier 
communications, in which the Matacão serves as one of their global bases. Lastly there is the 
aforementioned Chico Paco, a spiritual pilgrim to the Matacão, who constantly promotes being 
in transit, even through his death.  
Scholars have critically approached the Matacão in differing and dynamic ways. Aimee 
Bhang examines the terrain of the novel as a mutant and speculative space of historically 
disavowed empire and present day capitalist hubris. Alternatively, in her 2004 essay “Local 
Rock and Global Plastic,” Ursula Heise situates the Matacão as “primarily a destination,” in that 
“the reader follows all the other characters [except for the native-born Mané Pena] on their 
journeys from far-flung places of origin to the rainforest” (142). What both Bhang and Heise 
highlight are the interdependencies of globalism and nationalism through the valence of the 
“natural” world. By fruition, fortitude, or force, all the novel’s characters seek the Matacão in an 
effort to settle and conquer it (either materially or ideologically) – recalling again that master 
narrative of nature’s subjugation to nation. In many ways, although never a nation-state, the 
Matacão assumes the tropes of a nation. It is quickly settled into a distinct territory, mapped out 
and claimed by numerous peoples and groups for various rights spanning from capital gain to 
religious sanctity.  And “Territoriality,” Chuh articulates, “literalizes nation, lending to it a 
palpability that contributes to its sense of inevitability” (86). The region of the Matacão is settled 
and developed for habitation and production; it becomes the site of pilgrimages and religion; it 
instigates a new system of jurisprudence and legality; it is sanctioned with its own higher 
education system: it is a place that becomes a home, a livelihood, and instigates a common sense 
of belonging. Yet Yamashita refuses to allow this burgeoning sense of nation to be the 
representational grid that designates subjectivity. Instead, it is the overlaid relations between the 
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various beings and the natural—indeed, the relations that the space of the Matacão enables—that 
promote subjectivities. 
Perceiving the Matacão through its various Umwelten not only requires an inversion of 
traditional demarcations of subject and object, it more importantly creates the space for an 
ontological reimagining of the formations of subjectivity itself, among which I contend we 
privilege spatial subjectivity.  To be clear, Uexküll’s theory of the Umwelt is an important way 
to use spatial subjectivity as a critique that incorporates senses of spirit, but the two theories are 
not the same. Where the Umwelt gives agency through the aspects of an environment that carry 
significance to the subject (think: only the species of wasp that is designed for a particular 
species of fig tree can squeeze herself inside the fruit to pollinate and ripen it) and forms its 
subjective-self-world, spatial subjectivity names the agency of the spirit that attends Umwelten 
and fosters the unknowing quality of harmonic relations.   
If we recall how Chuh challenges the constructedness of Asian American difference 
while maintaining our alternative-approach theoretical example of the Umwelt, then we can start 
to see the liberatory potential of spatial subjectivity for historically disenfranchised groups. Yet I 
would be remiss to not explain a very distinct departure spatial subjectivity takes from 
subjectless discourse. Chuh approaches the concept of “space” through a critique of the 
territorialization of nation, where she investigates how a “naturally distinct ‘here’ and ‘there’” is 
promulgated through a “spatialized logic” that “posit[s] the naturalness of the relationship 
between the native-born and the nation” (87, 86). In other words, Chuh articulates space as a 
cartography of ideological difference mapped on to physical places which all materializes in very 
real political practices of Othering. In many ways, then, I am working the flip side of the coin: 
rather than interrogating space as a vacuum or as a tool of binary logic, I suggest that space can 
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also be approached relationally as a non-national grid of subject formation that does not have to 
hinge upon Western epistemology. The Matacão, for example, was initially imagined through the 
news media to be a site of inexplicable healing properties. Mané Pena, a longtime resident 
farmer on the land through which the Matacão emerged, is interviewed by a national news 
station during the initial fascination of the strange polymer substance. His interview quickly 
devolves to focus on his quirky fixation with a special feather he discovered on his property, 
which he claims has restorative, healing powers. His claim then cemented by the reporter who 
attests that the feather eliminated the pain in her shoulder, Mané’s feather becomes the public 
symbol of the magical phenomenon of the Matacão. Viewers across the world see Mané’s 
interview and are further drawn into the mythos of the Matacão. Kazumasa’s maid, Lourdes, 
watches the interview on TV and reflects, “There’s something about that place, that Matacão, 
Seu Kazumasa. I just know it. That old man and his magic feather. It’s the Matacão” (24, my 
emphasis). And Lourdes is not the only one who is enchanted. Chico Paco’s invalid best friend 
and soulmate, Gilberto, walks again after his grandmother, Dona Maria Creuza, “had promised 
Saint George that if her prayers [to heal Gilberto’s legs] were granted, she herself would walk 
barefooted to the Matacão and erect a small shrine in his honor” (27). Chico Paco voyages to the 
Matacão in place of the elderly Maria, already sure that the Matacão “was a divine place. It was 
the only possible reason why the feather could have even been discovered by Mané Pena” (24). 
All the main characters in the novel attend the Matacão based on the innate belief that the space 
is an epicenter of connection – tapping into the sacred layers of the world, connecting disparate 
strangers to a promise of something unknowable, but also in doing so making them available to 
receive one another. The promise of connection to something sacred and even magical operates 
entirely outside the domain of Western scientific logic; rather, its proof is anecdotal, experiential, 
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and even rumor-based. No single scientific method alone can discern the enigmatic, subject-
forming spatial properties of the Matacão. 
Articulating spatial subjectivity through the notion of the Umwelt as an ecological 
philosophy is one way that we can reimagine space unsieved by Western, identity-based systems 
of knowledge. Uexküll’s son, student, and biographer, Thure von Uexküll, further reveals his 
father’s “theory of meaning” beyond the structure of dualistic thinking:   
Reality, to which all is subjected and from which everything is deduced, is not to 
be found “outside,” in infinite space, which has neither beginning nor end, and 
which is filled with a nebulous cloud of elementary particles; nor is it to be found 
“inside” within ourselves and the indistinct, distorted images of this external 
world created by our mind. Reality manifests itself in those worlds . . . These 
“subjective-self-world bubbles” [Umwelten] . . . are the elements of reality which 
form themselves into a synthesis of all subjects and their subjective-self-worlds at 
the same time undergoing constant changes in Natur—which lies beyond and 
behind the nature conceived of by physicists, chemists, and microbiologists . . . 
(280-81) 
Although in many ways Uexküll seems unable to completely do away with hierarchal logic (as 
previously mentioned, despite his radical revision of environment, the Umwelt still hinges on a 
subject and its objects/stimuli), he maintains faith in his non-scientific understanding of that 
sense of something other “which lies beyond and behind” Western knowledge. In their signals 
toward something “beyond” the domain of Eurocentric epistemology, I see Uexküll and Chuh 
making room for the concept of spatial subjectivity, and they are not alone in their gesture 
toward the subjectivity of space. Yamashita ponders a similar system of connectivity in her 
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epigraph to Through the Arc, in which she notes, “I have heard Brazilian children say that 
whatever passes through the arc of a rainbow becomes its opposite. But what is the opposite of a 
bird? Or for that matter, a human being? What then, in the great rain forest, where, in its season, 
the rain never ceases and the rainbows are myriad?” Calling out the childish simplicity and static 
capacity of binary design, Yamashita challenges her reader from the start of the novel to openly 
receive the other possible forms of being – of sentience, connectivity, making meaning, living, 
and ultimately, of humanity – that she offers in her narrative catalogue. Yamashita hails her 
reader to suspend their propensity toward disbelief, for a time, to instead privilege reception of 
the Other.  
Just as Yamashita protests the outposts of binary logic, Uexküll approaches ecology 
through the multiplicity of subjectivities. In this way, both Yamashita and Uexküll align with 
Lowe’s appeal (which clearly resounds with Chuh’s) to “imagine a much more complicated set 
of stories about the emergence of the now, in which what is foreclosed as unknowable is forever 
saturating the ‘what-can-be-known.’ We are left with the project of visualizing, mourning, and 
thinking ‘other humanities’ within the received genealogy of ‘the human’” (208). Although 
writing some seventy years apart from one another, Yamashita and Uexküll both seem to tap into 
a common quintessential tenor, a particular sense of spirit, in their work.  
4.4 Spirit and Memory 
Uexküll’s attunement to the intricate networks of nature came from his deep belief in 
their intelligent plan of survival, where that plan (what Uexküll calls Natur) “lies beyond and 
behind the nature” conceived by man and Western thought. While Natur is simply the German 
word for “nature,” yet it holds a distinct extra-anthropocentric value for Uexküll. While it may 
not resonate with strict scientific discourse, Uexküll was never afraid to admit that there is 
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something more—something other—of Natur that cannot be empirically qualified and 
scholastically conquered. And this “something other” is sentient, and is almost soulfully 
described to conduct the elaborate interworkings of nature, that is, its own being. Or rather, 
nature simultaneously conforms to plan as Natur is itself plan. One of the reasons classic science 
struggles with Uexküll’s horizontal, rhizomatic13 understanding of nature is because it is never 
unchanging long enough to be linguistically smashed into the already-existing vertical structure 
of evolutionary hierarchy. Uexküll refuses the teleology of evolution. Countering the 
contemporary more popular thought of Darwin,14 Uexküll always imagined nature as an intricate 
horizontal web network of all life forms, equally privileged in agency, if not biological 
complexity. Here again, taking Uexküll’s theory of meaning a few steps further, we can see 
spatial subjectivity to be both the web strands and the ether between them: the relations and the 
thing that engenders those relations.  
Environmental scholar Daniel Berthold-Bond describes how nature has been flattened 
into a barren, background object, stripped of its life force, and in doing so lends us the 
connective language that situates how both spatial subjectivity and the Umwelt (as a method of 
spatial subjectivity) might be seen to evoke the sentience of nature. “With very few exceptions,” 
Berthold-Bond contends, “this dominant tradition [of Western thought] has taken it to be self-
evidently true that the boundaries of ethical life entirely coincide with the sphere of the human 
world, with the nonhuman environment existing as utterly ‘other,’ on the outside of the circle, 
                                               
13 Although phenomenological philosophers Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari provide the most 
well known theoretical use of “rhizome,” the term is etymologically rooted in botany; see their 
introduction to A Thousand Plateaus. 
14 For more on Uexküll’s academic genealogy and divergence from contemporary scientific 
theories, see Buchanan’s Onto-Ethologies: The Animal Environments of Uexkill, Heidegger, 
Merleu-Ponty, and Deleuze, 9-12. 
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without rights, without moral standing” (8). As such, “Nature becomes something like the 
‘negative space’ [ . . . where] morality is an affair of humans in their relations with other humans, 
pure and simple; and nature, correspondingly, is a mere [. . .] morally empty space” (Berthold-
Bond 9). Berthold-Bond pinpoints how nature has been pushed into the margins of epistemology, 
forced into the category of what Butler terms the “domain of unviable (un)subjects” (20). That 
Uexküll insists on the language of nature as a great symphonic composition15 marks his 
commitment to counter his contemporary colleagues' push to privilege Man as the keeper of 
world(s) and positions him as an early champion of deep ecology thought.  
Undoubtedly, Uexküll would have mourned Berthold-Bond’s articulation of the 
objectification of nature if he had lived long enough to read it. My intention here is to put 
morality—what I prefer to interpretatively distinguish as what I have been calling “spirit”—back 
into nature. I have shown that Through the Arc of the Rain Forest illuminates nature as a space 
and subject carrying infinite relations with other beings; I here hope to reinforce this stance by 
articulating how Yamashita engenders the spatial subjectivity of nature through an applique of 
spirit and creative use of narrative form. Thus, spatial subjectivity emerges as a potential to not 
only indelibly reinscribe the agency of nature, but also to challenge the Western forging of the 
figure of all-powerful Man in whom epistemology is self-reflexive and stationed as an absolute. 
Chuh limns out how “knowledge” is used as a device to ensure hegemony and limit agency, 
which is a crucial aspect of how agency is viciously guarded for those who count as legitimate 
makers of meaning. She contends, “Those from whom information flows are sedimented into 
                                               
15 While “musical score” and “composition” are often used to express the overall intelligent 
interweaving of nature, Uexkull also refers to“chime,” “rhythm,” “melody,” “harmony,” and 
“symphony” to describe the relations of organisms; see “Theory of Meaning.” For a list and 
definitions of the musical terms Uexkull uses throughout his oeuvre, see Buchanan 26-27. 
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objects of (area) study, whereas those from whom knowledge flows are coetaneously empowered 
with the subjective authority to evaluate that information” (90). By locating intelligence and 
design in nature and tracing other (human and non-human) beings’ subjectivities through their 
relation to natural space, we transpose the genesis of subjectivity to the spirit of the biosphere, so 
that human ontology is but one node of sentience amongst a vast, ever-changing sea of other 
subjective-self-worlds.  
“These different worlds,” Uexküll explains of Umwelten, “present to all nature lovers 
new lands of such wealth and beauty that a walk through them is well worth while, even though 
they unfold not to the physical but only to the spiritual eye” (A Stroll 320). Uexküll’s Umwelt 
theory rests on perception: not only in the primary sense of each being perceiving its own 
subjective-self-world, but also in the secondary sense of us, as readers and learners, to see these 
worlds that are not our (individual or society) own with an alternative sensory faculty beyond the 
ocular—to revise our perception to acknowledge a creative and biological gesture towards a 
beyond. This revision is a massive undertaking in that it deviates from canonized conceptions of 
“being,” and consequently largely lacks the language to articulate such recension. As Manes 
keenly qualifies, “we must contemplate not only learning a new ethics, but a new language free 
from the directionalities of humanism” (342). At first glance, this call may seem to be an 
insurmountable project, but the works of Yamshita, Chuh, and Uexküll show it to be an ongoing, 
open invitation, as they have already proposed a matrix of alternative approaches to subject 
formation. In the first paragraph of his most well-known monograph, Uexküll reminds us that we 
must be willing to look beyond the systems of what is known, as these systems instigate a 
blindness to Otherly beauty: “Many a zoologist and physiologist, clinging to the doctrine that all 
living beings are mere machines, denies their existence and thus boards up the gates to other 
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worlds so that no single ray of light shines forth from all the radiance that is shed over them. But 
let us who are not committed to the machine theory consider the nature of machines” (A Stroll 
319). Yamashita, too, points to the brilliance of such other worlds in the aforementioned 
epigraph, when she proposes the possibility of infinite beings when something is transformed as 
it passes “through the arc of the rainbow . . . in the great rain forest” where “rainbows are 
myriad.” Likewise, Chuh grounds her theory of subjectless discourse in critiquing the Western 
machinery of justified belief. In this way, Uexküll reverberates through Yamashita and Chuh: 
“So, reader, join us as we ramble through these worlds of wonder” (A Stroll 320). When all three 
writers are considered in a light reflected by one another, they illuminate the need to consider 
spirit as an inherent dynamic of subjects that come into being relationally, as the ethers of spatial 
subjectivity.  
“Spirit” as a term historically has been religionized, institutionalized, and 
anthropomorphized. In various contexts it has been given a plethora of definitions, each suited 
for the aims of establishing some definite known thing, or system of knowing. Being aware and 
cautious of such appropriations, I believe we can also perceive spirit more materially in spatial 
subjectivity by focusing on the relational network of nature and recognizing that spirit is at once 
the subjectivity created by space and the agency of that space. When nature is reframed through 
specificity of subject, “[a] new world comes into being,” leaving subjectivity open to alternative 
articulations of language and knowing (Uexküll A Stroll 319). This is what Kazumasa’s ball does 
for the reader, the Matacão does for the biosphere, and Chuh does for critical race studies. 
Through this analysis, we come to a deeper understanding of spirit as the refusal of any known 
absolutes: it hinges on change and instability, it is enlivened through an unknowing yet 
intelligent web of relations. In Yamashita’s imagining, this web permeates not only individual 
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beings, but also throughout man-made social systems of thought that, sharing the same genesis as 
Frankenstein’s monster, are often considered to be self-sustaining and -perpetuating things unto 
themselves. In Through the Arc, capitalism, environmentalism, and globalism are non-opposing, 
interconnected forces of which there is no singular master manipulator. In a playful inversion of 
Berthold-Bond’s reading of nature as a morally empty space, Yamashita ignores the moral 
declinations in which these social systems are usually couched, espousing a neutral space of 
subject formation that operates outside the Western ideas of judgment and knowing. In the novel, 
spirit materializes as a system of fractal returns. The earth’s mantle manipulates non-
biodegradable waste to form the Matacão; copper-colored butterflies thrive in their seemingly 
unnatural environment of an old rusted junkyard in the forest; even the forest itself has a 
symbiotic relational manipulation, as it reconsumes vestiges of civilization. In Yamashita’s 
narrative world—which, of course, is not too different from the world we find ourselves in 
today—a series of changing relations, individual yet interconnected, wax and wane and are 
reconstituted into new formations of society and environment. 
Ultimately, spatial subjectivity harkens infinite new imaginations of agency for all 
beings. The narrative framing of Kazumasa’s ball provides an ontological revision of subjectivity 
of and on this biosphere. The figure of Kazumasa’s ball hails a consideration of how spatial 
subjectivity is wound not only throughout all Earth’s life forms, but all life forces—Earthly and 
not—by its very sentient presence. As the novel progresses and the reader is introduced to the 
emergence of the Matacão, it is understood from the opening paragraphs that the ball’s existence 
has already cycled through extinction. “By a strange quirk of fate,” Kazumasa’s ball explains, “I 
was brought back by a memory . . . I could have been reincarnated, if such things are possible, 
into the severed head of that dead chicken or some other useless object . . . Instead, brought back 
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by a memory, I have become a memory, and as such, am commissioned to become for you a 
memory” (Yamashita 3). Kazumasa’s ball disrupts all sense of stable narrative: the novel is 
relayed as a memory, told by a memory that is now the reader’s memory, which is called forth at 
an indistinct future time, when presumably our current sense of the world is long lapsed and 
forgotten. Kazumasa’s ball an embodiment of spirit connected to biosphere as “the voice that 
emerges from the depths of geology” (Heise 147). But, just like Uexküll’s notion of Natur, it is 
also brought forth from spirit, from the unknowable ethers of spatial subjectivity. Kazumasa’s 
ball recalls the moment it was incarnated and tied to Kazumasa by acknowledging that 
alchemistic spirit. Playing with other children on the beach of his hometown on the west coast of 
Japan, “Kazumasa felt the Divine Wind ripple through his hair and scatter with the clouds over 
the ocean’s mercuric mantle . . . Suddenly, an enormous crack of thunder echoed across the 
shore, and a flying mass of fire plowed into the waves, scattering debris in every direction . . . A 
tiny piece of debris had plummeted toward him and knocked him unconscious . . . there, close to 
Kazumasa’s face, a small object buzzed,” and “Kazumasa was never again in life alone” 
(Yamashita 3-5). From the start of the novel, then, spirit, Divine Wind, and memory overlay and 
produce each other. Memory is return just as spirit is return, yet it is memory beyond the scope 
of human qualified time or nationalized place.  
To return to the end of the novel, the funeral procession of Chico Paco finally restores his 
body to his birthplace. Importantly, there is nothing nationalistic in laying the people’s leader to 
rest, exemplifying again how Yamashita divorces nature from nation. There are no politicians, 
gurus, or entrepreneurs awaiting his burial. There is no mention of a cemetery or monument to 
mark his existence on earth. Rather, Chico Paco’s mother brings him back to the shores and sand 
dunes of his youth, to the designations of beauty and peace he was equipped to perceive: “As she 
137 
caught the sight of the dunes laced in the undulating shades of orange and purple and the white 
tips of the waves beyond, Chico Paco’s mother thought sadly that her son should never have left 
this place, but she said out loud, ‘This is the way he always wanted it. He wanted to be buried 
here, near the sound of the waves’” (210). Chico Paco’s man-made legacies no longer matter: 
Chicolandia, the amusement park built on the Matacão to honor his sweetheart Gilberto, pales 
against “the undulating shades of orange and purple,” the radio waves of his evangelizing 
eponymous Radio Chico are muted against “the sound of the waves.”  
It is only at the end of the novel that the reader sees that Yamashita had been alerting us 
to the otherly, uknown intelligence of spirit all along. Less than half way through the text, 
Yamashita spatializes the simultaneity of spirit-as-returns as she pitches it through the ultimate 
humanly binary logic of existence: “The Matacão became a stage for life and death” (102). Yet 
life and death, Yamashita reminds us, are not opposites, but rather a continuous, spiralic cycle of 
return—indeed, it is precisely this sense of return that so strongly embodies spirit in the novel. 
The final section of the novel is titled “The Return,” though each individual chapter’s title is a 
cognate of death: “Typhus,” “Rain of Feathers,” “Bacteria,” “The Tropical Tilt.” To wit, the 
most perfect organism imagined by Yamashita is the ecosystem of olden time, still intrinsic 
throughout the forest: “The old forest has returned once again, secreting its digestive juices, 
slowly breaking everything into edible absorbent components, pursuing the lost perfection of an 
organism in which digestion and excretion were once one and the same” (212). And even though 
that “lost perfection” “will never be the same again,” it is the gesture toward the return to that 
state of transformative ambiguity that resonates so deeply in the text, and which ultimately 
underpins the meaning of spatial subjectivity. Yamashita shows what Uexküll proposed in 
biological sciences nearly a century ago, and what Chuh articulates in social theory today: 
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subjectivity is not the exclusive domain of the human; rather, humanity is a participant of the 
space of subjectivity.
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5 CODA: PUBLIC PRAXIS 
 
Is there a way that we might struggle for autonomy in many spheres,  
yet also consider the demands that are imposed upon us by living  
in a world of beings who are, by definition, physically dependent  
on one another, physically vulnerable to one another?  
– Judith Butler, Precarious Life  
(2004) 
 
On October 27, 2018, during a morning Shabbat service at the Tree of Life synagogue in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, eleven people were shot and killed and seven more critically injured by 
a single domestic, white nationalist terrorist. An American male in his late 40s was arrested and 
charged on multiple counts of federal, capital, and state crimes, although he pled not guilty 
because he was protecting his “people” from being “slaughtered” by the immigrant “invaders 
that kill our people” – invaders whom, of course, the synagogue aided.1 The massacre in 
Pittsburgh was tragic, but it also fell into a terrifying normative pattern – the U.S. has seen 
multiple iterations of this brand of white nationalism and domestic terrorism in recent years.2 
Oftentimes, this is where our national memory stops for such terrifying events. But what should 
be equally noted in our memory is the response of mourning and support by other local faith-
based organizations and churches for the Tree of Life congregation. At the inter-faith community 
vigil for the victims, Wasi Mohamed, the Executive Director of the Islamic Center of Pittsburgh 
and Emgage Pennsylvania (a nonprofit organization for Muslim advocacy), gave his condolences 
to the survivors of the attack, foregrounding in his remarks the prophetic traditions of both Islam 
                                               
1 For more on Robert Bowers (the shooter) and his xenophobic and anti-semitic posts on social 
media, see “Pittsburgh Shooting Suspect Described as Man Who Kept to Himself” in The Wall 
Street Journal. 
2 Other religious sites that recently have been subject to terrorism include the Oak Creek, 
Wisconsin Sikh temple shooting in 2012 and the Charleston, South Carolina Emanuel AME 
Church shooting in 2015.  
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and Judaism which share a deep reverence for compassion and insistence to meet hate with love, 
tolerance, and fellowship (Garza). But his message was not just sentiment. Mohamed also 
delivered action: the Muslim community started a funding page on LaunchGood.com and had 
raised over $70,000 for the Jewish community in less than two days to help shoulder their burden 
(ultimately, U.S. Muslims raised nearly $250,00 for the victims’ families), and he went even 
further than fiscal support to offer physical care to their Jewish “brothers and sisters.” Mohamed 
explained: 
And this is sincere. We’re not gonna stop because this [LaunchGood.com campaign] is a 
high number. We just want to know what you need. If it’s more money, let us know. If 
it’s people outside your next service, let us know, we’ll be there. If you need organizers 
on the ground, [we] will provide them . . . If you need food for the families or you need 
somebody to come to the grocery store because you don’t feel safe in this city, we’ll be 
there.  
Offering every form of support they were able, the Muslim community responded to the Tree of 
Life massacre as an act of Islamic faith. Tarek El-Messidi, the founding director of 
CelebrateMercy (a Muslim nonprofit) which partnered with Mohamed’s organizations, remarked 
“We wish to respond to evil with good, as our faith instructs us, and send a powerful message of 
compassion through action” (my emphasis). This encounter of Others receiving Others—perhaps 
more than any other anecdotal reference or literary analysis this project has considered—delivers 
the clearest rendition of the idea of empathetic humanism that I have sought to trace through 
these chapters. This story of solidarity and alliance not only reminds us that empathetic 
humanism is already being evoked in meaningful and deliberate ways all around us, but it also 
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stands testament to the power and necessity of combining abstract principles (such as 
compassion and love) with action – to put, in other words, empathetic humanism in praxis.  
How does a humanities scholar navigate this terrain? My project has explored modes and 
methods of being and belonging that focus on iterations of empathetic humanism that minority 
communities in particular successfully employ. Literature is a useful device for thinking through 
these parameters of non-Western subjectivities because it enables a deep intellectual engagement 
with notions of humanism while providing a critical distance that insulates the reader from the 
lived experience of the story line. But if a purpose of literature, or for that matter, of the 
humanities itself, is to cultivate cultural understanding through intellectual work, then it stands to 
reason that the humanities should also be the primary tool to issue a counter-stance against 
hegemonic systems of exclusion. Literature can imagine and offer a form of counter-narrative, 
but it cannot act, at least not on its own. The question then becomes: How can traditionally 
researched and written literary studies, such as the one I have presented here in this dissertation, 
be put into praxis for the public good? And further, what is the best way to implement and 
disseminate such publicly-oriented research?  
5.1 Public Digital Humanities 
Through my dissertation project and the work I do with local Atlanta communities, I have 
learned how vulnerable communities are often sequestered to the margins through an 
oxymoronic structure of being the object of study in the humanities. But I have also found that 
the study of literature equips me to better engage with disenfranchised groups, as it tunes my 
intellectual and pedagogical approach to what is always intense mental and emotional labor. In 
other words, I employ my literary and critical studies to calibrate how I collaborate and work 
with non-academic partners. While I believe it is imperative for scholars to seriously consider 
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their place in and partnership with the public, the methodological approach must be followed-
through with collaborative execution of work that is, from its outset, made available to and 
usable by the community it engages. Here, the digital intervenes as the most capacious and 
sturdy vehicle for this work.  
By virtue of its delivery platform, digital work always has the capacity to be public work 
– and, in the cases of my projects, community-engaged research almost always yields digital 
deliverables. But it has not always been oriented for the public. As an academic field, digital 
humanities has quickly gone from being a coined term (2004, A Companion to Digital 
Humanities), to a field of study (2006, NEH’s Digital Humanities Initiative), to tenure-track 
requirements and area specialty (present day). As archives became digitized and extended to the 
public domain, tools were developed to access and assess digital material, and born-digital 
objects and events demanded scholarly attention. Digital scholarship swept through the 
humanities with great expectations and even greater skepticism. The greatest challenges we face 
are not only to maintain the hallmarks of traditional humanistic scholarship (interpretation, 
explication, and theorization), but moreover to embrace the challenge of adapting those traditions 
into digital technologies, ontologies, and disseminations. Make no mistake: digital humanities 
has democratized scholarship and we are all better for it. But we must remember that while the 
content, delivery, and analytical methodologies necessarily change to adapt to digital 
innovations, the purpose of scholarship does not: discovery is still the beating heart of 
humanities – digital and analog alike. So why not expand its realm? “Doing” digital humanities 
is not only about access; its scope should not be limited to creating a digitized version of 
traditional scholarship for the traditional academic audiences. As Sheila Brennan argues in 
Digital Humanities Debates 2016, “Doing any type of public digital humanities work requires an 
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intentional decision from the beginning of the project that identifies, invites in, and addresses 
audiences needs in the design, as well as in the approach and content.”3 Digital work has the 
ability to catalyze participatory scholarship, binding scholars and community members. 
Although only a small percent of humanities scholars presently incorporate digital 
technology into their academic work, research on the human condition will surely continue to be 
increasingly yoked to digital methodologies and ways of thinking. And for good reason. Digital 
humanities puts the concept of what is “human” under pressure; it forces a reckoning of how the 
humanities might make humans more humane in that digital humanities has the capacity to frame 
problems and inquiries beyond modes of living to lived outcomes. This is what digital 
humanities must do that analog humanities often does not: in order to engage a meaningful and 
sustainable project, we necessarily have to step outside our silos of research and invite 
collaborators with other skill sets––community advocates, computer scientists, language 
translators, geographers, archivists, software developers, and more––to make our goal stand on 
its own as all are integral to the creative research process. This is in part due to the fact that 
digital humanities itself refuses static methodologies or rigidly-defined metrics of outcome. 
Inherently collaborative, transdisciplinary, and interactive, digital humanities has the potential to 
put resources and actionable information in the hands of people who live the analytics of 
disenfranchisement. 
Public digital humanities, then, can be both democratizing in its scope and participatory 
in its usability when the public community is the cornerstone of the work. But as Judith Butler 
cautions in Precarious Lives, it is important to remember that “when we are speaking about the 
                                               
3 It should be noted, though, that the community should always define itself – it is not the 
scholar’s place to drop in and try to create or invent what the community is or what it needs for 
betterment. For more, see Steven Lubar’s blog post, “Seven Rules for Public Humanists.” 
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‘subject’ we are not always speaking about an individual: we are speaking about a model for 
agency and intelligibility, one that is very often based on notions of sovereign power” (45). A 
distinct balance must be struck, then, so that the community does not collapse into a singularity 
under the weight of research and academic partnership. With this imperative in mind, the 
following sections outline three of the community-based projects I have engaged during my 
doctoral program that have been guided by the theories of empathetic humanism I work through 
in my dissertation. All of the projects I lead through my Innovation Fellowship at GSU use 
digital platforms and technologies as the basis for curating and disseminating our collaborative 
work with our community partners (with the slight exception of the Urban Migration grant 
project, as it keeps all participants completely anonymous). In the following sections, I will 
explain these partnerships and reference some of the digital tools used in these community-
partnered projects to illustrate how digitally imagined and shared projects can benefit all 
participants, researchers, and stakeholders.   
5.2 Cosmopolitanism: Objects of Refuge 
To be a refugee means to be stripped of a home, country, and tangible objects that 
construct a history. Individuals fleeing war and violence take only what they can carry. 
Oftentimes they take nothing but their lives, the clothes on their back, and their story. Refugee 
stories are often formulated to obtain the United Nations’s political designation of “refugee” and 
the requisite protections that offers – a restrictive narrative formula that is further transposed on 
migrants fleeing their homeland without the official state-sanctioned paperwork designating a 
refugee status. Objective facts and accuracy of an individual’s experience are supplanted by the 
compulsory elements of a narrative that will win protection from a bureaucratic institution.  This 
demands a story of persecution and victimization – perpetuating the power differential inherent 
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in the dominant nation’s relationships to the migrant. Thus, the history of refugee migration, 
whether through the transmuted stories told or the absence of artifacts to provide evidence to an 
individual’s experience, is largely told by the powerful.  
As cosmopolitan scholars argue, a strong push back against nationalism is more 
important now than ever as “Migrants across the face of the earth – hundreds of millions of them 
– are often ground zero of nationalist resurgence, and often symbolize the foreign Other that 
threatens the imagined community of the nation, built as it is on the logic of insider/outsider, 
us/them” (Friedman 199). Extreme intensification of global migration requires us to do the work 
of counter-posing fear-based exclusion and nativism. The autobiographies of Obama and 
Higsashide both work toward that counter-narrative goal and even offer fuel for efforts of 
advocacy and redress. To be a migrant subject with all that that involves is to necessarily 
reference and invoke the border and, crucially, the legitimacy of the state (or other institution) to 
establish and police that border. It means the migrant subject is only ever granted conditional 
agency that is relative to the singular event of border crossing. The migrant subject is forever 
marked and indelibly stamped with the moniker other/outsider in a way that essentializes and 
legitimizes a powerful sedentary/nomadic dimension. As it privileges the subject-position of 
migrants and substantiates a recognition of a universal obligation to the Other, cosmopolitanism 
provides a productive sight line for revising migrant subjectivity. Does this cosmopolitical model 
of humanism—belonging to the world, rooting in homeland, grasping agency through being in 
transit—not most accurately embody liberatory transnationalism today? Of all the things, ideas, 
products, histories, and peoples that move across, between, and through real and imagined 
borders that define the nation, are not the subject-positions born from migrant journeys at once 
the most important and most consequential? 
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In spring 2018, I teamed with a GSU faculty member who teaches at Perimeter College, 
the community college branch of the university, in Clarkston, a small city adjacent to Atlanta 
that is one of the largest refugee resettlement communities in the United States. Because of the 
Clarkston campus, GSU has one of the highest refugee student populations in higher education. 
Refugee students at Perimeter College have long been expressing their desires to share their 
histories and stories of emigration. Theirs are not stories of perpetual victimhood; rather, they are 
predominantly stories of struggle, resilience, accomplishment, persistence, and compassion. The 
guiding inquiry for this project became seated in the following question: How can refugee 
students construct a history, an archive, and a story of their own – not the prototypical story of 
persecution necessarily crafted to obtain asylum, but the story of their individual migration 
history? 
Consulting with refugee students, we devised our project plan to interview refugee 
students, map their migration paths, and use 3D photogrammetry and scanning tools to digitize 
and preserve an object they brought with them on their journey. Through this methodology, 
students establish an interactive and shareable archive––a history––of their migration. In summer 
2018 we piloted the project with three refugee students affiliated with Perimeter College: Obie 
Njoku from Nigeria, Kpor Shee from Burma, and Duha Ghazla from Syria. We interviewed each 
student about their homeland and life in the metro Atlanta area, asking them to tell us about their 
migration through the lens of the object they brought with them in transit as a way to counter-
pose the master narrative of victimization. Titling the project “Objects of Refuge,” its framework 
and intention is now conceived as a new kind of archive, a collection to serve as a public 
memory reconstituted by those whose lived experiences are the testimony to the global migration 
crisis. 
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Going forward, the project team will continue to conduct interviews with refugee 
students, build 3D digital objects through photogrammetry and scanning, and create an active, 
accessible website (built on the preservation cornerstone of the Library Special Collections 
archive), all of which will be used to further community outreach, refugee student advocacy, and 
interpersonal scholarly engagement for both students and teachers. We will use the Omeka web 
publishing platform to organize, display, store and share the media-rich archive exhibit and 
OHMS (Oral History Metadata Synchronizer) software to tag and categorize audio and 
transcription files into searchable and accessible segments. The resulting archive seeks to restore 
documented historicity to a group without one, but also serve as a pedagogical tool in humanities 
and social science classrooms to teach primary research methods, archival practices, and digital 
literacy. 
As refugees’ stories are perpetually displaced and distorted, an archive that safeguards 
these narratives in their fullest interactive expression humanizes their migratory experience. 
Refugees bring with them heritage, memory, languages, and contributions to their new 
communities that tend to be subordinated by the immediacy of assimilating into the dominant 
culture of their new countries. Given our current global migratory crisis, the need for preserving 
their cosmopolitan narratives has never been more dire. 
5.3 Suffering: Urban Migration Study 
Urbanization is a genuine planetary challenge. In the coming decade, the United 
Nations projects that several billion more people will be living in the world’s cities compared to 
2019. Many of these newcomers are migrants. But migrants already experience housing 
precarity and face severe problems in accessing housing. How cities and countries address these 
issues will impact community relations, economy, politics, and the environment. In light of this 
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socio-urban context, I joined the chair of GSU’s Geosciences department in Fall 2017 to help 
research and manage her international study on the living conditions and well-being of urban 
migrants in the Atlanta area (alongside our partner research teams in Hong Kong and Pretoria). 
Responding to the UN’s New Urban Agenda, our project is one of the first to add internationally 
comparative data on migrant housing precarity. Our project was developed based on the belief 
that effective intervention needs reliable data on the experiences of migrants and the range of 
stakeholders who are involved. With the goal of increasing local and community capacity to 
sustain the development of positive housing options for migrants through global engagement of 
stakeholders, our project engages local stakeholders in each of the three cities to frame options 
for better policy on migrant housing. 
To build primary and internationally comparative knowledge on migrant housing 
precarity, the research teams in Hong Kong, Pretoria, and Atlanta are interviewing 
approximately 120 newcomers living in each urban center. In the interviews, we specifically ask 
the participants about the conditions of their current residence, how they find housing and what 
obstacles they have gone through to secure livable spaces for themselves and their families, what 
kind of relationships they have with their neighbors, how they create local ties to the community, 
how much of their income is devoted to their housing and how much they send back home to 
family they may have left behind, and how they feel about where they live and the direction of 
their lives (empowered, secure, ambivalent, disappointed, skeptical, scared, angry, etc.). I cannot 
disclose specific details from the interviews with the study’s participants due to strict anonymity 
clauses built into the grant funding agreement and the IRB approval. However, this narrative data 
will be used to calculate an Index of Migrant Housing for neighborhoods in these cities by 
combining migrant experiential data with statistical information which we will leverage to create 
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detailed, interactive digital maps that draw attention to the comparative experiences of migrants 
in Pretoria, Atlanta, and Hong Kong. 
In addition to the data we collect through our interviews, we also argue that migrants 
should be incorporated into accounts of how precarity pervades the economic, social, and 
political dimensions of daily urban life. Precarity, and its regulation, is recognized as an 
important structural relation in cities. As Butler suggests in her 2012 essay, “Precarious Life, 
Vulnerability, and the Ethics of Cohabitation,” “every political effort to manage populations 
involves a tactical distribution of precarity . . . that depends on dominant norms regarding whose 
life is grievable and worth protecting and whose life is ungrievable . . . and thus less worthy of 
protection and sustenance” (148). Analyses of precarity should consider how underlying power 
works intersectionally through social, spatial, and temporal relations of migrant daily life, and 
avoid rendering a totalizing account stressing only sovereign, disciplinary, or bio- powers. 
Recalling Butler’s cautionary argument in Precarious Life about the balance that must be forged 
between the (dominant) group and the (minority) individual when articulating the conditions of 
precarity from Chapter One, it is useful to re-cite her stance in the context of urban migration: 
When we argue for protection against discrimination, we argue as a group or a class. And 
in that language and in that context, we have to present ourselves as bounded beings – 
distinct, recognizable, delineated, subjects before the law, a community defined by shared 
features. Indeed, we must be able to use that language to secure legal protections and 
entitlements. But perhaps we make a mistake if we take the definitions of who we are, 
legally, to be adequate descriptions of what we are about. Although this language may 
well establish our legitimacy within a legal framework ensconced in liberal versions of 
human ontology, it does not do justice to passion and grief and rage, all of which tear us 
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from ourselves, bind us to others, transport us, undo us, implicate us in lives that are not 
our own, irreversibly, if not fatally. (24-5) 
To be clear, empirical evidence suggests that while precarity is recognized as a structural relation 
across cities, it is migrants that disproportionately experience precarity.4 That is, precarity, often 
accompanied by prejudice, appears at certain times and in certain places to be exacted against 
individuals and groups with particular ascribed characteristics of, for example, mobility, 
immobility, and sociolegality. Financial debts from passage, bondage, the need to use pay day 
loans and participate in the parasitic economy, burdens of remitting, and low expectations of any 
rights or protections in the workplace increase migrant precarity and often instigates suffering. 
Thus a large part of our work is to define these common experiences and hardships that migrants 
go through without allowing those metrics to become the identity of migrants themselves. While 
we can argue this distinction easily enough through writing, we have also (and more importantly) 
been careful to demonstrate to the study’s participants that we recognize and honor their agencies 
as individuals. In this, I have leaned on my literary studies to consider the complexity of the idea 
of a person’s worth and how to manifest that idea through action. The value of someone’s time 
and efforts can be acknowledged monetarily, but their dignity cannot. To this point, we pay the 
participants a modest sum for their time and contribution of narrative data. But we also offer a 
hot meal, brought in from a local restaurant owned by migrants that serves food common to the 
participants’ homelands (halaal, posole rojo, masa, etc.), and make sure that the table they eat at 
has a tablecloth, comfortable chairs, and centerpiece flowers.   
Ultimately, migrants’ role in constituting the social fabric of a larger community suggests 
                                               
4 See Luin Goldring and Patricia Landolt’s “Caught in the Work-Citizenship Matrix” and Bridget 
Anderson’s “Migration, Immigration controls and the fashioning of precarious workers.” 
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they exert multiple forms of agency on social processes and challenge any theory of knowledge 
that separates migrants as agents in their own right. Similar to the protagonists of The Pagoda 
and Bitter in the Mouth, migrants are not merely the sum of their suffering. Migrants are not 
simply passive subjects being shunted from pillar to post at the behest of capital or the state. 
Rather, we have learned ways that migrants create minoritarian spaces in Atlanta through small 
initiatives like maintaining circuits of migration (sometimes by enabling family to join them in 
the U.S., but more often by taking trips back home to visit loved ones) or working toward a 
collective dream or goal. Suffering hardships and prioritizing these initiatives, migrants redefine 
and expand the frame of humanity to assert their dignity. And through that dignity, joy often 
surfaces.  
5.4 Spatial Subjectivity: Counter-mapping Post-incarceration 
In early 2018, I met three previously incarcerated citizens at an Atlanta community 
meeting. They were at the meeting to discuss their experience of taking English classes while in 
prison and how the critical thinking skills they developed through their courses transformed how 
they perceived the carceral space they were in and the contingencies of their time. Since this 
initial meeting, we have formed a partnership and expanded our team to consider the 
intersections of spatial thinking, digital mapping, and incarceration. Although this collaboration 
does not strictly evoke the sense of spatial subjectivity I argue for in Chapter Four (there are far 
too many restrictions based on social and criminal hierarchies and juridical power dynamics in 
the U.S. carceral system and physical prison structures for space to function as both a subject and 
a subject-formation process), the theorization of how space and subjectivity inform one another 
has been crucial to his public-facing collaborative project. 
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From the manipulation of space to confine, exclude, and discipline to the geographies of 
inequality fueling the prison industrial complex, mass-incarceration is a deeply spatial practice. 
Community-led projects reveal how critical approaches to mapping can be used to counter 
dominant narratives about mass-incarceration, or what Peluso terms “counter- mapping.” 
Reflecting on an ongoing Atlanta-based collaboration between ATLMaps (a community-focused 
geospatial visualization platform, which I manage), Common Good Atlanta (a college-in-prison 
higher education program), and Inner-city Muslim Action Network (a community organization), 
I teamed with two GSU colleagues and Common Good Atlanta alumni to ask what kinds of 
stories maps can tell about the experiences of (post-) incarceration. From this inquiry and 
through our collaboration, we wrote an article on mapping methodologies geared for returning 
citizens and successful reentry. In our article, we highlight three specific “story-projects” to 
showcase the potential of collaborative mapping to: 1) expose transcarceral practices; 2) educate 
others about the situated experiences of incarceration and reentry; and 3) engage seemingly 
disparate communities that shape and are connected through transcarceral experience. 
Our piece is a reflection on an ongoing collaboration that has produced numerous 
community-based mapping projects about post-incarceration: Common Good Atlanta (CGA) 
alumni have developed a Community-sourced Reentry Resource guide and shared it as a data 
layer on ATLMaps; content curators have published corresponding resource-, demographic-, and 
narrative-focused data layers of the carceral system; and ATLMaps members have designed a 
“Storytelling through Mapping” workshop series that is being presented to CGA students at 
various state incarceration facilities. Our work encompasses statistics of failure, such as how 
certain neighborhoods are disproportionately targeted for incarceration or are cut off from 
reentry services, but also stories of reclamation. 
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A unique spatial awareness is curated in our “Storytelling through Mapping” workshop 
with CGA students at state incarceration facilities. Just as Yamashita depicts series of 
intermingling connected networks of relationality in Through the Arc of the Rain Forest, CGA 
students’ revelations about the relationship between prison architecture and emotion as well as 
their debates about the constructed geopolitical boundaries of Atlanta as a city provide rich 
alternative worldviews. For example, the topic of gentrification is often brought up s by CGA 
students in our workshop as we discuss how maps tell stories. The men in the classroom 
immediately relate how the prohibition of particular acts and behaviors are spatially 
conditioned and shift depending on who occupies, owns, and governs said spaces: prosecutions 
vary depending on county, city, and state boundaries; private property lines demarcate where 
bodily presence (versus behavioral act) is considered a trespassing crime. With keen insight and 
perspective, the workshop participants demonstrate how the practice of counter-mapping 
situates returning citizens as essential partners in the vitality of the city, neighborhood, and 
community of which they are members. Similarly, in his piece on education in and beyond 
prisons, current inmate and CGA student David Evans argues that education has the potential to 
re-spatialize prison spaces from “negative place[s]” to what he feels is a more “positive” 
environment (7). Evans explains: “I’m often struck by the juxtaposition when I leave class and 
a guard yells at me and calls me ‘inmate’ with disdain in their voice. In class, I’m a human 
being; outside of class, I’m Frankenstein” (8). Evans further speaks of classrooms as creating 
“humanizing” bubbles within a dehumanizing institution, highlighting the transformative 
capacities of education in prisons when presented as a basic human right rather than 
rehabilitation. 
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Teaming with CGA and the Atlanta branch of the Inner-city Muslim Action Network has 
shown that collaborative critical mapping not only is about exposing problems associated with 
mass-incarceration; but also, the critical engagement with and production of maps enables 
incarcerated students and returning citizens to locate knowledge and power in themselves and 
perceive their personal stake and social responsibility to care about and for the communities to 
which they return. And in this way, spatial subjectivity is reformulated for incarcerated and 
returning citizens. Mapping can be a celebratory pursuit, as it foregrounds participatory alliances 
and imagines possibilities for future community growth. 
Working in concert with these educators, advocates, and returning citizens has taught us 
that maps can be useful tools for exposing unequal power relations and systemic injustice at 
multiple scales, provided that they do not reproduce the very systems of oppression they are 
intended to disrupt. We argue that, in addition to exposing the injustices and disparities produced 
through mass-incarceration, community-based counter-mapping can be employed to push against 
the boundaries of carceral power, creating new spaces and opportunities for public engagement 
and education beyond reformative models. Ultimately, our work seeks to illuminate how the 
power to think geospatially is a democratizing force, in which local community residents and 
returning citizens are not only mutually inclusive, but also are co-beneficiaries. 
5.5 A Closing Remark 
I partner with communities that have been systematically dehumanized by legal 
processes, political rhetoric, and social discourses. Working with these communities, I have 
come to understand how the theoretical work on empathetic humanism my dissertation engages 
through literary analyses can actually work in “real life,” fueled by academic studies. The 
community projects I have been a part of have ultimately taught me what it means to be a 
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humanist. At heart, humanists have an obligation to people and communities, not the machinery 
of institutions. Humanists are charged with being both guardian and dissenter, advocate and 
critic, for and of society. Humanists are trained to locate and analyze social values. But values, 
and therefore the humanist position, can easily become codified and bureaucratized. In a recent 
special issue of the Publication of the Modern Language Association, Cathy Davidson confesses, 
“Our wealthiest institutions are not always the ones leading creative innovation. More to the 
point, at some institutions of higher education, the definition of innovation does not include 
equality and actually exacerbates inequality” (708). My responsive goal is to foster 
collaborations that spring-load its team members for active, responsible citizenship. I work to 
cultivate in my teams a sustained commitment to mindfulness and careful scrutiny that privileges 
a pedagogy of compassionate discernment: how to recognize glamour parading as beauty, 
biography lording over identity, or novelty usurping nuance. After all, as Davidson concludes, 
“If higher education does not serve the public good, higher education does not deserve public 
benefit” (708). The work of humanists may be severely underappreciated, yet the need for 
humanistic work feels particularly dire in these opening months of 2019. Perhaps we would all 
do well to be guided by the understanding that the pedagogical and programmatic research of 
how to train and sustain humanists—both academic and not––in the 21st Century may well be the 
most crucial contribution of American universities from here forward.  
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